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I. INTRODUCTION
Every so often in the history of jurisprudence, a new idea, perspective, or
conceptual structure appears on the academic scene purporting to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the way the legal profession has come to understand law and
adjudication. Sometimes the emergence of a new jurisprudential perspective or theory
gives rise to a new intellectual and political movement resulting in paradigmatic shifts
and real revolution in legal theory and practice. More often than not, it is quickly
absorbed by the prevailing legal paradigm, resulting in modification, perhaps
revision, but not in revolution. Invariably, resolution will depend upon the degree of
discontent, ferment, and commitment spurred by both critics and advocates of the
prevailing paradigm.'
One of the more interesting developments in American legal thought of the
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1. The development of jurisprudential theories is not likely to be different from the development of scientific
theories. See generally T. KUHN. THE STRucruRE Or Scuiwnnc REvotumoNs (2d ed. 1970) (describing revolutionary
paradigm shifts in scientific thought).
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1980s has been the almost simultaneous emergence and maturation of three
influential jurisprudential movements-law and economics (L/E), critical legal
studies (CLS), and feminist legal thought.2 Each movement has introduced a new
form of legal scholarship which departs radically from the perspectives and methods
of mainstream legal thought. 3 Law and economics scholars argue for judge-made law
structured by quasi-scientific economic methods to reach the proper legal outcome.
Critical legal studies employs insights and methods from eclectic sources such as
critical theory, literary criticism, structuralism, feminism, and Marxism in advocat-
ing that the law should be "transformed" to create real democratic decisionmaking. 4
Modern feminist legal theory seeks, in turn, to establish a distinct "feminist method"
of "engendered" or "unmodified" jurisprudence 5 by developing insights and
2. Until recently, legal scholars have not regarded law and economics, critical legal studies. or feminist theory as
jurisprudential movements or theories. Today, however, these new movements in legal theory are regarded as offering
distinctively unique and radically different conceptions of law and adjudication. See. e.g., Fiss, The Death of the Law?
72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986): Kornhauser. The Great inage of Authori.,, 36 STAN. L. REv. 349 (1984); Minow. Law
Turning Ounvard, 73 TELos 79 (1986); Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 761 (1987); Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory. 101 HARV. L. REV. 826 (1988); West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Cti. L. REv. 1 (1988); White. Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161
(1986). One purpose of this essay is to identify and analyze the concept of law and adjudication-the "theory of
jurisprudence"-projected within the dominant scholarship of law and economics, CLS. and feminist legal thought.
There have been other academic legal movements of the 1980s such as law and society, law and literature, and law
and interpretation, which have made significant contributions to legal scholarship. I have chosen to focus on law and
economics, CLS, and feminist legal theory because these movements have generated forms of critique that share common
differences and similarities which render them unique when compared to other movements and schools of legal theory.
For example, the law and society movement is much more eclectic than law and economics and considerably less political
than either CLS or feminist legal theory. See infra note 202. Law and interpretation is less a school of thought than a
scholarly view about the relation between legal interpretation and literary theory. See. e.g.. Interpretation Symposium, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. I (1985). Law and interpretation has come to describe various eclectic approaches that mainstream
scholars and others have used for developing constructive approaches to law. See Kennedy, Turn Toward Interpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 251 (1985). Literary debates concerning law and literature are also the subject matter of modern
mainstream scholars who associate with the law and interpretation school of thought. See. e.g., Fish. Fish v. Fiss. 36
STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984). See also Symposium on Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1985).
3. There is probably no single theory of jurisprudence which could be characterized as tie mainstream view.
There is, however, an existing body of eclectic post-Realist theory and scholarship-legal process theory, rights theory,
and law and interpretation-which has come to define the mainstream jurisprudential positions of modern legal scholars.
See. e.g., B. ACKERMAN. RECONSTRUCrING AMERICAN LAW (1983); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); J. ELY,
DEMtOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUsTtCE (1971): Fiss,
Objectivit' in Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). For a discussion and examination of the mainstream view of
legal thought see Hutchinson & Monahan, Law. Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199, 202-13 (1984); Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in
THE POLmCS OF LAW 29-37 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Singer, Legal Realism Now. 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465. 505-13 (1988).
See also infra Part IV.
4. For a description and analysis of some of the dominant methodologies of CLS see Kennedy, Critical Theory.
Struturalism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship. 21 NEW ENG. L. REv. 209 (1985-86).
5. While sharp differences exist within the feminist community over the meaning and scope of "feminist
jurisprudence," a number of feminist legal scholars have sought to define feminist legal theory in terms of an
"'engendered" or "unmodified" form ofjurisprudence. It has been suggested that '[lustice is engendered when judges
admit the limitations of their own viewpoints, when judges reach beyond those limits by trying to see from contrasting
perspectives, and when people seek to exercise power to nurture differences, not to assign and control them." Minow,
Foreword: Justice Engendered. 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 95 (1987). See also Vest, supra note 2. at 72 ("Masculine
Jurisprudence must become humanist jurisprudence, and humanistic jurisprudence must become a jurisprudence
unmodified."). See generally C. MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
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theoretical criticism from perspectives shaped by the lived-experiences of women
whose interest feminist theory seeks to affirm. 6
Without doubt, the basic goals of the individual movements, and the perspec-
tives of those espousing them, are the source of deep disagreement about the nature
of law and politics. Despite the distinctions, the three movements can be understood
to establish quite similar modes of legal criticism, both in their method of attack on
mainstream legal values and in their method of advocacy of their particular
perspectives. This essay will characterize the three new jurisprudential movements by
identifying both their differences and similarities. By first focusing on their
distinctive modes of thought, language, and patterns of reasoning, I will show how
the three movements appear to be fundamentally different. I will then identify
characteristics of each movement which unite the movements in fundamental ways.
My objective is to offer a characterization that takes into account both differences and
similarities and that provides a rationale for understanding the concurrent develop-
ment of the methodologies. My thesis is that the differences and similarities between
these new legal movements can be understood in terms of how they have defined
themselves in relation to the criticism they raise about mainstream views of
jurisprudence. All three movements reject the traditionalists' claim that there is a
proper and correct "legal" analytic for understanding law and adjudication.
For some scholars and practitioners, law and economics, critical legal studies,
and feminism are naive, wrongheaded, threatening, and even dangerous movements.
Legal scholars have criticized these movements for being either too "theoretical" or
too "simplistic" in their claims or methods. 7 A distinguished liberal scholar, Owen
M. Fiss, has argued that law and economics and CLS are dangerous "jurisprudence
movements" because they may "mean the death of the law, as we have known it
throughout history, and as we have come to admire it."8 Still others have simply
denied the claims of the new theories without bothering to consider whether such
claims have creditability or substance.9 In this essay I will develop a somewhat
different account of the movements, one more hopeful and optimistic, focusing on
their contributions to a more complex and rich understanding of what "law" and
"adjudication" will mean in the 1990s-an understanding which is making it
increasingly difficult to accept the existing liberal jurisprudence of mainstream legal
scholars.
6. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism. Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635,
643 (1983).
7. At least one law school dean has suggested that so-called "nihilistic" members of one of these movements,
CLS, should be banned from the legal academy because their message is too "radical" or "subversive" for legal
education. See Carrington. Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDuC. 222 (1984). For responses to Dean Carrington's plea,
see Martin, "Of Law and the River. " and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom. 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. I (1985).
8. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 16. Fiss believes that the new "jurisprudential movements of the seventies" are
threatening because they are "united in their rejection of the law as public ideal." Id. Fiss's views are more fully
developed in Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978-Foreword: The Forms of Justice. 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter
Foreword]. See also Fiss. supra note 3. Fora critical review of Fiss' view see Brest. Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN.
L. REv. 765 (1982); Fish, supra note 2. For Fiss' reply to Fish see Fiss. Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1985)
[hereinafter Conventionalism].
9. Sunstein. supra note 2. at 826 ("[T]he basic claims of feminist theory are in many circles denied creditability
and respect, or even a fair hearing.").
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES THESE ACADEMIC MOVEMENTS EXHIBIT
Most legal scholars today have come to understand law and economics, critical
legal studies, and feminism as radically different approaches or "theories of law"
occupying the borders of traditional legal studies. Law and economics is commonly
associated with the right-wing economic philosophy of the "Chicago School"
whereas CLS is usually type-cast as the "New Left" intellectual offspring of the
radical counterculture of the 1960s.10 Feminist legal theory is more often than not
ignored, but sometimes ridiculed as being anti-male, anti-law, and anti-theory.I
Opponents use these impressionistic views to dismiss the intellectual substance
of each movement and to classify these jurisprudential approaches as marginal or
fringe "schools" working outside the profession's established academic tradition.' 2
Because the law and economics movement is often associated with the work of
conservative economists at the University of Chicago, law and economics is
frequently dismissed as extremist even though other law and economics "schools"
exhibit different perspectives. 13 Standard treatment and descriptions of CLS and
10. Law and economics is thus characterized as a reactionary movement of the right; CLS is frequently identified
as a radical movement of the left. These impressions are, of course, not without some basis in fact. See. e.g., Binder,
On Critical Legal Studies As Guerilla Warfare. 76 GEO. L. REv. 1 (1987) (discussing how CLS theorists practice a type
of academic "guerilla warfare"); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HoEsTRA L. REv. 487 (1980) (discussing why efficiency and the goal of wealth maximization should be
the prevailing norm in common law adjudication) [hereinafter Ethicall.
I1. "Feminism is a dirty word.... Feminists are portrayed as bra-burners, man-haters, sexists, and castrators. Our
sexual preferences are presumed. We are characterized as bitchy, demanding, aggressive, confrontational, and
uncooperative, as well as overly demanding and humorless." Bender, A Lastwer's Printer on Fetninist TheorY and Tort,
38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3 (1988).
12. Stereotyping, caricature, and over-simplification are typically the product of preconceived and misinformed
opinions about the nature of difference. It is "'one form of the failure to imagine the perspective of another." Minow.
supra note 5, at 51 n.201. Minow reports that "[slocial psychologists who study stereotyping and stigmatizing attitudes
point to the needs that these techniques of denigration serve for both individuals and social groups who have the power
to label others." Id. (citing K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 4-15, 69-81, 114. 196-99 (1966)); S. GILMAN, DIFFEENCE
AND PATmoLoGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, AND MADNESS 12, 18-23 (1985); IN TIlE EYE OF IlE BEtloLDER:
CONTrEMPORARY ISSUES IN STEREOTYPING (A. Milner ed. 1982). Minow argues that "[olthers have rejected as irrelevant or
relatively unimportant the experience of 'different' people and have denied their own partiality, often by using stereotypes
as though they were real." Minow, supra note 5, at 51.
13. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Liberal law and economic scholars at New Haven have utilized
the insights of the right-wing scholarship of the "Chicago School" to advance mildly reformist policy solutions that
acknowledge the necessity of state intervention and planning to correct market failures. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI. TIE COST
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Calabresi & Melamed. Property Rules. Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
Other LIE scholars have sought to break loose from the influence of the Chicago School of Economics by developing
a new reformist branch of law and economics. See. e.g., Cooter& Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067 (1986) (developing a normative theory based on Rawls' A TIIEORY OF JUSTICE to argue in favor
of the comparative negligence standard); Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-and the New Administrative
State, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988) (developing a new progressive L/E approach to argue for a more constructive approach
to administrative law).
At least one commentator has argued that the creative insights of law and economics may support a left-wing
understanding of law and its relation to economics. See Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's THE PROBLEM OF
SOCIAL COST: A View From tie Left, 1986 WIs. L. REv. 919 (argues that the Coasian insights of the "Chicago School"
ultimately raise left-wing implications for law and the legal system).
Despite the diversity of perspectives and approaches within the law and economics movement, most observers tend
to identify LIE with the work of conservative lawyer-economists at the University of Chicago. Practitioners of the
"Chicago School" tend to view law and the legal system as a mere supplement to the market: a necessary but minor
vehicle for perfecting market-like solutions. See Ackerman. SYmpositm on Lawr and Economics - Foreword: Talking and
Trading, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 899 (1985).
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feminism are similarly dismissive. Conventional argument, relying upon male
experiences as an implicit reference point, has either ignored the claims of feminist
legal theory or rejected them without a fair hearing.' 4 While CLS scholarship is
sometimes acknowledged in the work of mainstream scholars, it is quickly dismissed
as "crude Marxism" or "empty nihilism."1 5
Certainly more than misinformed stereotypes and offhand generalizations are
needed to assess the ideas of these new legal movements. Stereotyped thinking and
mischaracterization frequently involve "over-simplification, inattention to individual
characteristics, lack of seriousness, invariance."' 6 They also hide ignorance,
prejudice, and unwillingness to accept honest differences. We must take seriously the
theories and arguments of competing perspectives so that we can honestly evaluate
the validity and persuasiveness of their claims. Once the air is cleared of stereotyped
thinking and of the rhetoric of condemnation, there may be an opportunity to offer
sincere characterizations. It may then be useful to try to distinguish the new
jurisprudential movements by describing particular "forms of thought and life" or
"perspectives" projected by each movement about law, adjudication, and human
behavior. What follows will be an attempt to sketch the distinctive academic or
intellectual discourses of each movement.' 7
14. See Minow. supra note 5, at 39-45 (discussing how the Supreme Court's sex discrimination cases have been
decided under an unstated and implicit male norm). See also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 826 (commenting on the dismissive
attitude mainstream legal scholars have exhibited toward feminist legal theory).
The notoriety surrounding the recent tenure offer extended by the University of Michigan Law School to feminist
scholar Catharine MacKinnon is indicative of the marginalization of feminism in legal education. The New York Times
reported that MacKinnon's offer of tenure was a historical event-"a kind of turning point for legal academia." Job Offer
to Femnist Scholar May Mark Turn, N.Y. Times. Feb. 24, 1989, at B5. According to the Times story, feminist legal
scholars "often find themselves bouncing from one visiting professorship to another, with their research and writing
dismissed as marginal to mainstream legal studies." Id. MacKinnon remarked that her tenure offer from Michigan was
"a victory for women" because it represented the "expression of the seriousness with which they take the kind of work
I do, and their willingness to recognize other models of scholarship than the traditional ones." Id. However, not all law
schools have been so accepting of MacKinnon and her brand of feminism. During her visit at Yale Law School, there were
considerable doubts raised about Ms. MacKinnon's scholarship. Professor Geoffrey Hazard. for example, is reported to
have stated in a memorandum circulated to the Yale faculty that it was "not clear that [MacKinnon] has genuine
comprehension of law." Id.
15. See. e.g.. Carrington. supra note 7. at 227; Fiss, supra note 2. But see Frug, ArgumentAs Character, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 869 (1988) [hereinafter Argument]: Minda, Of Law. the Rirer and Legal Education, 10 NOVA L.J. 705 (1986);
Singer. The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). While it is true that a number of
CLS scholars have traced their intellectual heritage to ideas associated with Marx and modern continental philosophers,
it is wrong to conclude that CLS can be equated with vulgar marxism or sixties anarchism. Of course, the fact that CLS
is openly a "leftist" academic movement is partly responsible for generating a new "politics of mischaracterization." As
Robert Gordon has suggested. "[flor one thing, for all that use it makes of conventional academic argument, CLS is a
radical movement and of the left, and that's enough in itself to make some fellow lawyers see Red." Gordon, Law and
Ideology. 3 TtKKEN 14. 84 n.l (Jan./Feb. 1988). For a history of anti-left repression in legal academia, see Frug,
McCarthvist and Critical Legal Studies (Book Review). 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 665 (1987) [hereinafter
McCarthy ismn.
16. See Scales. The Emergence of FeministiJurisprudence: An Essay. 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1394 (1986) (discussing
the use of stereotyping by feminist legal scholars in coping with problems of inequality of the sexes). See also Bender,
supra note 1I. at 5 n.5 ("As soon as labels are imposed, stereotypes and preconceived images are generated, and ideas
become fixed instead of remaining fluid and growing."). See also Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38
J. LEGAL EOcc. 47. 52-53 (1988) ("The dominant culture has established certain criteria for theories, for legal arguments,
for scientific proofs-for authoritative discourse. These established criteria are the governing rules. " (footnote omitted)).
17. Any attempt to describe the perspective of others is bound to be influenced by the observer's vantage point.
My particular perspective has undoubtedly been influenced by my personal commitment to the political, professional, and
personal network associated with the critical legal studies movement. This essay reflects the belief, however, that it is
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A. Law and Economics
Law and economics (L/E) appeared on the academic scene in the early 1970s
when a number of law and economics scholars developed a "new" methodology and
jurisprudential theory for undertaking economic analysis of law. What was "new"
about the law and economics of the early 1970s was that it purported to offer a new
theoretical framework for systematically describing and reformulating adjudication
and legal decisionmaking. A central claim of the new law and economics 18 was that
common law adjudication could be analyzed and reformed through the application of
a relatively small number of fundamental economic concepts. 19
Tension and struggle have occurred between orthodox and reformist stands of
law and economics scholarship. The orthodox position of L/E developed from a
common methodology based upon the Chicago School perspective of economics. 20 It
possible to identify and understand other perspectives embedded within organized bodies of thought and knowledge even
though it may be difficult to transcend one's own perspective. The concept of perspective has been utilized by others to
understand the "culture" of academic movements; see, e.g., White, supra note 2; to appreciate the "difference" between
points of view, see, e.g., Minow, supra note 5; to critique claims of objectivity in interpretation, see, e.g., Fish, Still
Wrong After all These Years, 6 LAW & PHIL. 401 (1987) (Book Review of Dworkin's LAW's EMPnRE); and to understand
unstated assumptions in child custody law, see, e.g., G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THiNGs 80-81 (1987). The
point of such work is to show how perspectives reinforce assumptions, attitudes, and modes of reasoning, and to show
how perspectives shift and change. While I reject the idea of a "neutral perspective," I believe that it is possible to
honestly evaluate differences in the perspectives of others and to try to control the ways in which our own perspectives
distort as well as direct our perceptions of the world.
18. Introductory discussions about law and economics typically begin by distinguishing the "old" law and
economics from the "new" law and economics. The old law and economics is associated with the economic analysis of
antitrust law and the law of taxation and corporations: subjects where substantive issues often turn on economic questions
involving the regulation and operation of explicit markets. While the use of economic analysis in legal subjects such as
antitrust remains rich and dominant, commentators are quick to note that much of what now goes under the name of law
and economics developed within the last two decades. See, e.g., R. POSNE, THE ECONO.,tC ANALYStS OF LAW 19 (3d ed.
1986). The new law and economics involves the application of economic analysis to common law subjects such as tort,
contract, and property, where the relevance of economics is less apparent. See Posner, The Economic Approach to Law,
53 TEx. L. REV. 757 (1975). The difference between new and old versions of law and economics appears to be breaking
down as practitioners of the old have incorporated the new learning of economics into their work. See, e.g., P. AtEEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYStS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEtR APPLICATION (Vols. 1-8) (1986). See also
B. ACKERNIAN, supra note 3, at 60 n.15. The birth of the new law and economics movement is said to have occurred
sometime in the early 1960s, when Ronald Coase published his seminal article on English nuisance law, see Coase. The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960), and Guido Calabresi published his first piece on torts, see Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Lav of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). However, law and economics as an
academic movement did not "coalesce" until Calabresi published his widely acclaimed book on accidents law in 1970,
see G. CALABRESI, supra note 13. Richard Posner published his textbook for law students in 1972, see R. POSNER, supra,
the same year in which a scholarly journal, Journal of Legal Studies, was dedicated to "the application of scientific
methods to the study of the legal system."
19. The most influential work advancing the idea that economic analysis can be instrumentally applied to law
"across the board" is Posner's THE ECONOMtC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner and the ECONOtMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
39 OHto ST. L.J. 439, 462 (1978) [hereinafter Lanyer-Economist]. The Chicago School in law and economics is usually
associated with the law-and-efficiency hypothesis, or principle of wealth maximization. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note
18; R. POSNER, THE ECONOMtCS OF JUSTICE (1981). See also Minda, The Lav and Economics And Critical Legal Studies
Movements in American Law, in LAW AND EcoNosncs 87 (N. Mercuro ed. 1989) [hereinafter Movements]; Minda, Toward
A More 'Just' Economics of Justice (Review Essay in forthcoming issue of CARCoZO L. REV.). By far the most significant
work in the field of law and economics has been done by lawyer-economists associated with the "Chicago School."
The influence of the first generation of Chicago School L/E scholars "peaked" as a new generation developed
alternative approaches to the economic analysis of law. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, Law And Economics: Paradigm,
Politics, or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 233 (N. Mereuro ed. 1989). The second generation of L/E scholarship
is quite diverse. For a recent examination of the developments, tensions, and new prospects of L/E scholarship see LAW
AND ECONOICS (N. Mercuro ed. 1989). One strand of second generation LIE scholarship has attempted to construct a
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was these "hardliners" of the Chicago School (the founding fathers) who throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s advocated strong claims based on the law-and-efficiency
hypothesis. This hypothesis, normally associated with the views of Judge Richard A.
Posner, asserts that the common law is, or at least should be, a primary vehicle for
promoting efficiency-what Posner has called the principle of wealth maximiza-
tion.21 This approach was premised upon the argument that the structure of the
common law serves to maximize the value of legal entitlements as measured in dollar
equivalents. 22
By the mid-1980s, the influence of the Chicago School peaked. 23 A new
generation of L/E scholars has emerged who have distanced themselves from the
orthodoxy of the Chicago School and begun developing alternative methodologies for
more sophisticated understanding of the Chicago School approach by developing non-market theories to explain
bureaucratic and institutional behavior. See, e.g., Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923 (1984) (developing an interest group analysis of the corporate board to explain bureaucratic corporate behavior). See
also 0. WILIA.MSON, Eco.omIC lNINSTTUTONs F CAPITALISM (1986) (positing an economic argument of institutional
behavior based on new assumptions of human nature-that people possess bounded rationality and act opportunistically).
IE scholars associated with the Virginia School have in turn adopted the Chicago School's conservative perspective by
advancing theories of relational contract and strategic behavior to explain long-term bargaining relations. See infra note
31. Another group of second generation LIE scholars embraces the Chicago School perspective in developing a new theory
of public choice based on game theory of bargaining or interest group theory for analyzing the behavior of legislators and
the institution of legislation. See, e.g.. Rowley, Public Choice, Law and Economics, in LAW AND EcoN oMrcS 123 (N.
Mercuro ed. 1989) [hereinafter Public Choice]. See also Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 236. Moreover, there is now a new
group of second generation LIE scholars who reject the law and efficiency hypothesis associated with the Chicago School
and advance a different normative framework for economic analysis of law. These IE scholars have developed a new
form of liberal law and economics which offers economic analysis to realize the liberal conception of law as public
morality. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra. at 241-44. See also infra note 30. Although the second generation of L/E
scholarship has developed in part on the basis of methodological disagreements with the founding members of the first
generation, the tension between first and second generation LIE scholarship has been marked mainly by tonal differences
in style and anxieties about the distinctively conservative agenda of the Chicago School. See. e.g., Rose-Ackerman,
supra, at 236 (arguing that the reformist school of LIE bridges the gap between the extremism of the Chicago School and
open-ended policy analysis).
21. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEOAL STUD. 103 (1979); Posner, Ethical, supra
note 10.
22. The wealth maximization principle generally provides that common law adjudication can best be explained in
terms of the law-and-efficiency hypothesis--that common law adjudication is merely an instrument for enhancing
efficiency of the common law; if a "value" is to be achieved it is the sole value of "wealth maximization." The principle
of wealth maximization is premised upon two distinct yet seemingly related claims-positive and normative. The positive
claim asserts that wealth maximization is a primary legal norm which helps describe the nature and operation of common
law adjudication. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 18, at 20-22. The normative claim asserts that maximization of wealth
should be the prevailing legal norm for the common law. See, e.g., Posner, Ethical, supra note 10.
The distinction between descriptive and normative claims tends to break down in practice as the description of
efficient states become the evaluative criteria for favoring the "justice" of outcomes which maximize wealth. As Judge
Posner once put it: "Since efficiency is a widely regarded value in our world of limited resources, a persuasive showing
that one course of action is more efficient than the alternatives may be an important factor in shaping public choice." R.
POSN.ER, TItM Eco.omic ANALYSIS OF LAw 6 (2d ed. 1977).
23. Even Judge Posner has softened his original hard line. He now argues that efficiency and wealth maximization
is just one of several social values to be promoted by law. See Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decisionmaking,
4 I,'Nr'L. REv. L. & EcoN. 131 (1984); Posner. The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply To Malloy, 36 KANSAS L. REV.
261, 263 (1988). Judge Posner has also softened his positivistic perspective of jurisprudence. In his earlier scholarship,
Judge Posner argued a strong positivistic line, defending his view that wealth maximization should be the primary criterion
for judging. See e.g., R. POSNER, THE Eco*o.%ncs OF JJSTICE 115 (1981). Judge Posner has now embraced an infinitely
more skeptical perspective of judging. See Posner. The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 862 (1988)
(arguing that judges should abandon the goals of certainty and formal accuracy and instead embrace a more practical form
of jurisprdence which would require judges to reach the most "reasonable" results under the circumstances, and citing
the work of Kent Greenwalt of Columbia University as an example. See Greenwalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: Tire
Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges. 75 CoLums. L. REV. 359 (1975)).
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approaching economic analysis of law. 24 Although most L/E scholars now agree that
efficiency analysis of economics is a fruitful way for understanding behavior under
law, many current practitioners reject the notion that efficiency should be regarded as
the only legal norm in common law adjudication. 25
Moreover, there is now a new breed of L/E scholar who argues in favor of a
"genuinely reformist law and economics" to "address the problems of the modern
welfare, regulatory state.''26 These L/E scholars no longer believe that legal rules
should be affirmed or rejected solely on the basis of efficiency. Instead, a growing
number of second generation L/E scholars have shifted their attention away from the
common law to an examination of public law and the normative justifications for the
activist state.27 This second wave of LIE scholarship has helped to finally establish a
liberal school of law and economics, sometimes known as the New Haven or
Reformist School. 28
24. Second generation L/E scholars have attempted to distance themselves from the Chicago School to deflect the
dismissive attitudes of those legal scholars who have associated law and economics with the extremism of the Chicago
School. See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis ofLaw: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974). Second
generation LIE scholars argue that such critics mischaracterize the movement. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20.
at 237, 251; Ulen, Law and Economics: Settled Issues And Open Questions, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 210 (N. Mercuro ed.
1989).
Distancing was also necessary for those LIE scholars who reject the conservative research agenda of the Chicago
School. In drawing from the methodology of the Chicago School without adopting its hard line position on the
law.and-efficiency hypothesis, the second generation of LIE scholars have attempted to develop more acceptable forms
of law and economics. See, e.g., Ulen, supra, at 210 (arguing that there are many practitioners of law and economics who
are now agnostic about the claims of the law-and-efficiency hypothesis of the Chicago School); Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 20, at 241-44 (arguing that a new reformist school of law and economics has developed which explicitly rejects the
Chicago School perspective).
However, while the second generation of LIE scholars have sought to distance themselves from the conservative
influence of their founding fathers, their underlying vocabulary and methodology remains heavily embedded within the
vocabulary and theoretical perspective of the Chicago School. The right-wing tilt which observers attribute to the
movement is probably the result of the continuing influence of the Chicago School's claims. By far, one of the most
popular slogans of the movement continues to be that "law is efficient."
25. See, e.g., Wlen, supra note 24, at 210 (arguing that there are many practitioners of LIE who are agnostic on
both the normative and positive claims of the law-and-efficiency hypothesis). See generally R. CoorR & T. ULE.,
EcoNotics oF LAW (1988). The skeptical position of these scholars can be traced to the LIE scholarship associated with
Guido Calabresi. See, e.g,, Calabresi, supra note 18.
26. Ulen, supra note 24, at 253. See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 358 (developing a progressive LIE
approach to administrative law which purports to follow a "middle ground between the Chicagoan's faith in free markets
and the present regulatory system under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.").
27. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 241-46 (arguing that a reformist law and economics has
developed to rival the free-market advocates of the Chicago School). See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13 (arguing
a similar position in defending a new constructive approach to administrative law); Fiss, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that
the practitioners of the New Haven School "contemplate a larger role for the state and for adjudication" by
acknowledging the significance of market failure and by refocusing their attention to the "great public law cases of our
day."). See generally B. ACKEIPAN, supra note 3 (for the argument in favor of a new reformist vision of law and
economics).
28. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2, at 7; Rose-Ackerman. supra note 13; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20. at 241-46.
There is some disagreement about what to call this new school of law and economics. Rose-Ackerman, for example, has
taken issue with me for having used the label "New Haven School" to describe the liberal branch of LIE scholarship (see
Minda, Movements, supra note 20, at Ill n.3) because she believes that this school is "not pervasive enough at Yale Law
School to warrant using [her] hometown as a label." Id. at 253 n. 1. However, at least one member of Yale Law School,
Owen M. Fiss, has used the New Haven label to describe what Rose-Ackerman identifies as the "Reformist" school;
suggesting that at least some members of the Yale faculty perceive the existence of this new school of economics at New
Haven. Moreover, much of the methodology of New Haven liberal practitioners can be traced to the work of Guido
Calabresi, the Dean of Yale Law School. See, e.g., G. CALABRSI, supra note 13; Calabresi & Melamed. supra note 13.
Finally, the term "reformist" may itself be confusing since it could just as easily be claimed by the Chicago School
practitioner who is seeking to "reform" the law in light of a vastly different "'reform" program.
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The current generation of L/E scholarship tends to be more modest in its own
claims about the role of economics in law and less accepting of the conservative
orientation of property rights analysis of the Chicago School founders.2 9 Only a small
number of methodological issues appear to be settled; including claims that
microeconomic theory is a basis for analyzing law, that demand curves are downward
sloping, and that cost-benefit analysis and the economic definition of cost (opportu-
nity cost) are essential for intelligent policymaking. Second generation L/E scholars
have retreated from the orthodoxy of "efficient" answers for nearly every legal
question; instead, the second generation thinkers admit that "[m]ost law and
economics questions are still open and likely to remain so for a long time.''30
Second generation law and economics scholarship is also more eclectic
theoretically and much more sophisticated than the work of the L/E founding
fathers. 3' The new generation of L/E scholars has developed microeconomic theories
which promise a more realistic, yet inchoate, understanding of the bureaucratic,
institutional, and relational contexts of modern transactions, legal relations, and
adjudication. New theories of relational contract and strategic behavior have thus
been offered to modify or replace the static models and assumptions of neoclassical
microeconomic theory utilized by Chicago School practitioners. 32
29. See, e.g.. Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and The Theory of Property, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985)
(proposing equality and efficiency justifications for inalienability rules). According to Rose-Ackerman, "[a] reformist law
and economics denies the primacy of the existing distribution of property rights while retaining the assumption of
methodological individualism that is central to the economic approach." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 343.
Much of the theoretical support for the Chicago School can be traced to transactional analysis of the Coase Theorem
that first wave LIE scholars applied in their research of common law fields of tort, contract, and property law. See, e.g.,
Rose-Ackerman. supra note 20, at 236. This so-called "theorem" has undermined the confidence in the "interventionist"
programs of welfare economics of the 1960s and thereby strengthened the influence of the free market conservatives at
the University of Chicago and elsewhere. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). The Coase Theorem's preoccupation with private property rights committed the first generation
of L/E scholars to an underlying conservative political perspective in favor of laissez-faire capitalism and a theory of
jurisprudence which claimed that law should facilitate free choice and private contract, and should protect the integrity
of private property. In remaining agnostic on distributional consequences of its analysis, the theorem served to legitimate
the interest of the status quo. While the second generation of LIE scholars have distanced themselves from the
conservative influence of their founding fathers at Chicago, underlying vocabulary and methodology of the "new" LIE
scholars remain heavily embedded within the market concept bequeathed by Coase.
30. Ulen. supra note 24, at 224-25.
31. See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. UL.EN supra note 25. The Cooter and Ulen book is a good example of second
generation law and economics scholarship. The book embraces the hypothesis that "law is rational" without explicitly
accepting the extreme claims of the law-and-efficiency hypothesis. Id. at 12. Unlike Richard Posner's textbook, THE
EcoNottc ANALYSIS OF L w, supra note 18, the Cooter and Ulen book attempts to be more eclectic in accepting
philosophical and humanistic traditions of legal thought. As Cooter and Ulen explain, "olur approach in this book will
be to try to bring economics into contact with the philosophy of law in order to connect the analytical methods for
explaining rational behavior with the sensibilities motivating reasonable behavior." R. CoorE & T. ULEN, supra note 25,
at 12.
32. See. e.g.. Goetz & Scott. Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); MacNeil,
Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978). See also 0. WIL.tmtsoN, THE EcoNosncs OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL
OBJECTIVES IN A TIIEORY OF THE FiRnm (1964).
The methodology of the Chicago School. based on the assumptions of the neoclassical model of microeconomics,
analyzes problems from the universal perspective of the homogeneous, autonomous economic actor who approaches a
market, engages in a discrete transaction, and then goes on about his or her business. The new economics of relational
contract and strategic behavior seeks to provide an understanding of market transactions in the context of long-term
relations, where bargains are never discrete and where strategic advantage may influence behavior.
Relational contract analysis asserts that there are some types of contractual relations, those of long-term duration,
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A new group of Public Choice theorists has in turn offered a theory of interest
groups for understanding the economics of statutory law and the behavior of
legislators. 33 Other L/E scholars, associated with the New Haven School, 34 have
since sought to resuscitate a liberal, reformist vision of law by using economic
analysis to defend various liberal conceptions of law and adjudication. 35 Clearly, the
tribe of law and economics has grown to encompass a host of divergent theoretical
perspectives and normative conceptions about law and adjudication.
Even though the L/E movement is diverse in theory and perspective, there are
some common premises which all L/E scholars accept and utilize in various degrees.
Lewis Kornhauser, a second generation law and economics scholar, has recently
identified four theses that he claims describe the corpus of law and economics
scholarship: (1) A "behavioral claim" which asserts that "[e]conomic theory can
provide a good theory for predicting how people will behave under rules of law;"
3 6
which represent important exceptions to the model of discrete transaction found in neo-classical microeconomics. See
generally Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 461-757. A relational
contract is one where "future contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncertain" making it difficult for contract parties
to "allocate all risks at the time of contracting." Goetz & Scott, supra, at 1090. For these contracts, the analysis of
discrete transactions is not a "feasible contracting mechanism" because it is impossible to allocate risks optimally in terms
of well-defined contract promises. Id. While Goetz and Scott seek to build on the Chicago model by utilizing a relational
economic analysis to defend efficient contracts, other scholars have discovered the possibility of a different, more critical
relational analysis based on the values of relation, security, and solidarity. See Gordon, Macaulay. Macneil, and the
Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 565.
Strategic behavior is an essential aspect of bargaining strategy which occurs whenever a party attempts to decipher
an opponent's moves and thereafter acts accordingly. R. Coomer & T. ULEN, supra note 25, at 101. Strategic behavior
raises complex problems in bargaining theory because economists have been unable to define equilibrium solutions for
bargaining exhibiting such behavior. Id. at 101 n. 10.
33. See, e.g., Rowley, supra note 20, at 123; M. OLSEN. THE LooiC OF COLLECTIVE AcTIoN (1965). See generallv
Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). Public choice theory attempts to explain how
political and bureaucratic bodies actually make collective choices under models which assume that political actors, like
economic actors, are self-interested maximizers of something. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIc CHoIcE (1979); Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 13, at 344-45. Chicago School practitioners utilize public choice theory to justify a deregulatory,
court-centered approach to the study of legislation. Id. at 348. See also Easterbrook, Statutes Domain, 50 U. CHt. L. REV.
533 (1983); Posner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CI. L. REV. 262 (1982).
Other public choice scholars, however, de-emphasize the role of the courts and instead look to social decisionmaking of
legislatures and ideals of limited government for understanding public law. See, e.g., DeBow & Lee, Understanding (and
Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEx. L. REV. 993, 1005, 1011 (1988). Liberal
or progressive L/E scholars utilize public choice theory to develop a more realistic understanding of the legislative process
and to thereby provide theoretical support for new forms of welfare regulation. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman. supra note 13
(developing an economic argument based partly on public choice theory to defend a legislative-centered approach to
occupational health and safety problems).
34. See supra note 28.
35. A good example of such work is Cooter & Ulen, supra note 13 (advancing an economic argument based on
Rawlsian notions of justice to support the normative case in favor of the comparative negligence standard). See also
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 241 (arguing that there is now a reformist law and economics which "begins by
denying the primacy of the existing distribution of property rights."); Ulen, supra note 24, at 210 (arguing that modem
L/E scholars have "found room in their analyses for shared values, a sense of community, and morality.") This new form
of normative LIE is important for it represents the emergence of a liberal law and economics wedded to the process values
and rights theories of mainstream legal scholars. See. e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13 (developing a new economic
approach to administrative law which complements the process-oriented approach to judicial review of John Ely). It is the
liberal branch of the second generation of L/E scholarship, not the Chicago School. which best represents what Roberto
Unger has described as the link between "law and economics and the rights and principles schools" of legal scholarship.
See R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEsErEr 12 (1983). The development of a liberal, more reformist branch
of law and economics appears to be in the formative stages of development.
36. Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 353.
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(2) A "normative claim" which asserts that the "law ought to be efficient;" 37 (3) A
factual or "positive" claim that argues that the "(common) law is in fact efficient;" 38
and (4) a "genetic" claim that argues that the "common law tends to select efficient
rules, although not every rule will, at any given time, be efficient.' ,39 According to
Kornhauser, "[e]very article in law and economics adheres, explicitly or implicitly,
to one or more of [these] logically distinct [claims].' 40
Only the scholarship of the Chicago School founding fathers, who adopted the
law-and-efficiency hypothesis, embraced all four claims of law and economics
Kornhauser identified. These LIE practitioners accepted the behavioral claim that
individuals respond rationally to incentives and that legal rules affect behavior.
Because these scholars asserted that "the normative claim identifies efficient
behavior as the criterion for choosing among rules," 4' they utilize the behavioral
claim of economics to identify legal rules which induce efficient behavior. For these
practitioners, judging becomes an exercise in cost-benefit analysis, transaction cost
reduction, risk assessment, and wealth maximization. Such an economic perspective
places the judge in the role of the "social engineer" with the distinctive purpose of
shaping rights and liabilities in the name of efficient resource allocation. 42
The positive and genetic claims identified by Kornhauser describe the position
of Chicago School practitioners who view the common law as a system of rules
having a factual or natural (genetic) tendency to induce efficient behavior under
law. 43 Their underlying legal perspective is the product of a world view which
pursues truth about law within a paradigm that evaluates legal rules under the single
universal standard of wealth maximization. For these practitioners, the law-and-
efficiency hypothesis becomes a comprehensive organizational principle for under-
standing the nature of legal relations. 44
Second generation LIE scholars, however, either reject the normative and
genetic efficiency claims identified by Kornhauser or they remain agnostic on
37. Id. at 354.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 355.
40. Id. at 353.
41, Id. at 354.
42. Unlike Roscoe Pound's conception of social engineering, see Pound, A Suney of Social Interest, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1943); the Chicago School approach of first generation L/E scholars understands legal decisionmaking as an
exercise in wealth maximization to the exclusion of other social interests and values. The idea that judges should design
the law for the specific purpose of achieving wealth maximization seems to run contrary to mainstream views of
adjudication. The traditional jurisprudential view neither presumes that judges preside over a committee of economic
welfare nor does the traditional view contemplate that judges consciously weigh overriding social interest in resolving
conflicting claims of right. See. e.g., Greenwalt, supra note 23.
43. According to Kornhauser, the positive claim "merely requires that the law in fact induces efficient behavior,
even if economic theory does not explain how the law induces such behavior." Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 354-55. The
genetic claim "provides a comprehensive economic theory of political institutions, a theory of how these institutions come
to be and how they persist." Id. at 355.
44. Thus, these L/E scholars engage in a form of rational fact-gathering and categorization generated by a
theoretical construct of the world which pursues truth through assumptions and preconceptions about efficient behavior.
The positive and genetic claims about the common law are asserted by Chicago School practitioners to be "objective"
and "descriptive" even though they are the product of the particular theoretical perspective of the law and economics
observer. See, e.g., White, supra note 2. at 168.
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whether these claims are persuasive. 45 While the new breed of L/E scholars adopts a
positive claim about economic analysis of law, it is different from the one identified
by Kornhauser. Second generation L/E scholars merely claim that "a given rule can
be fruitfully examined using microeconomic theory," 46 and that the tools of
microeconomic theory provide "explanations of the law and predictions of the
consequences of legal rules." 47 The positive claim of the new breed of L/E scholar
is thus more modest; it merely assumes that law can be understood as a rational
system of behavior based on economic interest. Instead of adopting the law-
and-efficiency hypothesis, these scholars embrace the hypothesis that "law is
rational. ' 48
Thus, the only claim identified by Kornhauser which can be said to characterize
the dominant methodology of the movement today is the behavioral claim.49 This
claim commits all L/E scholars to the view that rational, self-interested calculations
45. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 237; Ulen, supra note 24, at 210.
In predicting the consequences of behavior under law, L/E scholars are confronted with fundamental questions about
whether law should encourage a particular form of behavior. Much of the current debate between first and second
generation LE scholars centers on this basic question. It is at this point that serious differences appear as a result of the
positive, normative, and genetic claims of efficiency advanced by Chicago School practitioners.
While refusing to embrace the normative and genetic claims of efficiency, some L/E scholars remain "undecided"
on whether efficiency or some other legal norm should be adopted by the IE analyst in evaluating the consequences of
behavior under law. See, e.g., Ulen, supra note 24, at 210 (citing the "extensive literature on the death penalty"
[reviewed in) R. COOTmR & T. ULEN, supra note 25). See also Kornhauser, Legal Rules As Incentives, in LAw AND
EcoNoNttcs 27 (N. Mercuro ed. 1989) (developing a theory of economic behavior under law without advancing a
normative position about the theory's directive consequences on behavior); Rowley, supra note 20, at 123. These scholars
may be the nihilists of the law and economics movement.
Another growing group of second generation LIE scholars rejects the normative and genetic claims of efficiency and
instead adopts other, more philosophical values. These LIE scholars, associated with the New Haven, reformist, or liberal
schools, acknowledge that there is room in their theory for "shared values, a sense of community, and morality. " Ulen,
supra note 24, at 210. They are thus much more in sympathy with the mainstream view of traditional legal scholars who
argue in favor of a "public ideal" conception of law. The emergence of a liberal school of L/E represents the most serious
challenge to the conservative perspective of the founding fathers.
Finally, a new breed of Chicago School practitioner, associated with the Virginia and strands of the Public Choice
Schools, has rejected the property rights orientation and transactional analysis of the Chicago School in favor of a more
sophisticated understanding of institutions and strategic behavior of bargaining. See. e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20,
at 236. However, because the new theories of institutional economics and strategic behavior have failed to produce
determinant theories, these scholars have accepted the possibility of more openness in their analysis than that tolerated by
the first generation of L/E scholars. The possibility of indeterminacy has in turn encouraged the second generation of
Chicago School scholars to remain relatively agnostic on the strong version of the law-and-efficiencY hypothesis of the
founding fathers.
One important difference then between first and second generation Chicago School scholars centers on the somewhat
different research agendas pursued and the degree to which methodologies allow for indeterminant results. While the new
breed of Chicago School practitioner believes that the law-and-efficiency hypothesis is a useful analytical device, these
practitioners are far from convinced that the normative and genetic efficiency claims of the L/E founding fathers continue
to make sense in the face of a more sophisticated, less transactional form of law and economics.
46. Ulen, supra note 24, at 210.
47. R. CooTER & T. ULEN, supra note 25, at 11.
48. See, e.g., id. at 12 ("The fundamental hypothesis of the economic analysis is that law is rational.").
49. The behavioral claim of economic analysis holds that legal rules direct behavior by establishing implicit prices
or costs for various forms of behavior regulated under law. See Kornhauser, supra note 45, at 29. The behavioral
hypothesis of the new law and economics is said to depart from the so-called naive theory of behavior found in traditional
legal scholarship. Id. at 34. The naive theory of behavior assumes that legal actors conform their behavior perfectlv to the
directives of legal rules found in legal texts. The naive theory thus characterizes the methodology of traditional legal
scholars who are said to focus on "the study of legal texts: statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial opinions."
Id. Hence, the traditional legal analyst "scrutinizes these texts to determine what behavior they command, or argues that
a text ought to announce some right or duty. In either instance, words, not actions, are the focus of concern." Id.
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of individual cost and benefit is the key to understanding and evaluating legal
relations and various rule systems. The behavioral claim of economics establishes the
consensus view that "law is rational, and hence analyzable by economic
concepts." 50 All practitioners of the movement appear to believe that "rules of law
[are] like prices and legal actors [are] like perfectly rational individuals."- 5'
If there is an ideological tilt to the law and economics movement it is no longer
the result of the conservative perspective of the Chicago School or the law-
and-efficiency hypothesis. Rather, the ideology of this movement can best be
explained today in terms of a particular world view which assumes that rationality and
economic self-interest establish a universal principle for understanding law and
adjudication. 52 The behavioral and positive claims of second generation scholars
commit these observers to the view that law and the larger social world can be
understood as a system of rational behavior, sometimes influenced by impulses
toward efficiency, other times not, but always a product of "objective" reason. In
this way, the tenet that "law is rational" characterizes a particular world view based
on the belief in a universal, objective knowledge about a particular form of individual
motivation. 53
In the spirit of logical positivism, legal economists maintain a perspective about
the world that assumes the necessity of abstraction, universalism, and rationality.5 4
50. R. Coo-TFR & T. UL.N, supra note 25, at 12.
51. Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 353. "Thus, a liability rule, which imposes costs on individuals for various
actions, may be seen as setting the price for engaging in those activities." Id. at 354. See also R. COOTER & T. UtEN,
supra note 25, at 11. Hence, "the rule that gift promises are generally unenforceable raises the implicit price to those who
truly wish to make such a promise and also raises the price of taking action in reliance on such a promise's being fulfilled;
the rule that grants an exclusive property right, good against the world, to the person who authors an original novel lowers
the costs to the author of defending her work against expropriation and thereby induces her to expend additional resources
in writing; the rule that imposes liability on some who fail to take a reasonable amount of precaution raises the price of
being careless and thereby increases the amount of precaution consumed." Ulen, supra note 24, at 211.
52. Critical legal scholars argue that the ideology of law and economics can best be understood by focusing on the
dominant discourse which advocates of this movement utilize to articulate, describe, and conceive of the way the law
operates in the world. See Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of "Taw and
Economics', 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274 (1983); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Lair, 73 CAIF. L. REv. 1151, 1268
(1985) ("In the law and economics approaches, the laws of supply and demand as reflected in price theory, or the
processes of free-riding and holdout in institutional economics, are seen simply as facts inherent in social relations, to
which law can instrumentally and neutrally adapt.").
53. Roberto Unger has called this the view of objectivism--"the belief that the authoritative legal ideas-embody
and sustain a defensible scheme of human association." R. UNtER, supra note 35, at 2. The perspective of objectivism
assumes that "laws are not merely the outcome of contingent power struggles or of practical pressures lacking in rightful
authority." Id.
Unger's analysis is helpful for understanding the perspective of LIE scholars because it seeks to identify the
relationship between methodological methods, professional discourse, and world view. When IJE scholars converse about
law they employ a host of metaphors, analogies and cultural symbols to shape opinion, organize perceptions, and defend
factual and normative perspectives. See. e.g., Peller, supra note 52, at 1151, 1153 (discussing how "legal reasoning is
political and ideological in the manner in which legal discourse excludes (or suppresses) other modes of discourse, the
way in which it differentiates itself from 'mere' opinion or will."). Embedded within the law and economics vocabulary
are a series of assumptions and preconceptions about law and the social world. These assumptions and preconceptions
influence the way law and economic scholars categorize facts about reality and behavior under law. They are the unstated
points of the analysis which structure the law and economics perspective. Cf. Minow, supra note 5, at 13 ("such
assumptions work in part through the very structure of our language, which embeds the unstated points of comparison
inside categories that bury their perspective and wrongly imply a natural fit with the world.").
54. Law and economics scholars do not deny that their claims are "to some extent" oversimplified and unrealistic.
See R. PosxRz, supra note 18 ("But it is true that the assumptions of economic theory are one-dimensional and pallid
when viewed as descriptions of human behavior.... However, abstraction-reductionism if you like-is of the essence
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The language of law and economics continues to assume that legal analysis must
proceed in the way that scientific inquiry proceeds-the reduction of complex
phenomena into simplified abstractions of universal law. This quasi-scientific
perspective argues that there is an acceptable standard for judging legal arguments. 55
It presumes that lawyers can discover a relatively stable basis for justifying legal
results by universalizing propositions about the law from speculations about the
economic motivations of homogeneous individuals. The "law is rational" hypothesis
becomes an acceptable, unproblematic standard for judging legal argument.5 6
Unlike traditional legal scholars who focus their research on authoritative legal
texts, L/E scholars look beyond legal texts in developing economic predictions based
on what they expect rational, self-interested legal actors to do when confronted with
the directive force of legal rules. 57 Most L/E members incorporate into their research
a "naive" understanding of the behavioral claim which assumes that the directive
force of legal rules has no effect on the underlying preference structure of legal
actors.58 In focusing on the consequences of behavior under law, the L/E observer
of scientific inquiry."). Others, including myself, have been critical of the methodological claim of law and economics.
See, e.g., Minda, Lanyer-Economist, supra note 20, at 466-72 (arguing that the lawyer-economists' methodological
claims are only one side of a continuing debate about the role of simplifying assumptions in economic theory); Sen,
Rational Fools: A Critique of Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Art. 317, 326-29 (arguing
the current economic models fail to reflect important behavioral characteristics). See also Fletcher, Fairness and Utility
and Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972); Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PL. & PUB. AFr. 66
(1972); Tribe, Technology Assessments and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL..
L. REv. 617 (1973). LIE scholars, however, defend their claims by arguing that what they claim about behavior and the
nature of the common law can bejustified methodologically as hypothetical assumptions useful for prediction. They assert
that their claims are methodologically valid because they predict behavior with reasonable accuracy. However, critics
claim that practitioners of this movement appeal to the prestige of the natural sciences in their effort to create a system
of legal thought that is "objective, neutral, and apolitical." Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HoF'sRA L. REv. 905 (1980).
55. According to law and economics, legal arguments must be judged in terms of whether they logically support
the predictions or claims of law and economics. See White, supra note 2.
56. Rejected is the idea of legal argument as an example of commitment or what Jerry Frug has called "argument
as character." See Frg, Argument, supra note 15, at 872 ("Argument as Character... involves examining the elements
of [legal argument] such as facts, precedents and principles, not in terms of how they support the argument's conclusion
but in terms of how they form attitudes or induce actions in others." (footnotes omitted)). In his critique of the behavioral
foundations of economic theory, Amartya Sen has argued that the assumption of egoistic self-interest, which is central to
the economic theories of revealed preference and rational choice, fails to account for behavioral characteristics based on
the concept of commitment. Sen, supra note 54, at 326-29. Commitment is defined by Sen "in terms of a person
choosing an act that he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is also available
to him." Id. at 27. The behavioral characteristic of commitment may have its counterpart in the notion of lawyer as
partisan, or public-interest notions of lawyering.
57. The behavioral claim of economic analysis assumes that legal actors conform their behavior imperfectly to legal
rules because the relationship between law and behavior depends on the actor's rational calculation of self-interest of legal
roles. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 45, at 34; Ulen, supra note 24, at 211. A legal rule may influence behavior, ex
ante, by influencing the choice to engage in a particular form of conduct, or influence action ex post, by structuring
subsequent bargaining in settlement negotiations between the parties. Kornhauser, supra note 45, at 31.
58. At least one IE scholar has noted that there is a problem with this naive view of economic behavior in that
it assumes that the autonomous legal actor has a utility preference function which is independent of the directive force of
law. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 45, at 43-44. The naive theory of economic behavior thus assumes that there is
an objective prior self to which could be assigned preferences and attitudes, measured and evaluated a priori. If law affects
the preference structure of legal actors by influencing their utility preferences, then the naive theory of economic behavior
is difficult to conceive or sustain.
A more sophisticated view of the behavioral claim assumes that legal rules may have normative force in influencing
behavior by altering the legal actor's desires or preferences. See Kornhauser, supra note 45, at 43-44. Kornhauser argues
that legal rules can have normative force by appealing to the legal actor's preference for law conforming behavior or by
directly influencing the actor's preferences. Id. The more sophisticated understanding of the behavioral claim of
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also places less attention on the legal concepts of rights, as a normative framework
for establishing correlative duties, and instead focuses on behavioral consequences of
various bundles of legal entitlements. Consequently, "rights and their correlative
duties no longer hold center stage" in the economic analysis of law. 59
The new power talk of economics has encouraged lawyers to make a shift in
their analytical perspective to a new normative perspective of rationality that
recharacterizes legally relevant facts as costs and benefits and frames normative
issues in the narrow context of microeconomic theory. 60 This shift in analytical
perspective has allowed the legal theorist to restructure legal categories in fundamen-
tal ways. Lawyers employing the insights of the lawyer-economist might argue that
the seemingly unrelated subjects of contract, property, tort, and criminal law can be
analyzed from a more universal perspective. Lawyers may claim that securities fraud
problems are not unlike nuisance problems caused by air pollution. 6'
Law and economics also offers a new approach to legal scholarship. L/E
scholars argue that legal scholarship should concentrate on formulating and then
testing falsifiable, law-like generalizations about social life. 62 The underlying
approach appears to be that law can be studied and understood as a "science." While
law and economics scholars appear to agree that traditional legal scholarship is
flawed by ambiguity in purpose and method, they argue that the current doctrinal
justifications of the law can be grounded by economic analysis. While only the
Chicago School founders argue that the principle of wealth maximization can ground
legal analysis, all LIE scholars believe that judges can employ an understanding of
rational behavior as a universal standard for analyzing law "objectively." It is in this
important sense that the "new" law and economics purports to provide a universal
method for achieving a comprehensive understanding of legal issues. 63
economics thus requires the analyst to look beyond behavior to politics. Hence, Kornhauser's development of a more
sophisticated understanding of the behavioral claim of economics draws from Critical Theory of Gramsci and his concept
of hegemony. See Kornhauser. supra note 2, at 375-76 (citing A. GRASC,. SEtEcMnONs FRom THE PRISON OTEBOOKS
53-60. 206-09, 228-29, 245-46 (1971)). This aspect of Kornhauser's LIE scholarship is unique. He appears to be the
only L/E scholar developing an economic analysis of law that synthesizes concepts ia economic theory with related ideas
that CLS scholars use. But see infra note 70. In acknowledging that legal rules may establish hegemonic structures that
shape and legitimize economic behavior, Kornhauser has uncovered a theoretical point raised by critical legal scholars
which has gone largely unnoticed in the law and economics literature. This development in L/E scholarship raises the
possibility of a synthesis or partnership between the reformist wing of the second generation of L/E scholars and CLS.
59. See. e.g.. Koruhauser, supra note 45, at 31 (discussing the role of the behavioral claim of economics in the
economics of property rights).
60. The new economic analysis of law has therefore established what Bruce Ackerman has called "a new form of
power-talk" which lawyers have utilized to restructure the framework of traditional legal analysis. B. ACKtEEAN, supra
note 3, at 46. See also Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
711 (1983). While Ackerman's focus was on explaining the influence of the Chicago School, the general point he makes
has relevance for understanding the new forms of law and economics developing in the wake of the second wave of LIE
scholarship.
61. "While a layman might think that there is almost nothing in common between, say, the problems raised by
securities fraud and those raised by air pollution, a common externality analysis makes it possible for lawyers in one field
to learn from the regulatory experience in the other." B. ACKERIMAN. supra note 3, at 59.
62. See. e.g., Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1211 (1981).
63. The idea of law as a universal body of discoverable principle is not new. See C. LANODELL., PREFACE TO
SELECTION ON CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNrACTS (1879). See also Horwitz. supra note 54; Minda, Lawrer-Economist, supra
note 20, at 439-40 (1978). In Langdell's view, law was a "science" consisting of fundamental "principles or doctrines"
that could be discovered by examining a relatively small number of appellate decisions. See generally B. Ackerman,
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If economic analysis can be applied "across the board" to every legal subject, 64
then lawyers have a powerful tool for understanding law and legal development. This
new tool, however, questions the idea that law can be studied "autonomously"
through traditional methods of legal analysis. The "new" economic analysis of law
requires the legal profession to look beyond the law to discover a new medium for
resolving contested views of policy, which in turn requires a new understanding of
law's legitimacy. 65
B. Critical Legal Studies
While law and economics began attracting the attention of legal scholars, a
distinct movement in legal studies established itself as a major critic of both
traditional and law and economics scholarship. This new academic movement-
Critical Legal Studies (CLS)-surfaced in the late 1970s when a group of legal
scholars formed a social and professional network called The Conference on Critical
Legal Studies and began publishing critical essays on various legal subjects. 66 Like
the law and economics scholar, the CLS scholar seeks to develop a totalistic critique
of legal doctrine, but does so by using different nonlegal methodologies and insights.
But unlike L/E, CLS is an intellectual, social, and political movement which links its
intellectual projects with the political and social aspiration of its membership.
According to a CLS conference statement, CLS seeks "to explore the manner in
which legal doctrine and legal education and the practices of legal institutions work
Introduction: On the Role of Economic Analysis in Property Law, in EcONO. c FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B.
Ackerman ed. 1975).
64. See R. POSNER, supra note 18.
65. See also Minow, supra note 2. at 89 (arguing that behind each of the new trends in law, including law and
economics, is "a brooking doubt about whether law deserves a privileged place in resolving conflict and ordering
society").
66. Critical legal studies emerged as an identifiable movement with the foundation of the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies in 1977. The scholarship of this movement also exhibits generational conflicts. The "first wave" of critical
legal studies scholarship appeared on the academic scene during the late 1970s when a handful of legal scholars on the
"left" sought to develop various critical strands of post-realist scholarship. The "first wave" turned to interdisciplinary
traditions of continental philosophy and literary criticism to develop a new left critique of mainstream scholarship. The
"second wave" of CLS scholarship has been generated by a new group of critical scholars, many of whom studied under
CLS scholars, "a generation which sees its work as a response to both (mainstream and CLS scholars) and often writes
in the argot of 'post-modernism,' 'post-structuralism,' or 'feminism.'" D. Kennedy, A Rotation in Contemporary Legal
Scholarship (Bremen conference paper, 1986 Conference of American and German Traditions of Sociological
Jurisprudence and Critical Legal Thought, Bremen, Germany) (unpublished manuscript by David Kennedy on file with
The Ohio State Law Journal) [hereinafter Rotation]. The post-modern CLS scholar associated with the "second wave"
tends to prefer interdisciplinary sources which respond to and challenge the critical literature relied upon by the first
generation of CLS scholars. The move from first wave to the post-modern scholarship of the second wave has been a move
from the critique of indeterminacy to the study of argument, rhetoric, and conversation. See, e.g., Berman, Sovereignmv
it Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 Wis. lrNr'L L.J. 51 (1989); Frog, Argument, supra note 15;
Kennedy, A New Stream of International Scholarship, 7 Wis. Imr'L L.J. 1 (1989). This shift within generations of CLS
"has been conducted far more overtly as a transformation in the political commitments and deployments of the movement
than as a change in interdisciplinary focus." Kennedy, Rotation, supra, at 52. For various internal views of the critical
legal studies movement see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRMCAL LEGAL STUDtS 114-50 (1987); R. UNGER, supra note 35;
Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated and Affectionate History of the Conference oil Critical Legal Studies,
36 STAN. L. REv. 391 (1984). For the psycho-social history commenting on the "state of the movement," see Kennedy,
Psycho-Social CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 1013 (1985) [hereinafter Psvcho-Social].
The intellectual component of CLS is described in R. UNGER. supra note 35. For a bibliography of CLS scholarship see
Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
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to buttress and support a pervasive system of oppressive, inegalitarian relations." 67
While CLS scholarship evinces a richly diverse set of opinions and perspectives, CLS
scholars (CRITS) as a group generally attempt to show how the dominant tradition in
legal scholarship (as well as the emerging tradition represented by the law and
economics movement) has served to justify domination and privilege through an
abstract discourse which claims neutrality in process and outcome.
A number of commentators have suggested that the intellectual component of
CLS is difficult to characterize because CRITS only share antipathy toward
traditional views of law and do not advocate a common method or approach to legal
scholarship. 68 It has been said that "while law and economics scholars seem 'divided
by a common methodology,' critical legal scholars seem united only in a shared
antagonism.'69 Critical legal studies is thus typically characterized as a "negative"
or "destructive" movement; one that criticizes without offering either a constructive
program or specific standard of reference for judging. 70
Martha Minow, however, has argued that the CLS "school is recognizable in its
commitment to explain both that legal principles and doctrines are open-textured and
capable of yielding contradictory results, and that legal decisions express an internal
dynamic of legal culture contingent on historical preferences for selected assumptions
and values.' ' Tt She has identified four "activities" in which CLS scholars are known
to engage: (1) "[t]he critical scholar seeks to demonstrate the indeterminacy of legal
doctrine: any given set of legal principles can be used to yield competing or
contradictory results;" 72 (2) "[tlhe critical scholar engages in historical, socioeco-
nomic analysis to identify how particular interest groups, social classes, or en-
trenched economic institutions benefit from legal decisions despite the indeterminacy
67. Statement of Critical Legal Studies Conference, quoted in CRITICAL LEGAL SrUDIES (P. Fitzpatrick & A. Hunt
eds. 1987).
68. See. e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 2. at 352.
69. Id. at 64. Kornhauser's description of critical legal studies is both tentative and somewhat inaccurate. His
understanding of critical legal studies is tentative because he was unable to "characterize" the CLS program or "list, as
[he) did for law and economics, a small number of theses commonly presented by critical legal scholars." Id. at 364. His
tentative conclusions about critical legal theory are somewhat inaccurate because much of what he has to say about critical
legal theory derives from a book by Raymond Guess, THE IOEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT
SCtOOL (1981) which is, as its title suggests, about the social theories associated with Habermas and the German
philosophers associated with what is known as the "Frankfurt School." Most critical legal scholars in America would take
issue with much of the scholarly enterprise of the Frankfurt School and its attempt to construct an empirically informed
theory of moral truth. The Guess book does not even mention critical legal studies nor does it discuss any of the current
CLS literature. It is difficult to understand why Professor Kornhauser believes that the Guess Book is relevant to "It]hose
Seriously interested in understanding Critical Legal Studies." Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 372. Indeed, the Guess book
may in fact give the uninformed reader a misleading impression that the critical legal studies movement is linked with the
Frankfurt School movement associated with Habermas.
70. Koruhauser, supra note 2. at 372. ("Both the diversity of views among members of the Critical Legal Studies
movement and the largely destructive nature of their writings thus far forestall a neat characterization of the Critical Legal
program." Id. at 364.) See also Fiss, supra note 2. at 10 ("Critical Legal studies scholars want to unmask the law, but
not to make law into an effective instrument of good public policy or equality."); Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be
Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247. 260 (1984) ("Critical legal writing systematically evades the question. 'Compared to
what?' ").
71. Minow. supra note 2. at 83.
72. Id. at 84. "To assist this demonstration, the critical scholar may adopt a method-like structuralism developed
in linguistics, anthropology, psychology, and literary analysis. The scholar unearths a deep structure of categories or
tensions at work behind the surface layer of legal talk, and develops a grammar or guide to those underlying tensions and
to the techniques by which they are masked or expressed." Id. (footnote omitted).
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of the legal doctrines;" 73 (3) "the critical scholar tries to expose how legal analysis
and legal culture mystifies outsiders and legitimates its results;" 74 and (4)"the critical
scholar may elucidate new or previously disfavored social visions and argue for their
realization in legal or political practice in part by making them part of legal
discourse. "175
The "four activities" depicted by Minow contain implications drawn from the
different projects of various critical legal scholars. For example, scholars following
Duncan Kennedy's notion of a "fundamental contradiction" 76 have sought to
demonstrate the "indeterminacy" of legal doctrine by describing in minute detail
how various legal doctrines rotate around contradictory values or opposing polarities
such as objective/subjective, public/private, and so forth. 77 In describing how legal
rights favor particular interest groups or "mystify" their results, critical legal
scholars develop critiques based on the psychoanalytic concept of denial78 or the
Gramascian notion of legitimation and hegemony. 79 Still others seek to develop a
new historiography to describe how American legal history can be understood as a
"winner's story" about how a long-term political tradition displaced other traditions
and how law developed to serve the needs of American corporate enterprise and
industrialization. 80 Hence, there is no single method or epistemology which describes
critical legal theory. 8'
73. Id. at 84-85. "This activity may involve identifying competing visions or possibilities alive in particular legal
debates and reforms, detailing the ways in which one vision prevails over others, and describing the difference between
legal norms as self-expressed and the law in practice." Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 85. "This inquiry takes the scholar back to legal materials, instead of social and historical ones, but the
scholar asks expressly, how does the legal community construct itself through a system of shared meanings, made to look
natural rather than chosen and how do legal roles and the level of legal discourse distance legal officials and readers from
their own experiences and moral judgments." Id. (footnotes omitted).
75. Id. at 84-85. "For this enterprise, the scholar may seize upon literature, anthropology, and other expressions
of human aspirations and achievements." Id. at 85-86. Mark Kelman has recently offered a somewhat similar description
of what he calls the "four-part critical method of CLS." See Kelman. supra note 52, at 3-5. See also Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 505 (1986).
76. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFFALo L. REV. 209 (1979) [hereinafter Blackstone's].
77. See, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Kennedy,
Theses about International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN YEARBOOK FINTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (1980); Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
78. See. e.g., Gabel. The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Part of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TFx.
L. REV. 1563 (1984).
79. See, e.g., Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLrrIcs OF LAW 172 (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941. 62
MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
80. See, e.g., M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFOR IATION OF AIERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); M. TuSHNEr, THE
AmERCAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATION OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981); Horwitz, Republicanism and
Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 W, t. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987).
81. As Minow has noted, "Critical legal scholars often resist or reject efforts to systematize their work, as they
seek to express claims of textual ambiguity and historical contingency in the very methods of their work." Minow. supra
note 2, at 83. An illustration of this tendency in CLS scholarship can be seen in Duncan Kennedy's recanting of the
"fundamental contradiction" which is attributed to his own work. See Kennedy & Gabel. Roll Over Beethoven. 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 36 (1984) ("I've recanted the fundamental contradiction, and also altruism versus individualism. I think I'm
also on the verge of recanting the critique of rights.").
It may also be evident that critical legal theory, or at least the various approaches which serve to characterize critical
theory, need not be exclusively a left-wing enterprise even though it has been associated with the political left aspirations
of CLS. There is no theoretical reason why the critiques of indeterminacy, legitimation, or even the new historiography
could not be used by right-wing lawyers to attack progressive legal reform programs. Indeed, liberal lawyers have
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Perhaps the strongest feature of CLS theory and practice is the presence of an
on-going internal critique. For example, women and racial minorities within CLS
have shown how law can be understood as a political discourse of power contextu-
alized within a social and legal description established by white male discourse. 82
Such critiques have challenged the dominance of white male discourse and have
transformed the intellectual and political nature of the movement into a movement
embracing race, class, and gender differences. Hence, a new wave of CLS scholar-
ship has surfaced which reacts against progressive theories of antidiscrimination law
and challenges the ability of white elites of all political persuasions to understand how
racist attitudes and assumptions have actually operated within legal ideology to
reinforce social domination on the basis of class and race. 83 Feminist legal scholars
associated with CLS have also challenged and transformed CLS discourse by
bringing the gender perspective into wider view. The internal dynamic of such
criticism within the CLS movement has strengthened the nature of the external
critique made by CRITS in their response to other legal perspectives.
In critiquing law and economics scholarship, for example, CLS scholars have
asserted that law is "rational" or "efficient" only because it appears to conform to
a particular political ideology which seeks to justify and explain race, class, and
gender disadvantage and privilege as the logical consequence of rational private
choice. 84 The "normative" and "genetic" claims of Chicago School L/E scholars
are thus seen by CLS scholars as highly refined statements of the particular world
objected to CLS scholarship because they assume the critiques of CLS will undermine and destabilize the legal
justifications for believing in the coherence of the liberal conception of rights.
Hence, liberal legal scholars assert that a coherent theory of rights is necessary to restrain the exercise of arbitrary
power. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2, at II ("when I read a case like Brown v. Board of Education, for example, what
I see is not the unconstrained power of the justices to give vent to their desires and interests, but rather public officials
situated within a profession bounded at every turn by the norms and conventions that define and that constitute
profession."). See also Carrington, supra note 7; Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985).
CRrTS argue that the liberal conception of rights is simply too indeterminant to sustain the claims liberal scholars
make. On the other hand, CRITS utilize liberal formulations of community and justice in arguing for the social
transformation of liberalism. See, e.g., Kennedy & Gabel, supra, at 4 (Duncan: "My line.., is that it's a good idea to
call on and evoke all historic formulations, the rhetorics, the preacherly or the hortatory or demagogic rhetorics of social
transformation movements.").
82. Nearly everyone within the CLS movement has come to a sharpened awareness of gender and race per-
spectives. Fem-Crits have struggled to reveal and change those aspects of CLS discourse and culture which have
established inequality of power between men and women. The transformative project of Fem-Crits has solidified a
distinctively feminist edge to CLS theory and practice despite the dominant but changing influence of white male
discourse. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The
Fem-Crits Go to Law School". 38 J. LEGAL EDCc. 61 (1988). See also Kennedy. Psycho-Social, supra note 66. People
of color have recently advanced powerful critiques of progressive theories of racism to show how critical scholars have
failed to appreciate the reality of the racially oppressed and the choices actually available to racial minorities. See, e.g.,
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV 1331 (1988); Matsuda. Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
323 (1987). Some have questioned the validity of critical legal strategies which reject the language of legal "rights." See
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 401 (1987);
Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv.
301 (1987). In exposing the racial and sexual politics of CLS and the larger culture, minority groups within CLS have
provoked the movement to address issues from the racial, gender, and class perspective. The dynamic of this internal
critcism has been fueled, in part, by a pervasive theoretical skepticism. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical
Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 773-78 (1985).
83. See Crenshaw, supra note 82, at 1366-87.
84. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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view embedded within the elite legal culture which law and economics seeks to
explain and refine. 85 Critical legal analysts have thus argued that there is no
politically neutral, coherent way to talk about law and economics because its internal
logic depends upon concepts which are artificially constructed from a particular
world-view perspective which fails to appreciate the contextual consequences of race,
class, and gender differences.8 6 CLS scholars contend that the concept of transaction
costs found in first generation L/E scholarship fails to identify what counts as a
disutility 87 or whether value should be measured from the perspective of possession
or expectation. 88 The efficiency claims of LIE scholars are thus seen to be too
contestable to support the types of claims the scholars advanced about law. 89
CLS scholars thus present a picture of the world that seeks to reveal the diversity
of culture: the differences of race, class, and gender. They argue that the richness of
human experiences cannot be captured by abstract, universal values, or by rational
desires. According to one of the founders of this movement, Duncan Kennedy,
human beings are simultaneously pulled by two opposing values and desires: "One
is the need to preserve independence from the outside world. The other demand is the
equally basic need of the self to live in a world transparent to its mind and responsible
to its concern, a world with which it can therefore be at one.-90 Kennedy argues that
all theories of individualism must struggle to combine the negative felt experience of
alienation and isolation with the positive yearning for connection and community. 9'
Liberal legalism, 92 the label CLS attributes to mainstream legal scholarship, is
85. See. e.g., M. KELIAN, supra note 66. at 114.
86. See id. at 142. ("The CLS claim, quite simply, is that there is no absolutely politically neutral, coherent way
to talk about whether a decision is potentially Parieto efficient, wealth maximizing or, whether its benefits outweigh its
costs.").
87. "Cost means no more than disutility .... If you are a liberal, and believe that there is a lot of good as %ell
as a lot of bad in human nature, it is possible to construct, on this model, an efficiency argument for every one of the state
interventions the conservatives claim are paradigmatically inefficient." Kennedy, supra note 29. at 398, 400.
88. This is the "offer-asking problem" advanced by CLS scholars to critique conservative interpretations of the
Coase Theorem. See Kelman, Consumption Theory,. Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 669, 678-95 (1979); Kennedy, supra note 29, at 401-21. Liberal L/E scholars seek to deflect the criticism of
CRITS by arguing that CRITS excoriate "strawmen"-the first generation of Chicago School practitioners who are no
longer representative of the LIE movement. See. e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 251.
89. See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
90. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLtICs 205 (1975). See also Kennedy, Blackstone's, supra note 76.
91. "It is that essential human condition which carries the seeds of our twin fears of alienation and annihilation.
as well as our twin desires for autonomy and attachment." West, supra note 2. at 51 (describing the "fundamental
contradiction" in the work of Duncan Kennedy). See also R. UNGER, supra note 90, at 217 (describing the "paradox of
sociability" as the "problem posed by the relation between self and others").
92. Karl Klare has defined the term liberal legalism as follows:
Legalism has been defined as "[tihe ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following,
and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules. " "Liberal Legalism" is a particular
historical incarnation of the legalist outlook, which characteristically serves as the philosophical foundation of
the legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commitment to general,
democratically promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and the radical separation
of morals, politics, and personality from judicial action. Liberal legalism also consists of a complex of social
practices and institutions that complement and elaborate upon its underlying political philosophy and
jurisprudence. With respect to its modern Anglo-American form, these include adherence to precedent,
separation of the legislative (prospective) and the judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligation to formulate
legal rules on a general basis (the notion of ratio decedendi), adherence to complex procedural formalities and
the search for specialized methods of analysis ('legal reasoning') .... The rise and elaboration of the ideology,
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said to deny the values of community and human connection by a universal
perspective that emphasizes the importance of only certain values-the value of
autonomy and of individual self-interest. A central goal of CLS scholarship is to
reveal how traditional modes of legal analysis prioritize the values of autonomy and
self-interest and thus belie the phenomenological experience of living within a society
that values autonomy, but yearns for community; glorifies reason, but longs for
passion. Hence, while law and economics offers a new technocratic discourse to
legitimate the universal perspective of mainstream legal thought, CLS interjects a
new phenomenological discourse of political critique.
The behavioral claim adopted by most CRITS assumes that law is a culture
which shapes beliefs and attitudes about the status quo. The CLS view assumes that
the preferences of legal actors are shaped by the ruling orthodoxy. 93 Adherents of
CLS movements thus assert that "[like religion in previous historical periods, the
law becomes an object of belief which shapes popular consciousness toward a passive
acquiescence or obedience to the status quo." 94 What CLS scholars purport to do is
to identify certain values characterized as part of the ideal of law and then to show
how the dominant discourse in law has obstructed the realization of those ideals.95
CLS scholars say that they seek to reveal how a commitment to the ideals of law
would require more, not less, discussion about how people can learn to actually
realize the ideals of a democratic society within the legal system. 96
Most CRITS practice a form of oppositional existence in that they seek to
challenge and transform the very practices which define their profession. 97 Some, but
not all, reject the idea of liberal scholars that legal analysis and argumentation can be
grounded in, or rendered determinant by, a mode of discourse claiming to be
humanistic, fair, and just.98 Some critical theorists, referred to within the movement
as the "rationalists" or "northerners," argue that critical theory can be used to
re-rationalize mainstream legal doctrine and provide a normative basis for "recon-
practices, and institutions of liberal legalism have been accompanied by the growth of a specialized,
professional caste of experts trained in manipulating legal reasoning and the legal process.
Klare, supra note 79, at 276-77 (footnotes omitted).
93. The behavioral claim of CLS. which assumes that preferences are not exogenous but influenced by law, has
been recognized in the work of non-CLS legal scholars. See, e.g.. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,
53 U. CIII. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1986).
94, Gabel & Harris. Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CiArOE 369, 374 (1982-83).
95. See Minda, supra note 15, at 719.
96. As Jerry Frug has put it, "what we need to discuss is our different conceptions of what our profession and our
nation should become; we need to build ways of talking that allow us-all of us--to argue about our future while still
making practical decisions about alternative courses of action." Frug, Language as Power, 84 CoLumt. L. REV. 1881,
1895-96 (1984).
97. See. e.g.. Binder, supra note 10, at 35-36 ("Their aim is to persuade people in power that violent protest by
underprivileged people in America is rational, justifiable, even inevitable."). Duncan Kennedy has advanced this form
of practice as a method for resisting hierarchical power of legal institutions. See D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION A D THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY-A Pot.Et uc AGAINST HE Sysmi (1983). See also Kennedy, Legal Education and the
Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDLC. 591 (1982). The idea behind Kennedy's proposal for legal education has
been described as "a sort of law school cultural revolution." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 69.
98. CLS members, for example, have claimed that traditional legal scholarship has helped create and legitimate a
world that tolerates wide discrepancies in wealth, class, and social position. See Kennedy, Cost-Redtction Theory as
Legitination. 90 YALE L.J. 1275 (1981).
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struction" after the demise of liberal legalism. 99 Other critical theorists, known as the
"irrationalists" or "southerners," argue that all reconstruction efforts are doomed
because attempts at reconstruction are all subject to the indeterminacy critiques. o
The southerners thus apply critical techniques relentlessly to all descriptive and
normative rationalization endeavors.' 0'
Nearly everyone within the CLS movement has sought to demonstrate the
indeterminacy or incoherence of many of the legal profession's traditional beliefs and
theories. The "hallmark" of CLS is unceasing critique, sometimes called
"trashing," 0 2 of liberal claims that seek to establish the coherence and benevolence
of established theory and doctrine.' 0 3 In attacking the idea that it is possible to
objectively demonstrate the "truth" of abstract claims about law and the legal
99. See, e.g., Dalton, Book Review, 6 HARV. ,VOM.N's L.J. 229 (1983) (reviewing THE POt-mCS OF LAW (D. Kairys
ed. 1982)) (describing the rationalist/irrationalist split); D. Kennedy, The American Critical Legal Studies Movement In
a Nutshell 3 (June 1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with The Ohio State Law Journal) (describing north/south split).
The use of such terminology within CLS (rationalist/irrationalist, northerners/southerners) has perhaps had unfortunate
consequences, resulting in confusion.
100. D. Kennedy, supra note 99, at 3. See also Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1377, 1417-23 (1985)
[hereinafter Spring Break].
101. D. Kennedy. supra note 99, at 6. The debate between the northerners and southerners within CLS has involved
nearly every critical methodological issue, but has been especially prevalent in the famous "rights debate" within critical
legal studies. See Symposium-Rights Debate, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984). The northern position on rights accepts the
idea that rights can support progressive efforts even though the liberal conception is rejected. The southern position on
rights argues that all attempts to define and implement a theory of rights have failed to establish a coherent analysis and
that "rights imagery projects an imaginary world of abstracted social harmony that will always be false." D. Kennedy,
supra note 99, at 3.
102. See Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984). See also Binder, supra note 10 (describing how CLS
advocates practice a confrontational form of legal criticism).
103. More recently a new breed of second generation CLS scholar, the postmodern, has sought to break loose from
all claims seeking to demonstrate that legal texts are either "indeterminant" or "determinant." See, e.g., Kennedy,
Spring Break, supra note 100, at 1420. See also Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1985); Frog, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Peller, supra note
52. The postmodern critics have argued that the various left, liberal, and right-wing legal scholar's positions on the
supposed determinacy or indeterminacy of the law are the products of highly contested interpretations of law and social
structures. For example, to discredit "vulgar" and "dogmatic" accounts of indeterminacy associated with the founders
of CLS, a second generation CRIT, David Kennedy, has argued that the indeterminacy thesis of CLS may rest on unstable
or "indeterminant" positions. See Kennedy, Spring Break, supra note 100, at 1420. See also D. Kennedy, Rotation,
supra note 66. David Kennedy's scholarship deliberately resists all tendencies to locate legal criticism in some
authoritarian practice. He thus appears to be constantly reexamining his positions, avoiding moments of closure and
fixation. This aspect of postmodern scholarship drives some critical legal scholars "crazy." See Freeman, Racism, Rights
and the Quest ofOpportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 321 n.75 (1988) (arguing that
David Kennedy's scholarship seems "simply academic-a congealed and reified by-product of a forgotten political
moment."). Another postmodern critic, Gary Peller, has argued that the posture of postmodernism is necessary to "face
the inevitability of politics in the fullest sense." Peller, supra note 52, at 1290.
Postmodernism has also become linked with feminist theory as feminists within CLS began to fashion a new
powerful form of feminist criticism. Francis Olsen's work on gender and sexuality, for example, has utilized
deconstructive methods to show how legal concepts of equality theory simultaneously privilege gender roles by classifying
on the basis of male and female qualities such as rational/irrational, active/passive, thinking/feeling, and so forth. Olsen,
The Sex of The Law (unpublished manuscript on file with The Ohio State Law Journal) (Olsen's paper is discussed in
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 74.) In advocating a new strategy of sexuality based on androgyny, Olsen's work can
be seen as an effort to upset the traditional understanding of sexual roles with the explicit goal of bringing about
revolutionary change in gender relations. See also Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 Asm. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985) [hereinafter Re-Reading Contracts].
Postmodern critical legal scholars have thus elaborated upon the themes of openness and closure, sometimes in a
playful spirit, and sometimes in a serious mode, to reveal the contingency in either the "text" or the "analysis" of others.
Sometimes the form of criticism characteristic of postmodern work focuses on the notion of movements within the
text-the way ideas and concepts become located within positions which constantly move between alternative positions
which assert either negation or connection. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, SPEECH ANO PHENOMENA (1973).
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system, CLS challenges the liberal notion that law is distinct from politics and that
knowledge is distinct from power.'°4 A popular CLS slogan is that "law is politics."
In adopting a critical perspective to law practice, CLS scholars advance
descriptions of the legal system showing how practices within the system "create a
political culture that can persuade people to accept both the legitimacy and the
apparent inevitability of the existing hierarchical arrangement." 0 5 Peter Gabel and
Paul Harris have argued, for example, that the judicial function is "heavily laden
with ritual and authoritarian symbolism" that "signifies to people that those in power
deserve to be there by virtue of their majesty and vast learning." 106 They maintain
that when "[tiaken as a whole, this display of legal symbolism lays the deep
psychological foundation for a political culture that substitutes identification with
authority for real democratic participation and substitutes fantasies of patriotic
community for an actual community founded upon love and mutual respect." 07 The
"conservative power of legal thought is not to be found in legal outcomes that resolve
conflicts in favor of dominant groups, but in reification of the very categories through
which the nature of social conflict is defined."' 0 8
As an alternative, critical legal thinkers have argued that lawyers must be trained
to de-emphasize their role as technical experts by understanding the moral and
political consequences of the work lawyers perform. William Simon has claimed that
lawyers must represent clients to advance the clients' interests and values instead of
the lawyer's interests.' 09 The goal is to reconceptualize the attorney's facilitating role
in the creation of "nonhierarchial communities of interests.""t0 Instead of asserting
their expertise as a function of hierarchical power, lawyers would serve to empower
those who are disempowered by the cultural and intellectual hierarchies of the legal
system. I I "
The CLS perspective about law also influences the way critical scholars
understand adjudication. In his essay on the critical phenomenology of judging, ' 2
Duncan Kennedy describes the experience of a judge struggling to reach a specific
104. See R. UNGR, supra note 90, at 217 (describing the "paradox of sociability" as the "problem posed by the
relation between self and others.").
105. Gabel & Harris, supra note 94, at 372.
106. Id. Hence, "[e]ach discrete conflict is treated as an isolated 'case'; the participants are brought before a judge
in black robe who sits elevated from the rest, near a flag to which everyone in the room has pledged allegiance each day
as a child; the architecture of the courtroom is awesome in its severity and in its evocation of historical tradition; the
language spoken is highly technical and intelligible only to the select few who have been 'admitted to the Bar.'" Id.
107. Id. at 373.
108. Id. As Gabel and Harris have explained:
In a genuinely humane social order, the law would express provisional forms of moral consensus about all
aspects of social life, arrived at through a genuinely participatory process. In our current system, such discussion
is foreclosed by virtue of the abstract or removed character of the political process. Instead, the legality of
hierarchy is frozen in historical rules which assume that the social relations expressed through the existing
institutions of property, contract, and the modern corporations are extensions of human freedom.
Id. Reification is defined as the "attribution of a thing-like or fixed character [given] to socially constructed phenomena."
Id. at 373 n.10.
109. See Frug, supra note 96, at 1894; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29 (1978).
110. Frug, supra note 96, at 1894.
111. Gabel & Harris, supra note 94, at 374.
112. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
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outcome in the context of choosing between competing conceptions of law. Kennedy
argues that the "experience" of judging "is a kind of work with a purpose, and here
the purpose is to make the case come out the way [the judge thinks] justice tells [him]
it ought to [come out), in spite of what seems at first as the resistance or opposition
of the 'law.' "113 Kennedy offers a phenomenological description of the reasoning
process judges utilize in creating legal justifications for decisions they make based
upon precedent, policy, and social and historical arguments. From the perspective of
his hypothetical judge, Kennedy describes how judges are constrained by the "felt
objectivity" of "applying the relevant rules," and yet are pulled by the contingent
experience of arbitrariness in the process of selecting outcomes."t 4 In this critical
view of jurisprudence, adjudication is understood as a process for objectifying and
rationalizing the felt-experience of rule indeterminacy.
CLS scholars also engage in a form of scholarship different from mainstream
legal scholarship. The ambition of most CLS scholars is to describe the internal
structure of doctrine as a "narrative" or "story." They are admittedly committed to
the task of uncovering the hidden assumptions and values of the dominant legal
discourse. By tracing the manner in which discourse is committed to a particular story
or vision about the way the world is supposed, in reality, to operate, CLS scholars
reveal how these narratives reflect underlying ideological biases about the world. In
critical scholarship, other stories about law are told to evoke in the reader the
experience that "things could be otherwise" and that the official stories of the law are
just stories, nothing more or less. This type of critical scholarship thus uses
alternative methods for establishing the "truth" of knowledge: a consciousness-
based, or a phenomenological, form of legal scholarship."l 5
C. Feminist Legal Thought
By the late 1970s, a powerful new theory of jurisprudence came on the scene
offering a distinctively feminist perspective of law and adjudication. Feminist
jurisprudence grew out of the women's liberation movement of the 1960s as women
activists distanced themselves from leftist sexism and dogmatism by establishing
critiques of law and society based on the experiences of women. "16 The emergence
of a truly feminist jurisprudence can be traced to the scholarship of women who
confronted and exposed the political and conceptual barriers to women's emancipa-
tion that were reflected within the theory and practice of mainstream legal theory. "17
113. Id. at 526 (emphasis in original).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Kennedy, Spring Break, supra note 100; Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
251 (1985) [hereinafter Turn]; Pellet, supra note 52; Frug, Henry James, Lee Marvin and the Law, N.Y. Times. Book
Rev. Mag. (Feb. 16, 1986). "A phenomenological approach to legal interpretation stresses the importance of the
individual's subjective experience in developing descriptions and critiques of law based upon the everyday experiences
of social life." Minda, Phenomenology, Tina Turner and the Law, 16 N.M.L. REv. 479, 488 (1986).
116. See, e.g., A. RicH. BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELEcrED PRosE 1979-1985, viii-ix (1986); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 82, at 62 n.4.
117. Feminist legal scholarship is diverse and voluminous. For an excellent discussion of some of the dominant
views within the feminist movement in law, see Bender, supra note II; Colker, Feminism. Sexuali., * and Self. A
Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REv. 217 (1988); Finley, Choice and
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Feminist legal theory, like CLS theory, has been diverse and anything but
monolithic. I I" It is possible to understand modern feminist theory as a reaction to the
jurisprudence of modern legal scholars (primarily male scholars) who tend to see law
as a process for interpreting and nurturing a universal, gender-neutral public
morality.1 19 Feminist legal scholars, despite their differences, appear to be united in
claiming that "masculine" jurisprudence of "all stripes" fails to acknowledge, let
alone respond to, the values, fears, and harms experienced by women.' 20
Feminist legal thought is perhaps the most powerful of the contemporary
movements in legal theory; first, because its foundation, like the civil rights
movement of the 1960s, is sufficiently diverse to include and mobilize all women
(and men); and, second, because feminism demands a fundamental re-examination
and restructuring of existing legal and social arrangements. Feminism, as a
movement in law like other great movements such as the civil rights movement,
represents a transformative cause that challenges the attitudes and beliefs which have
become basic to the professional discourse of the law. Yet, feminist legal theory is
also deeply divided by sharp differences in method, approach, and perspective.
Feminist legal theorists represent a broad spectrum of political and social
perspectives. One group, the Fem-Crits, have organized to encourage and foster the
creation of a "feminist" perspective within CLS. t2t Although the Fem-Crits develop
and rely upon CLS critique, their perspective also diverges from that of CLS. The
crucial difference between Fem-Crits and CLS appears to be that the feminist critique
emphasizes the perspective of women, sometimes relying primarily upon an
experiential discourse, 22 as a basis for knowledge and critique to inform analysis of
social structures, gender hierarchy, and sexual objectification. The CLS critique is
Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914 (1987) [hereinafter Choice]; Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Work Place Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986)
[hereinafter Maternity]; Karst, WIoman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and
Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L. REV. 613 (1986);
Minow, supra note 5; Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View", 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39 (1988); Scales, supra note 16;
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589
(1986); west, supra note 2. See also N. CHODOROw, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); D. DINNERSTEIN, THE
MERMAID AND TIlE MINOTAUR (1976); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); C. MACKINNON, supra note 5.
118. "Feminism is not a monolithic concept but an ongoing conversation about women's subordination." Bender,
supra note 11, at 5 n.5. One of the more recent revelations coming from within the feminist legal movement has been
open discussion of the conflict and divisions within the movement. See. e.g., Bartlett, Book Review, 75 CALIF. L. REv.
1559 (1987) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)); Echols. The New Feminism of Yin and Yang, in
POWERS OF DESIRE, THE VOICES OF SEXUALITY (A. Snitow, C. Stonsell & S. Thompson eds. 1983); West, supra note 2.
119. See. e.g., Scales. supra note 16, at 1385; West, supra note 2, at 27.
120. West, supra note 2. at 29 ("Nor does the Rule of Law recognize, in any way whatsoever, muted or unmuted,
occasionally or persistently. overtly or covertly, the contradiction which characterizes women's, but not men's lives:
while we value the intimacy we find so natural, we are endangered by the invasion and dread the intrusion in our lives
which intimacy entails, and we long for individualization and independence." Id. at 59.).
121. See, e.g., Frug, Re-reading Contracts. supra note 103; Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analsis. 63 TEN. L. REv. 387 (1984); Minow, Rights of One's Own (Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REv. 1084 (1984);
Dalton, supra note 103. The Feminist presence within the Conference on Critical Legal Studies heightened in 1985 when
a group of Fem-Crits organized and planned the first national CLS feminist conference in Boston, Massachusetts. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow provides a brief social history of the Fem-Crits in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 63-66.
122. For a discussion of the experiential perspective, see Schneider, Dunlap, Lavery & Gregory, Lesbians. Gays,
and Feminists at the Bar -Translating Personal Experience into Effective Legal Argument, t0 vostEN's Rrs. L. REP. 107
(1988). Not all feminists accept the experiential perspective. See infra note 128.
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said to be a "male-constructed" form of left criticism "in which domination and
oppression can be described and imagined but not fully experienced." ' 23 Hence,
while CLS critics argue that "law is politics," the Fem-Crits assert that "law is
sexual politics."
Other feminists have maintained their independence from other movements and
academic associations by establishing a distinctive "feminist jurisprudence."' ' 24
Today there are feminist legal scholars who could be characterized as conservative,
liberal-center, or left-radical. Moreover, as the debate involving the equal rights
movement illustrates, there are women who claim to be feminists and yet are also
fierce advocates of political and social perspectives that other progressive feminists
associate with male domination or right-wing causes. The diversity of political
orientation within the feminist movement is possible because the feminist perspective
is itself based upon different vantage points and methods.'1 5
Like CLS, there may be no single "feminist method" or "feminist epistemol-
ogy" which can be identified to characterize feminist legal theory. 126 Because the
problems which concern women involve the experience of women, it is said that there
can be no single method which could hope to capture the experience of all women. 127
If there is a "feminist method" to be described, it is the "method of consciousness-
raising-personal reporting of experience in [a] communal setting to explore what has
not been said." 128 The methodology of consciousness-raising has meant that feminists
have resorted to the use of an experiential discourse in their legal criticism to validate
the experiences of women. 12 9 As the feminist legal theorist Ann Scales has explained:
123. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 61. The difference between critical legal studies and feminism has also
been distinguished on the ground that feminism is an "oppressed people's movement" and CLS is not. See Binder, supra
note 10, at 34-35. Binder explains the difference as follows:
What critical legal scholars do is combat ideology. Unlike feminists they do not combat ideology among the
oppressed; but like feminists they combat ideology among their own class-in their case, the ruling class.
Id. at 35. It has been said that male critical legal scholars are not in the same position as Fem-Crits because they cannot
assert their self-experience as a method of consciousness-raising for emphasizing and transforming the repressive
structures of gender hierarchy. "Critical Legal scholars are not in the same social position [as feminists] and their
conversations, regardless of content, cannot make the same contribution to social change." Id. See also Littleton,
Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. Rsv. 751, 783 (1989) (arguing that
the CRIT "method of 'exploiting contradictions' privileges no particular group's position within the contradiction-riddled
hegemonic structure, and thus ends up giving weight to one's own experience.").
124. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 117; MacKinnon, supra note 6; Scales, supra note 16; West, supra note 2. See
also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 64.
125. See Minow, supra note 5, at 62-64. Minow argues that there is an explanation why feminist discourse appears
to be contradictory to the outside world. As Minow explains:
The inconsistency lies in a world and set of symbolic constructions that have simultaneously used men as the
norm and denigrated any departure from the norm. Thus, feminism demands a dual strategy. First, feminism
must challenge the assumptions of female inferiority-the belief that women fall too short of the unstated male
norm to enjoy male privileges and that women's own traits make male privileges or benefits inappropriate for
them. Second, feminism must challenge the assumption of separate but equal spheres. Thus for more than a
century, feminists have claimed that distinctive aspects of women's experiences and perspectives offer the
resources for constructing more empathetic, more creative, and in general, better theories, laws and social
practices.
Id. at 62 (footnote omitted). See also Minow, supra note 16, at 49.
126. See. e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 70.
127. See. e.g., Minow, supra note 5, at 62-64.
128. Id. at 64.
129. Bender. supra note 1I, at 9 ("Feminist consciousness-raising creates knowledge by exploring common
experiences and patterns that emerge from shared tellings of life events. What were experienced as personal hurts
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Feminist method proceeds through consciousness raising. The results of consciousness
raising cannot be verified by traditional methods, nor need they be. We are therefore
operating from within an epistemological framework which denies our power to know. This
is an inherently transformative process: It validates the experience of women, the major
content of which has been invalidation.
30
In developing a critique based upon the felt-experiences of women, feminists
purport to develop a theory of jurisprudence which speaks directly to the "oppressed,
dominated and devalued" experiences of women.' 3' Like the CLS theorist, the
feminist theorist utilizes an experientially based methodology encompassing a wide
range of methodologies and perspectives. Feminists claim they can do more than just
describe and imagine what it is like to be oppressed-they can actually report on the
experience. 132 Feminists also emphasize that their method is aimed at explaining
"attributes historically linked to women." 133 The objective of such work is to explain
how the law subordinates women by relying upon theoretical distinctions which are
both reified and ordered to favor male interests and values over those of women. 1
34
individually suffered reveal themselves as a collective experience of oppression. Thus, the revelation of feminism is that
the personal is political.").
130. Scales, supra note 16, at 1401 (footnotes omitted). Or as MacKinnon has explained:
Feminism does not appropriate an existing method-such as scientific method-and apply it to a different
sphere of society to reveal its preexisting political aspect. Consciousness raising not only comes to know
different things as politics; it necessarily comes to know them in a different way. Women's experience of
politics, of life as a sex object, gives rise to its own method of appropriating that reality: feminist method. As
its own kind of social analysis, within yet outside the male paradigm just as women's lives are, it has a
distinctive theory of the relation between method and truth, the individual and her social surroundings, the
presence and place of the natural and spiritual in culture and society, and social being and causality itself...
Through consciousness raising, women grasp the collective reality of women's condition from within the
perspective of that experience, not from outside it.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGs 515, 535-36 (1982) (emphasis in
original, footnotes omitted) cited in Colker, supra note 117. at 241. See also Rhode, supra note 117, at 41 (discussing
how feminists seek multiple accounts and multiple theories to illuminate cultural patterns of sexism).
131. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 61.
132. Fem-Crit Menkel-Meadow, for example, argues that "the feminist critique starts from the experiential point of
view of the oppressed, dominated, and devalued, while the critical legal studies critique begins-and, some would argue,
remains-in a male constructed, privileged place in which domination and oppression can be described and imagined but
not fully experienced." Id. Other feminists, however, have raised concerns about the use of an experiential discourse in
feminist writing on the ground that it is too individualistic. See Colker. supra note 117, at 229, 241-42. See also
Bottomley, Gibson & Metcyard, Dworkin: Which Dworkin? Taking Feminism Seriously, 14 J.L. & Soc'Y 47, 56 (1987)
("If we are right that patriarchy is constituted in more than the sum of individual lives then the response to it must be more
than the sum of articulated individual experience.").
133. Rhode, supra note 117, at 42. Rhode calls this method "relation feminism" to stress the importance of
relationships in explaining attributes historically linked with women." Id. She argues that the generic term relational
feminism best describes the common link between all feminists despite their methodological differences. The underlying
idea is that the work of all feminist scholars is "emblematic of the 'woman's point of view.'" Id.
134. Postmodem legal feminists utilize deconstructive techniques to validate alternative, suppressed perspectives,
as a trasformative process for opening up new ways to understand issues beyond women and gender. See, e.g., Minow,
supra note 16, at 47-48. However, not all legal feminists agree that postmodernism is a useful strategy for feminism.
Robin Vest, for example, has recently argued that postmodernism may frustrate, not further, a feminist understanding of
patriarchy and patriarchal power because, she claims, postmodernism is skewed by the male point of view. See R. \Vest,
Postmodernism and Feminist Legal Theory, (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with The Ohio State Law Journal).
See also West, Deconstructing the CLS-FEM Split, 2 Wis. WVOstr's L.J. 85 (1986). Vest argues that postmodernism fails
to appreciate that silence as well as discourse can operate to oppress women. \Vest, Postmodernism, supra. She claims
that postmoderism fails to ground its perspective of criticism within a feminist morality or ethic. Id. Finally, Vest argues
that postmodernism is directed to the task of deconstructing the liberal conception of self; whereas, the task of feminism
has been directed toward another goal-the construction of a definition of a feminist self. Id. Postmoderns, however,
reject the idea that postmodernism implies masculine notions of power, knowledge, morality, or concepts of
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The experiential point of view is utilized by some women to discover their authentic
sexuality and the reality of women's condition. 35
The idea of a distinctively "feminist jurisprudence" can be approached by
examining four principal strands of feminist critique developed from various critical
sources: "equal treatment," "difference," "different voice," and "dominance."
The "equal treatment" strand of feminist thought is associated with a variety of
perspectives and approaches. The least controversial (linked to the debate over the
Equal Rights Amendment and derived from the civil rights movement) argues that
men and women should be treated alike and permitted to compete on equal terms in
the public world. 136 The equal treatment approach seeks to narrow the different
treatment afforded men and women under various gender-based distinctions recog-
nized in law. Feminist advocates of this strand of feminist critique have challenged
"the assumptions of female inferiority-the belief that women fall too short of the
unstated male norm to enjoy male privileges and that women's own traits make male
privileges or benefits inappropriate for them." 137
Other feminists have defended "difference" as a basis for advocating "special
treatment:" the idea that women deserve special benefits because they are different
from men. 38 Martha Minow provides a more recent version of the difference
approach. In her feminist scholarship, Minow focuses on the value of difference and
argues for the creation of a new comprehensive discourse committed to the feminist
goal of thoughtfully considering all minority perspectives.' 39 "Taking minority
perspectives seriously calls," according to Minow, "for a process of dialogue in
which the listener actually tries to reach beyond the assumptions of one reality, one
version of the truth.' ' 40
self. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. The disagreement between West and postmodern feminists may rest upon
different understandings about the nature of postmodernism.
135. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 117, at 241-47. See also Finley, Choice, supra note 117, at 941-43;
MacKinnon, supra note 130, at 519.
136. See, e.g., Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983);
Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv.
265 (1984). See also Finley, Maternity, supra note 117; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 827.
137. Minow, supra note 5, at 62. See also Bartlett, supra note 118, at 1561; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 827.
138. This is often referred to as the "equal treatment vs. special treatment" debate. See. e.g., Finley, Choice, supra
note 117; Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1267 (1987); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 \Votu,'s RTS. L. REP. 172 (1982). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note
82, at 72.
Some Feminists seek to transcend the equal treatment-special treatment debate by arguing for an androgynous
perspective in which aspects of male and female would both be valued by recognizing, for example, that "sometimes it
is rational to be emotional, and that 'objective' claims are inevitably subjective." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 74
(discussing Fran Olsen's contributions to feminist theory). Still others argue that the tension between the "equal
treatment" and "special treatment" approaches are really two sides of the same coin because the real issue on either side
is power. See Minow, supra note 5.
139. See. e.g., Minow, supra note 16; Minow, supra note 2; Minow, supra note 5, at 69-95. See also Minow.
Learning to Live with the Dilemma ofDifference: Bilingual and Special Education, LAw & CoNs'T . Ptons, Spring 1985,
at 157; Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. Micii. J.L. REP. 933, 989-1009
(1985).
140. Minow, supra note 5, at 69-70. The "difference" approach advocated by Minow seeks to place emphasis on
the importance of "understanding misunderstanding" by establishing a way of talking which expresses differences and
communicates "across differences in method, world view, and purposes." Minow, supra note 2, at 95. She asserts that
her idea of a comprehensive discourse is premised upon "a feminist commitment to communication" because the
discourse of difference is based upon "a willingness to relinquish the claim of exclusive truth, and a concomitant
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The "different voice" strand of feminist legal thought is associated with the
pathbreaking scholarship of Carol Gilligan. 141 The different voice perspective asserts
that "there is a distinctively feminine way of approaching moral and legal dilemmas
[that has] been ignored or downplayed in legal doctrine and scholarship." 142 The goal
of such scholarship is to "expose biases in our knowledge due to unstated male
norms." 143 Feminists who advocate the different voice perspective have been called
"cultural feminists" because they tend to equate women's liberation with the
development and maintenance of a female-centered counterculture. The best way to
understand this strand of feminist critique is to consider the images of "the ladder"
and "the web" in Gilligan's description of the responses of two eleven-year-old
children who participated in a moral development study, the Heinz dilemma devised
by Kohlberg. 144
The two children, Jake and Amy, are presented with the following dilemma:
"[A] man named Heinz considers whether or not to steal a drug which he cannot
afford to buy in order to save the life of his wife." 145 The children are told that Heinz
does not have the money for the drug and the druggist refuses to give him the drug
without payment. The question posed is "should Heinz steal the drug?" 146 The boy,
Jake, responds that Heinz should steal the drug because "human life is worth more
than money." 147 Gilligan reports that Jake approaches the problem as "sort of like
a math problem with humans.'" 48 He treats the problem as an algebraic equation and
proceeds to work out the solution. 149 Jake's reasoning process is said to be based
upon rational deduction or what Gilligan calls "a hierarchical ladder of values."' 150
Amy, on the other hand, offers a different response based upon a different
reasoning process. Gilligan reports that Amy felt that Heinz "shouldn't steal the
drug" and that "his wife shouldn't die either."' 15' Instead of searching for a correct
answer based upon a hierarchy of values, Amy saw the dilemma "not as a math
problem with humans but a narrative of relationships that extended over time."1 52
Thus, Amy suggested that "there might be other ways besides stealing:" Heinz could
willingness to hear competing vantage points, all of which are partial." Id. at 97. Minow has explained her feminist idea
of difference in terms of commitment to take the perspective of another person seriously as a basis for understanding
partiality of one's own perspective. "If you try to take the view of the other person, you will find that the 'difference'
you notice is part of the relationship or comparison you draw between that person and someone else, with reference to
a norm, and you will then get the chance to examine the reference point you usually take for granted." Id. at 72. While
offered as a feminist perspective to difference, the approach Minow advocates is a broad-based critique which has
application to non-feminist concerns.
141. See C. GILLIAN, supra note 117.
142. Sunstein. supra note 2, at 827.
143. Bender, supra note 11. at 18-19.
144. See C. GILLUGAN, supra note 117. at 25-63. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 78; Spiegelman,
Integrating Doctrine. Theory and Practice In Legal Education: Balancing the Logic of Jake's Ladder with the Experience
of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 248 (1988).
145. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 117, at 25.
146. Id. at 26.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150, Id. at 62. See also Spiegelman, supra note 144, at 247.
151. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 117, at 28.
152. Id.
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talk to the druggist to explain his wife's situation and perhaps "borrow the money or
make a loan or something" to get the drug. 53 In an attempt to resolve the dilemma
in a way that gives emphasis to the relationship involved, Amy rejected the idea that
Heinz should steal the drug because "[i]f he stole the drug, he might save his wife
then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker
again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good."' 154
Ultimately, Amy concludes that "they [Heinz, the druggist, and the wife] should
really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money." 55
Gilligan argues that Amy's approach to the moral dilemma is based upon a very
different way of looking at the world-a way that conforms to women's experiences
and images of relationships. Gilligan calls this the experience of the image of the
web. "[S]eeing a world comprised of relationships rather than of people standing
alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather than through systems of
rules, [Amy] finds the puzzle in the dilemma to lie in the failure of the druggist to
respond to the wife." 56 According to Gilligan, "[b]oth children thus recognize the
need for agreement but see it as mediated in different ways-[Jake] impersonally
through systems of logic and law, [Amy] personally through communication in
relationships." Gilligan thus uses the image of the hierarchy of the ladder to describe
the perspective of Jake (the experience of males) and the connection of the web to
describe the perspective of Amy (the experience of females). 57
Cultural feminists who follow the different voice strand of feminist legal theory
use these images to show how Jake's image of hierarchy is the dominant image of the
law, and how Amy's image of the web is marginalized or excluded. Cultural
feminists argue that the male perspective found in the discourse of law must be
reconstructed to explicitly take into account feminine values of relationships and
connection, or what Gilligan calls the "ethic of care." 5 8
Finally, feminists who advocate the "dominance" approach, the "radical
feminists," claim that gender inequality in law is not the result of irrational
discrimination but rather the result of the systematic social subordination of women.
Radical feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon, 59 see gender hierarchy and sexual
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 29.
157. Id. at 62-63.
158. Id. Gilligan's "different voice" approach to feminist legal theory has been criticized by other feminists on a
number of grounds. In suggesting that a new form of feminist jurisprudence should be structured around a feminine
"ethic" called "care," Gilligan has been criticized for advocating a gender-based theory which seeks to reinforce the
gender-based stereotypes by giving legitimacy to the belief that "women's role is to care for others while men do more
important things." Bartlett, supra note 118, at 1569. See also Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care,
12 SIGNS 644, 645,648-49 (1987). Others argue that the "different voice" approach is a good starting point for creating
a distinctively feminist form ofjurisprudence. Bartlett. supra note 118, at 1569. But other feminists wonder if the different
voice approach is merely a description of feminine qualities and not a feminist theory at all. "An emphasis on sexuality
within a woman's life may be feminine but not feminist." Colker, supra note 117, at 231. Feminine is thought to be what
women have been allowed to be; whereas, feminism seeks to be politically transformative. Id. at 231 n.42 (citing C.
MAcKINNO,, supra note 5, at 39 ("So I am critical of affirming what we have been, which necessarily is what we have
been permitted, as if it is women's, ours, possessive.")).
159. Catharine MacKianon has been acknowledged to be "the most original and uncompromising of contemporary
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domination in legal and social relations and patterns of interaction between men and
women that are taken as unobjectionable, natural, and even as "intrinsic" to
traditional gender roles. 160 MacKinnon seeks to develop the very idea that sexuality
has been socially constructed by men to establish gender hierarchy. Heterosexuality
is said to be constructed upon the basis of social relations that create dominance and
submission in gender roles. 16' Hence, the underlying social standard of sexuality is
seen as the product of a culture controlled by men to protect male domination.
MacKinnon argues that "[b]ecause the inequality of the sexes is socially defined as
the enjoyment of sexuality itself, gender inequality appears consensual." 162 Thus,
MacKinnon claims that women who find pleasure within heterosexuality find
pleasure in their own subordination. ' 63
According to MacKinnon, "[g]ender neutrality is thus simply the male standard,
and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but do not be deceived:
masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both."' 164 In her view, gender is a
question of power, "specifically of male supremacy and female subordination" 165
and sexual abuse is the "product of women's subordination in society."' 166 In
defining the dominance approach she champions, MacKinnon asserts:
The goal of this dissident approach is not to make legal categories trace and trap the way
things are. It is not to make rules that fit reality. It is critical of reality. Its task is not to
formulate abstract standards that will produce determinant outcomes in particular cases. Its
project is more substantive, more jurisprudential than formulas, which is why it is difficult
for the mainstream discourse to dignify it as an approach to doctrine or to imagine it as a rule
of law at all. It proposes to expose that which women have had little choice but to be
confined to, in order to change it. 167
In utilizing these four different "strands" of critiques, feminist legal scholars
tell yet another story about law and adjudication. Those scholars who are associated
with the "difference" approach claim that the prevailing notions about women in law
deny women the opportunity to compete on equal terms with men. According to this
approach, legal distinctions based upon gender are built upon a gender bias in favor
of men. Other feminists seek to reveal how law has adopted a conception of human
nature that uses "male as the reference point and treat[s] women as 'other,'
(feminist) thinkers." Bartlett, supra note 118, at 1560. According to MacKinnon, radical feminism is the only feminism.
C. MAcKiNNoN, supra note 5. at 137. See also Colker, supra note 117, at 226 n.27.
160. See, e.g., C. MACKLNNON, supra note 5, at 32-45; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 828.
161. C. MACKiNNON, supra note 5. at 50. See also A. DWORKIN, I TERCOuRSE (1987). See also Littleton, Feminist
Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 47 STAN. L. REv. 751, 754-63 (1989) (describing how "MacKinnon's
project is one of searching for a path by which women might become 'a sex for ourselves.'" Id. at 755.).
162. C. MACKINNON. supra note 5, at 7.
163. Id. at 7-8. See also Colker, supra note 117, at 225. MacKinnon and Colker argue that women have been denied
the opportunity to experience or define their own "authentic," as Colker refers to it. sexuality because sexuality has been
defined on men's terms. Id. (citing MacKinnon. supra note 130, at 534).
164. C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 34.
165. Id. at 40.
166. See generally C. MACKtNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF VORKINO WwVOmw: A CASE OF SEX DIscRmINATION
(1979).
167. C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 40.
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'different,' 'deviant,' 'exceptional,' or 'baffling.' "168 Cultural feminists expounding
on the important work of Carol Gilligan have argued that the prevailing legal concepts
of law are based upon a male perspective which fails to recognize the "female
voice"-the way women approach moral and legal issues. Radical feminists have
argued that mainstream conceptions of law reflect social practices and structures that
subordinate women. The radical stance of this view asserts, for example, that sexual
harassment and pornography are a form of sex discrimination which reflects socially
constructed practices that are highly destructive to women. 169
Feminist jurisprudence attempts to tell the woman's story of law-what it feels
like to be a woman living in a legal and social world that is defined and manipulated
by male attitudes and experiences. The goal is to show how the prevailing
conceptions of the rule of law fail to respect the experiences and harms of women by
objectifying women under allegedly gender-neutral legal norms. 170 Feminist juris-
prudence thus responds to the official stories of law told by traditional legal scholars
by revealing the patriarchal values which those stories defend and reinforce. At the
same time, feminist theorists offer alternative stories to reveal law not as a universal
source of free choice and autonomy, but as an experience of contradictory truths,
about "knowing one thing on one level, and a different, inconsistent thing on
another." '7 ' In providing a feminist view of law, these critics focus on the value of
love, intimacy, and relational commitment.
Feminist scholars also attempt to "name" mainstream jurisprudence as "mas-
culine" or "patriarchal" jurisprudence in order to claim a new form of feminist
jurisprudence, distancing themselves from the dominant, masculine forms of juris-
prudence. The project of legal feminists has been described as "the unmasking and
critiquing of the patriarchy behind purportedly engendered law and theory, or, put
differently, the uncovering of what we might call 'patriarchal jurisprudence' from
under the protective covering of jurisprudence." 172 The objective is to "show that
jurisprudence and legal doctrine protect and define men, not women.' 1 73 Other
feminists have sought to reveal how prevailing conceptions of law have established
168. Minow, supra note 5, at 48. This is the important new variation of the difference approach associated with the
scholarship of Minow. This form of Feminist critique attempts to understand law as the "power of naming."
169. See generally C. MAcKINNON, supra note 5.
170. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 117 (arguing that abstraction in Rawl's A THEORY OF JUSTICE fails to take
account of women's experiences).
171. Bartlett, supra note 118, at 1563.
172. West, supra note 2, at 60.
173. Id. Robin Vest attempts to show how mainstream and critical legal jurisprudence have adopted a view of
human behavior which characterizes the experience of men, but not women. \Vest, supra note 2. She argues that male
jurisprudence has adopted a view of human nature which develops its insight from a "separation thesis" which views
individual human beings as separate and apart from each other. Id. at 5. West claims that the experiences of women,
however, are best understood in terms of what she calls the "connection thesis"; the idea that women experience
"connection" with others as a result of the experience of pregnancy and the socialization process. Id. at 14. Because the
dominant forms of jurisprudence are founded upon a separation thesis, Vest claims that all current versions of
jurisprudence fail to respond to the experience of women and thus cannot be defended on universal or fairness grounds.
Her general thesis is based on "the global and critical claim that by virtue of their shared embrace of the separation thesis,
all of our modern legal theory - by which I mean 'liberal legalism' and 'critical legal theory' collectively - is essentially
and irretrievably masculine." Id. at 2.
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patriarchal power by failing to take into account differences in gender. 174 Closely
related to this is a second objective, to show how women and their values have been
subordinated to a male-dominated society and system of law.
Feminist scholars also offer different perspectives on adjudication and the theory
of judging. Certain feminists, even the most radical, argue that a new feminist
jurisprudence requires the recognition of a nonliberal concept of rights-a concept
which can provide effective remedies for the specific harms experienced by
women. 175 This perspective would build upon the traditional notion of adjudication
by having judges do what they are thought to do best-interpret and define rights and
remedies. Other feminist thinkers have argued that the type of feminist analysis
necessary to protect women's interests requires a "rich, contextual thinking" denied
by traditional notions of rights analysis. 176 The more critical feminist argues that
rights analysis, even when done from the female perspective, is "politically
debilitating," and simply too indeterminate to bring about the type of objectives
sought by women activists. 177
These different perspectives of jurisprudence project competing conceptions
about the nature of legal scholarship. In developing a critique of law based upon the
experiences of women, feminist thinkers, like some CLS thinkers, claim that social
phenomena can best be understood in terms of the contextual experiences of certain
societal groups. Phenomenological rather than empirical proof is offered as an
explanation for social phenomena. The speculative and subjective nature of such
"proof" runs counter to the dominant claims of objectivity and neutrality permeating
the "proof" of mainstream legal scholarship today. There is thus a different
understanding of what counts as "academic modes of proof" in the scholarship of
feminist thinkers.178
Feminist scholarship, like some of that of CLS, is also unique in that it is openly
committed to a transformative project. Instead of seeking to describe reality or to
disagree with the way other legal scholars see reality, feminist scholarship seeks to
change reality by transforming the way legal academics understand reality. 179 In
developing a feminist perspective to law and jurisprudence, feminist scholars
question the dominant practices and methods used by traditional scholars for reading
and understanding law. Feminists argue that meaning and interpretation must be
understood against a background of interpretative assumptions that employ the male
as the reference point. These scholars argue that mainstream views reflect the norms,
174. Minow, supra note 5. at 65.
175. For example, MacKinnon has argued that liberalism applied to women is not feminism. "If the sexes are
equally different but not equally socially powerful, *differences' in the liberal sense are irrelevant to the politics of our
situation, which is one of inequality." C. MACKINNON supra note 5, at 237. Thus, MacKinnon sees radical feminism as
the only type of feminism. "Radical feminism, as I understand it. is against gender hierarchy. Since such a critique does
address the situation of women as I understand it. I term it simply feminism." Id. Other Feminists seek to advance
feminist objectives by advocating various law-reform strategies. See. e.g., Schneider, supra note 117.
176. See. e.g.. Finley. Choice, supra note 117, at 941-43.
177. See. e.g., Olsen. supra note 121.
178, West, supra note 2. at 21.
179. C. MACKINr, ON. supra note 5, at 44.
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categorical assumptions, and evidentiary criteria of a particular perspective. Feminist
writers seek to change this perspective by unmasking its ideological biases.
III. THE INTELLECTUAL BOND BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS, CLS, AND FEMINIST
LEGAL THOUGHT
There have been some who have claimed that the new movements in jurispru-
dence share a great deal in common, despite their differences. Martha Minow has
recently observed that behind each of these trends in legal scholarship "is a brooding
doubt about whether law deserves a privileged place in resolving conflict and
ordering society."1 80 In her view, "[e]ach of the different movements search outside
of law to address the question of law's legitimacy." 18' Similar views have recently
been expressed by a leading member of the law and economics movement 82 and by
well-known liberal legal scholars.183
If law and economics, CLS, and feminism differ in so many fundamental
respects, then why do some argue that they share a common ground? A possible point
of intersection is that each of the new movements appears to be a distinctively
dissident movement revolting against the mainstream. There is in fact a deep source
of unity grounded in admittedly different political commitments that nevertheless
unites these movements as oppositional academic movements in the legal academy.
180. Minow, supra note 2, at 89.
181. Id. at 90-91. Minow argues that the group of scholars within each movement has been "preoccupied with the
apparent loss of certainty and determinability within legal reasoning and legal decisionmaking." Id. at 91. Minow
concludes that the debate generated by law and economics and critical legal studies has raised serious questions
concerning "the legitimacy of law within a culture that suspects politics and believes in science or science-like methods
for securing truth." Id. at 90. She speculates that these new theoretical trends in legal scholarship may be hopeful new
developments in that they "offer new ways to discuss real issues in social and political life without adding responsibility
for them to a system of thought removed from human choice." Id. at 100.
182. In a recent essay commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of the Harvard Law Review, Judge Richard
A. Posner, the leading spokesperson for the law and economics movement, argued that "[tQhe supports for the faith in
law's autonomy as a discipline have been kicked away in the last quarter century," partly as a result of "a boom in
disciplines that are complementary to law, particularly economics and philosophy." Posner, supra note 2, at 766, 768.
Posner claims that the recent progress of interdisciplinary approaches in "illuminating law" has "undennineld] the
lawyer's (especially the academic lawyer's) faith in the autonomy of his discipline." Id. at 769. As Judge Posner
explained: "A purely verbal, purely lawyer's scholarship, in which the categories of analysis are the same as, or very
close to, those used by the judges or legislators whose work is being analyzed-a scholarship moreover in which political
consensus is assumed and the insights of other disciplines ignored-does not fit comfortably into today's scholarly
Zeitgeist." Id. at 773.
183. Cass R. Sunstein, a liberal legal scholar, makes a similar claim by suggesting that the emergence of feminist
legal theory has "throw[n] into question practices and conceptual structures that had previously been accepted or even
invisible, and eventually [may] produce . . . substantial change . . . in legal rules." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 826.
Sunstein notes that the feminist movement in law, like the other intellectual and political movements of the past,
challenges "practices that had for a long period been taken as natural and inviolate, sometimes even as based on biological
differences" by revealing how these practices are "socially created and subject to criticism and change." Id. Sunstein
contends that the feminist movement in law "is the most powerful contemporary development" in legal thought, rivaling
movements such as the abolitionist movement of the 1850s, the New Deal, or even the civil rights movement of the 1950s
and 1960s. Id. at 826.
Owen M. Fiss echoes a somewhat similar theme, albeit for different purposes. In a recent lecture delivered at Cornell
Law School, Fiss argued that "[b]oth law and economics and critical legal studies are united in their rejection of the notion
of law as public ideal." Fiss, supra note 2, at 2. In his view, "[b]oth movements can be understood as a reaction to a
jurisprudence, confidently embraced by the bar in the sixties, that sees adjudication as the process for interpreting and
nurturing a public morality." Id. Unlike Minow, Sunstein, and Judge Posner, Fiss believes that at least two of these new
movements in jurisprudence, CLS and L/E, are unhealthy in that they "distort the purposes of law and threaten its very
existence." Id. at 1.
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But what accounts for the fact that there are now three separate groups of scholars
raising objections to traditional forms of jurisprudence?
It may be significant that both law and economics and CLS scholars have
claimed, somewhat ironically, that their movements are rooted in the same intellec-
tual tradition-the tradition of American legal realism.184 Feminist legal scholars
have also recognized the contribution of the legal realists to their methods and
perspectives.' 85 While it would be a mistake to equate the new jurisprudential
movements with American realism, an understanding of the different forms of realist
critique can be helpful for explaining the common ground shared by these new
movements in law. There are a number of distinctive features of law and economics,
CLS, and feminist legal thought that exhibit the forms of critique found in the work
of the realists.
A. Legal Realist Thought
Legal realism, dominant during the 1920s and 1930s, attempted to transform and
undermine the assumptions of American jurisprudence. 186 The body of work which
gave rise to the American legal realist movement is, without doubt, marked by a
committed "engagement in struggle." 87 The realist movement was itself comprised
of conflicting impulses and alternative strands of oppositional thought.' 88
As members of an oppositional movement, legal realists revolted against forms
of so-called "mechanical jurisprudence," namely formalism and conceptualism,
184. See, e.g.. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981); Kitch, The
Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184 (1983); Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal
Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'Y PUB. TcHPs. L. 20, 21 (1980); Tushnet, supra note 75, at 505; Note, 'Round and 'Round the
Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1982) [hereinafter 'Round and
'Round]; Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 1153 (1970) [hereinafter Legal Theory]. See also R.
UNGER; supra note 35; Boyle, supra note 82, at 746-56; Menseh, supra note 3; Peller, supra note 52, at 1220-59. For
a critical review of the relation between CLS and the legal realist movement, see White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal
Studies, 6 STAN. L. REv. 649 (1984). See also Minda, Movements, supra note 20.
The work of the legal realists which has served as the bedrock of American realist thought includes: F. Cohen, The
Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); F. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 CoLUm. L. REv. 809 (1935) [hereinafter Transcendental]; M. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L.
R v. 553 (1933); M. Cohen, Propery and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions
in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918); Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLum. L. REv.
603 (1943).
For general background sources, see G. GjutoR, THE AGes OF Am FtCAN LAw (1977); G. G~u oR, THE DEATH OF
CoNTRAcr (1974); Kennedy, Toward Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal
Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3 (1980)[hereinafter Toward]; Mensch, supra note 3, at 26-29; Peller,
supra note 52; Purcell, The Rise ofLegalRealism, in THE CaSius OF DeIocRATic THEORY (1973); Schlegel, American Legal
Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459 (1979); Singer, supra note
3; Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613 (1987); D. Kennedy, Classical Legal Thought (unpublished
manuscript on file with The Ohio State Law Journal).
185. Scales, supra note 16. at 1400.
186. Legal realism has been described as a "broad and dynamic attempt during the twenties and thirties to alter
significantly the assumptions of American Jurisprudence." Purcell, supra note 184, at 118. Gary Peller argues that "it
is apparent that the realists felt an immediacy and urgency to their work, a belief that they were part of a larger
transformation extending across disciplines, a historic undermining of the dominant ideology." Peller, supra note 52, at
1220. Singer has illustrated how the legal realists "'sought to undermine the public/private distinction that had been
carefully constructed by the classical (legal) thinkers." Singer, supra note 3. at 477.
187. Pellet, supra note 52, at 1220.
188. Legal realism emerged from such early nineteenth century traditions as pragmatism, instrumentalism, and
progreassivism. See M. WHTr, SOCIAL THouGHT IN AmERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FOss.ALtS.1 (1957).
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which prevailed and dominated the judicial imagination during the so-called formalist
era of American legal thought.' 89 The legal realist movement was also a reaction
against the liberty of contract era of constitutional law-a time when the Supreme
Court routinely invalidated federal and state social welfare legislation. 90 The realists
claimed that the Supreme Court's liberty of contract cases were decided by methods
of legal analysis that concealed or deflected attention away from the social
consequences of judicial decisionmaking. t9 t Legal realism was much more than just
a crude belief in the subjectivity of judicial decisionmaking. It was a "many-layered
attack on formalism: on empirical ignorance, doctrinal abstraction, and oppressive
social values."1 9 2 There were, in fact, different critical strands of legal realist thought
which generated different attitudes and perspectives about legal formalism. 193 These
different strands of realist thought could support liberal, conservative, or radical
efforts to reconstruct American law. 194
One strand of legal realist thought was reflected in the scholarship of Felix
Cohen who emphasized a "deconstructive approach" 1 95 to legal criticism: an
approach that focused on the indeterminacy and the circularity of legal reasoning as
a basis for "debunking" liberty of contract discourse. Legal realists like Cohen
taught that legal scholars should be skeptical about claims of legal objectivity; that
many of the key categories of legal doctrine were incoherent, and that a paradigm of
"applying the law" through the formal logic of legal syllogisms was insufficient as
a model or legal theory. As Cohen put it, "the question of whether the action of the
189. See D. Kennedy, supra note 184. For example, the legal realists argued that it was "formalistic" to assume
that there was such a thing as a coherent "concept of freedom of contract" or "free market" independent of normative
questions of policy and morality. See also Singer, supra note 3, at 468-503.
190. See Peller, supra note 52, at 1193. As Gary Peller has explained: "This era is associated with the well-known
decisions in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (where the Supreme Court struck down a Kansas statute forbidding
employers to make nonunion affiliation a condition of employment), and in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(where the Court struck down a New York statute limiting the workday of bakers to ten hours)." Id. at 1193-94. See also
Singer, supra note 3.
191. Legal educators commonly invoke the legal realists as a group to signify some truism about legal
decisionmaking, for example, the proposition that a "legal decision depends less on precedent than on what the judge ate
for breakfast." Singer, supra note 3, at 465.
192. Note, Legal Theory, supra note 184, at 1159.
193. Gary Peller, a critical legal studies scholar, recently demonstrated how one might come to understand the
critique of legal realism in two different ways. See Peller, supra note 52, at 1219-59. For a similar discussion of the
different "traces" of legal realist thought, see Boyle, supra note 82, at 691-705, 746-56.
194. Bruce Ackerman has argued that the realist movement was a conservative movement in that it offered American
lawyers a "face-saving way to keep on talking in the traditional manner despite the political crises this lawyerly tradition
had helped provoke." B. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 41. Ackerman's reading of the work of realists focuses only on the
constructive strand, realism as science. There is, however, a way to read realists as establishing a much more radical
project. See Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARY. L. REv. 863, 866 (1985).
195. Felix Cohen's article, Transcendental, supra note 184, for example, is a classic illustration of the work of a
legal realist as "critic." Felix Cohen demonstrated in his article how legal principles, such as corporations, trade-marks,
or property rights, were flawed by contradiction and circularity of reasoning. Cohen's effort was to deconstruct the legal
concepts and arguments of the dominant discourse of the law in order to reveal how the legal abstractions were
indeterminate and incoherent. See also Peller, supra note 52, at 1227. Peller reveals how the "deconstructive" strand of
legal realism can be found in the work of other legal realists including Holmes and Robert Hale. Id. at 1230-40.
The deconstructive method seeks to reveal how legal rules and principles are indeterminate. Deconstruction was a
method utilized by the legal realist to critique formalism. Deconstruction is also one of the main themes of critical legal
studies. See Tushnet, Introduction, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1984). See also
Peller, Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation, 2 TtJKKEN 28 (1987) [hereinafter Reason]; see infra notes
208-18 and accompanying text.
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courts is justifiable calls for an answer in nonlegal terms. To justify or criticize legal
rules in purely legal terms is always to argue in a vicious circle." 1 96
The realists also argued that law must be studied as "it works in practice by
making use of the social sciences" to establish what Karl Llewellyn called a new
"Realistic Jurisprudence."'197 In this second understanding, realism became associ-
ated with a "post-formalist" method of law study and practice which was itself
influenced by the belief in the empiricism of the scientific method and in the
pragmatism of "skilled craftsmanship." Karl Llewellyn's empirical approach, for
example, focused on human behavior as the basis for understanding what "officials
do about disputes."' 198 Jerome Frank took Llewellyn's approach one step further in
arguing his case for a psychoanalytic understanding of the judicial method. 99 Other
realists defended the social engineering of the New Deal by articulating a coherent
conception of the public interest and then developing legal policies to advance that
interest. 200 These efforts ultimately led to the reconstruction of new public interest
law dedicated to public values and a theoretical practice established by the melding
of the older formalism's craftsmanship skills with new policy instrumentalism.
The scholarship associated with the legal realists thus provides at least two
powerful examples of how one might critique a system of thought and practice
oppositional forms of legal scholarship. 20 t A subsequent generation of legal scholars
could thus claim the realists as inspirational heroes for demonstrating that law could
not be divorced from politics, and that the logical methods of legal analysis could
never justify legal decisions without reference to nonlegal considerations. At the very
same time, a different group of legal scholars could celebrate the work of the legal
realists for demonstrating how one might apply scientific methods and technocratic
craftsmanship to legal study. 202
196. F. Cohen, Transcendental, supra note 184, at 810. See also Peller, supra note 52, at 1229.
197. The idea of "Realistic Jurisprudence" comes from Llewellyn's famous article, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The
Next Step, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 431 (1930) [hereinafter Realistic]. Llewellyn argued that "Realistic Jurisprudence" would
require judges to look beyond abstract legal verbalism and instead focus on behavioral factors--"the area of contact, of
interaction, between official regulatory behavior and the behavior of those affecting or affected by official regulatory
behavior." Id. at 464. The idea of "Realistic Jurisprudence" made the social sciences, including economics, relevant for
law study. As Llewellyn put it: "\When one approaches the law, not with the idea of formulating its rules into a system,
but with an eye to discovering how much it does or can effect ... economic theory offers in many respects amazing
light." Purcell, supra note 184, at 86 (quoting from Llewellyn, The Effect of LegalInstitutions Upon Economics, 15 AM.
ECoN. REv. 682 (1925).
198. Llewellyn, Realistic, supra note 197, at 431. See also Purcell, supra note 184, at 82 ("Llewellyn's empirical
approach concentrated on behavior as the proper subject of study for the legal scholar."); Note, Legal Theory, supra note
184, at 1169,
199. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 140-41 (1949). See also Purcell, supra note 184, at 82-83.
200. Note, 'Round and 'Round, supra note 184, at 1674. An example of such an effort can be found in Lassell &
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Polic'Y: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
201. What united the "deconstructive" and the "realistic jurisprudence" strands of legal realism thought was a
common opposition to the jurisprudence of formalism which came to characterize the liberty of contract discourse of the
1930s Supreme Court. The strand of critical realism associated with the work of the "radical" realists pursued a pure form
of relentless critique of the argumentative structure of the liberty of contract cases in order to show how judges were
essentially unrestrained in legal decisionmaking. The other strand of critical realism, "realism as science," sought to
ground the radical critique of the deconstructive approach in the determinant theories of the social sciences. Both strands
were united in their rejection of the political vision of a jurisprudence which viewed adjudication as a mechanical process
of logical manipulations of legal abstractions.
202. This strand of the realist critique has now associated itself with the "law and..." movements, including law
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B. The Realist Heritage
These two different ways of understanding the work of the legal realists may
help explain why law and economics, critical legal studies, and even feminist legal
scholars might "claim" legal realism as a source of their intellectual inspiration.
Critical legal scholars can argue that they are "heirs" to "realism as critique;" law
and economic scholars can claim that they are the "heirs" of "realism as
science. "203 Feminist legal scholars can acknowledge their indebtedness "to the
Realists for their convincing demonstration that the law could not be described, as the
positivists had hoped, as a scientific enterprise, devoid of moral or political
content." 204 All three movements can be seen as post-realist oppositional movements
rebelling against mainstream legal thought in much the same way that the legal realist
rebelled against the formalism of the liberty of contract era in constitutional law. 20 5
Like the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s, practitioners of each movement
have raised fundamental questions about the way mainstream legal scholars have
come to understand law and adjudication. Law and economics builds upon the idea
and economics, law and society, and others. The law and society movement, for example, is a movement which has
concerned itself with studying law and legal institutions "from the outside" by applying empirical methods to analyze and
criticize legal phenomena. Unlike law and economics, law and society practitioners have adopted the empirical
perspective of the social scientist for advancing progressive causes, and to this extent, the movement has alliances with
CLS. But "[s]ince many of the law and society scholars saw themselves as objective observers of law, not law reformers,
these normative implications did not receive sustained attention in their work." Minow, supra note 2, at 93 n.32.
According to one of the leading proponents of the law and society movement, David Trubek, "[law and societyl differs
from most feminist legal theory and from critical legal studies in its commitment to empirical research and its close
connection with the social sciences; and from law and economics in the pluralism of its use of various social scientific
and humanistic discourses." Letterfrom David Trubek, Newsletter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, July 1988,
at 14. An academic journal, LAW AND SocErY REviEw, is devoted to law and society scholarship.
203. Peller, supra note 52, at 1226-59. Boyle sets out a somewhat similar description of different "traces" of legal
realist thought. Boyle, supra note 82. He argues that at least three different traces or themes of critical thought can be
discovered in the work of the realists, structured by the binary opposition between what he calls the "structuralist" and
"subjectivist" strands of critique. Id. at 740. Boyle's thesis is "simply that these two strands represent a good way of
'getting at'.. .the most important philosophical issues and some of the most important existential experiences with which
social theory and political action have to deal." Id. at 740-41.
This does not mean that law and economics, CLS, or feminist scholars believe their work to be merely a continuation
of the American realist tradition. It would be a serious misinterpretation of these movements to equate them with realism.
There are, in fact, a number of distinctive features of the new jurisprudential movements which are quite different from
the work of the realists. See infra notes 205-19 and accompanying text. See also M. KELMAN., supra note 66, at 12-14
(describing how CLS differs from the realist project); Scales, supra note 16, at 1400 (describing how realists "did not
press their critique deeply enough.").
204. Scales, supra note 16, at 1400. The legal realist movement was essentially a movement of elite white male
scholars. As a faction, these scholars are just as much subject to the feminist critiques as any other male-dominated
movement-including law and economics, critical legal studies, or mainstream legal thought. Of course, the realists were
writing at a time when few, if any, voices (female or male) even realized the lack of a feminist perspective in law.
However, at least one realist apparently understood that there might be a problem. In responding to Theodore Roosevelt's
"sneer" at the legal profession as "especially fitted for the weaker sex," Jerome Frank wrote:
I think that the young Roosevelt was right in his conclusion, wrong in his attitude. For I believe that the judicial
process is one of the best means worked out by human society for the adjustment of many of its difficulties. I
believe also that flexibility, tact, and the understanding of people, are more important in the practice of the 'law'
than what has usually (but erroneously) been considered legal logic-the rigorous application of fixed legal
principles. To what do these beliefs add up? To the conclusion that it is the so-called "feminine" attitudes,
rather than the so-called "masculine," that are essential in the task of administering justice.
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AiERICAN JUSTICE 386 (1949).
205. These new movements are post-realist movements because they build upon the critiques of legal realism in
order to criticize the legitimacy and coherence of the prevailing conception of law and adjudication within the legal
profession. Hence, while right-wing law and economics and left-wing critical legal studies represent different ideological
camps, they are united in their opposition to some of the central premises of mainstream legal thought.
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of "realism as science" in its effort to reconstruct a new determinate theory of legal
analysis developed from the "science" of economics. 20 6 Critical legal studies and
feminist legal theory have developed the strand of legal realist thought which pursued
a deconstructive approach to legal criticism. This approach questions the idea that law
consists of a coherent body of principles and policies that informs and rationalizes
fundamentally shared values.207 Each movement can be seen to be practicing merely
a different form of legal criticism-forms of critique which draw upon the legacy of
legal realism-in opposing mainstream legal thought.
Like the realist movement, each of the new movements has also promoted
nonlegal methodologies for gaining insight into the nature of law and adjudication.208
Using these nonlegal techniques, the new critics question whether traditional forms
of legal analysis and "principled decisionmaking" can give determinate and
consistent expression and meaning to modern liberal virtues. 20 9 Members of each
movement assert that the judicial process, as it works in practice, is far too
inconsistent, unstable, and biased to support the claims of liberal scholars who
advocate it as a principled, consistent process. 210 Each movement, in its own way,
rejects the liberal notion that judges can rely upon an autonomous legal methodology
for choosing between hotly contested positions involving politics, economics, and
gender.2 1' Hence, while each movement offers fundamentally different ways of
206. See supra note 54.
207. Id.
208. Each movement argues the necessity for turning to new methods in resolving the critical issues of the day. See
Ninow, supra note 2. Both law and economics and critical legal studies reject the view widely held by lawyers and judges
that legal problems can be analyzed and studied "autonomously" by objective methods of legal reasoning and analysis.
209. By modern liberal virtues I am referring to the values of the liberal jurisprudence which some legal scholars
have identified with the Warren Court era-namely the presupposition that legal process and legal reasoning can be a
vehicle for expressing and preserving fundamental shared values. See. e.g., Fiss, supra note 2. Of course, not all members
of the new jurisprudential movement would embrace the values of the Warren Court. The Chicago School of economic
analysis, for example, appears to be hostile to the liberal virtues of the Warren Court.
210. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controvers': The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (CLS scholar arguing that liberal theories of constitutional scholarship are
essentially incoherent and indeterminate); Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 4. 8-9 (1984) (law and economics scholar arguing that the traditional methods of the judicial process are
unprincipled and inconsistent, but that constitutional interpretation has become increasingly principled as judges have
adopted the law and economics approach).
211. While LIE, CLS, and the feminist legal theories challenge established liberal notions of mainstream legal
scholars, not all members of these movements oppose Liberalism as a political philosophy. Liberal feminists, of course,
support liberalism. Northern CRITS who defend the rights theory also support aspects of liberalism. Strands of the law
and economics movement, especially the liberal school, can be understood to be working to defend the mainstream
scholars' vision of the liberal state by offering a new technocratic method for realizing the virtues of liberalism. Even the
conservative LIE scholars of the Chicago School could be seen to advance arguments which offer justifications for the
existing institutional practices of the modem liberal state as well as the doctrinal legal categories which justify the current
distribution of wealth and income in America. See M. KELMAN, supra note 66. at 115.
Perhaps the willingness of LIE scholars to defend existing institutional practices of the modern liberal state may
explain why mainstream liberal scholars are more tolerant of law and economics. For example, Fiss has observed that
-[t]he practitioners of law and economics tend to be better behaved; their mission more nearly accords with the traditions
of the academy than does that of critical legal studies scholars.' Fiss, supra note 2, at 2. While Fiss is critical of the
Chicago School of law and economics, he finds the liberal branch of LIE associated with some of his colleagues working
in the New Haven School to be on the right track and more faithful to the role of law as public ideal. Id. at 7.
Hence, while law and economics scholars are tolerated because they fit the traditional mold. CRITS are ridiculed
because they are thought to be nontraditional in their beliefs and life styles. In fairness to Fiss, it should be noted that
he has since recanted his views of critical legal studies scholars at a speech at the Jurisprudence Section meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools in New Orleans, on January 5. 1989. Fiss now accepts the CLS movement as a
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looking at the world-different ideologies, politics, metaphors, and narrative
structures-all three movements appear to share a commonality in rejecting the
hegemony of traditional understandings of law and adjudication.
C. What is New About the Movements of the 1980s
The jurisprudential movements of the 1980s offer new forms of legal criticism
that go beyond the criticism of the legal realists, establishing systematic or totalistic
critiques and analyses of the structure of American law. 21 2 The legal realists were
mainly concerned with critiquing individual cases and particular methods of legal
reasoning. Law and economics, critical legal studies, and feminist legal scholars offer
more than just new ways to critique cases or analyze law. Each of the new movements
have attempted to develop a new theoretical approach for analyzing American law
"across the board." Law and economics scholars show how various legal subjects
can be approached from the context of a unified approach based upon the logic of
economic rationality. Critical legal scholars seek to demonstrate how the system of
law as a discourse of power reinforces and legitimates social domination. Feminist
legal scholars practice a totalistic critique in their demonstration of how American
law supports and defends gender-based hierarchies of power and privilege.
Although law and economics is a diverse movement, all members are united
under a common theoretical perspective which assumes that human beings are
rational creatures that behave in ways tending to maximize their self-interest. This
movement is quite broad, however, with fundamental disagreement among various
"schools" of law and economics helping to advance different normative objectives.
Chicago School practitioners argue that efficiency should be the prevailing norm,
while other practitioners either remain agnostic or advance other philosophical
values. Despite basic differences about objectives and methodologies, all members of
this movement share an understanding of law and adjudication which is structured by
the belief that law is, or at least should be, rational.
The critical legal studies movement is also a diverse movement structured by a
common perspective about law and adjudication. CLS advances a world view based
on the presumed "irrationality" of law as revealed by the indeterminacy of law's
various doctrines and the behavior of law's actors. Some CLS scholars argue that law
and human behavior are too irrational and unpredictable to be the subject of a
coherent and determinist theoretical explanation. Others argue that law is quite
predictable when understood in light of its underlying biases, assumptions, and
ideological tilt. In advancing various indeterminacy theses, CRITS seek to reveal
worthy scholarly movement, and that some of its practitioners, especially Frank I. Michelman and Peter Gabel. offer
useful critical perspectives. Certainly, law and economics scholars have not suffered the degree of scorn that some
traditional legal scholars have exhibited toward practitioners of CLS and the feminist legal movement. See, e.g., Frog.
McCarlzyism, supra note 15. For example, no one has suggested that practitioners of law and economics should leave
the legal academy because they believe in a different legal vision or fail to share a particular creed. Nor have law and
economics scholars experienced the type of academic freedom problems that CLS and feminist legal scholars have
apparently encountered. See Kuttner, Free Ideas at Harvard Law School Aren't So Free, Boston Globe, May 18, 1987.
at 19, col. 1. See also Bernstein, Profs Say Dalton Was Treated Unfairly, Harvard Crimson, May 13. 1987.
212. See Boyle, supra note 82, at 706; Note, 'Round and 'Round. supra note 184. at 1686-89.
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how law serves to justify domination and privilege through an abstract discourse
which claims neutrality in process and outcome. Unlike law and economics scholars,
CRITS argue that law and its processes fail to account for the difference between self
and others. In developing a new critical phenomenological discourse, CRITS seek to
show how the sphere conversed by law includes politics.
Feminist legal theory is also a diverse movement united by a common
perspective for understanding law and adjudication. Feminist legal scholars resist
male-constructed perspectives in order to pursue alternative, suppressed perspectives,
and in order to open up new ways for understanding legal issues.2 13 Like the CLS
scholar, most feminist critics reject the idea of a universal and abstract methodology
in favor of a contextual, experiential perspective. Feminist legal scholars also seek to
reveal how traditional legal discourse serves to dominate, oppress, and devalue the
experiences of women. In seeking to claim jurisprudence for feminists, these scholars
have worked to show how forms of masculine jurisprudence, including the radical
version of CLS, reproduce and reinforce a perspective based upon gender hierarchy.
In contrast to the message of CLS, feminist legal scholars seek to reveal the sexual
politics of law and to discover ways for understanding legal issues from the
perspective of women.
Law and economics, critical legal studies, and feminist legal scholars thus
transcend the critique of legal realism by highlighting the inability of mainstream
legal scholars to appreciate the economic, political and gender context of law and
adjudication. In developing a new systematic understanding of the economic analysis
of law, law and economics scholars claim to offer a much more sophisticated basis
for establishing a new "rational" approach to legal analysis. The new developments
in law and economics represent significant advances compared to "social science"
scholarship of the legal realists. In this way, law and economics may offer a new
"constructive" understanding of the legal process school. 214 As Mark Kelman has
observed, law and economics may represent "the best worked out, most consum-
mated liberal legal ideology" of the sort that modern liberal legal scholars have
sought to defend and that CLS scholars have tried to understand and critique. 215 From
this perspective, one can see the L/E movement as "an academic school which has
advocated, normatively, a certain general vision of state function as well as particular
implementing practices and a movement that purports to present a general descriptive
theory of existing legal practice." 2 16
Critical legal studies and feminist legal scholars have also gone beyond the legal
realists in developing new forms of legal criticism. Critical legal theorists have
213. See, e.g., Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Micn. L. REv. 797, 821-22 (1989) (arguing for a nongendered
form of feminism which would "'follow through domesticity's insights into the gender structure of American capitalism
to their logical conclusion.").
214, See, e.g.. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 13 (developing an argument in favor of comparative negligence which
complements Rawlsian notions ofjustice); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 354 (developing a progressive LIE approach
to administrative law which is intended to complement the process-oriented theory of John Ely).
215, M. Kelman. The Law and Economics Movement: Normative Social Theory 183 (unpublished manuscript on
file with The Ohio State Law Journal).
216. Id. at 184.
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"pushed beyond realism" in developing a deeper understanding of "law as
politics.''217 While the radical strand of legal realist thought demonstrated how
judges employed "class bias and bad logic" in legal decisionmaking, CLS theorists
attempt to reveal how the belief that "law is rational" or the myth of "neutral law"
is betrayed by a "set of contradictions that beset the liberal view of the state.''218
Feminist legal critics have, in turn, argued that law must be understood in terms of
the gender bias which underlies the way traditional legal scholars perceive the world.
In rejecting claims of neutral law, CLS and feminist scholars appear to be united in
their disagreement with law and economics scholars, who argue that the inconsis-
tencies of traditional legal methods can be rendered determinant by the so-called
"scientific" methods of economics. 2 19
CLS and feminist legal scholars have also raised new theoretical questions about
the nature of truth and meaning as well as concepts of rationality and the limits of
scientific reasoning. In pushing the realists' deconstructive approach to new limits,
CLS and feminist practitioners have developed a theoretical critique which "tran-
scends" law in its attempt to demonstrate the "politics of reason." 2 20 Both CLS and
feminist legal scholars have argued that the realization of the liberal ideal of "a
government of law, and not men" requires a controversial metaphysics 22 1disguised
as the patriarchal structures of "gender and political hierarchies. "222
CLS and feminist legal scholars have questioned the manner in which traditional
legal discourse is constructed (including the claims of legal rationality made by L/E
scholars) to distinguish legal discourse from other ways of thinking and communi-
cating about the social world.223 The deconstruction strategies of postmodern CRITS
attempt to show how "the purported distinction between rational legal argumentation
and irrational emotional appeal is incoherent.' '224 The objective of such work is to
reveal how claims of rationality exclude other ways of understanding the world, other
knowledge, and other ways of being. 225 The goal of such analysis appears to support
the feminist objective: demonstrating the underlying openness of the legal system for
experimenting with new ways to respond to the interests and experiences of
women. 226 In rejecting the cynical resignation of legal scholars, who accept the
217. See Boyle, supra note 82, at 706.
218. Id.
219. Indeed, there is now a growing body of critical legal scholarship which critiques law and economics
scholarship. See, e.g., Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769; Kelman, supra note 88; Kelman, supra note
52; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Moves in Contract and Tort Lai., With Special Reference to Compulsory Tenns
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) [hereinafter Distributive]; Kennedy, supra note 29; Kennedy
& Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HoFSrA L. REv. 711 (1980). These critiques of the law and
economics scholarship advance the general form of CLS critique of mainstream scholarship. Thus, CLS scholars argue
there is simply no politically neutral, coherent way to discuss whether a legal decision is efficient and wealth maximizing,
or whether benefits outweigh costs. For a summary of the specific critiques, see M. Kelman, supra note 215, at 184.
220. Boyle, supra note 82, at 707.
221. Id. at 705.
222. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 5.
223. Peller, supra note 52, at 1154.
224. Id. at 1155.
225. "The point is that the attempt to exclude other discourses from the legal world because they are 'merely'
myths, poems, or opinions is mistaken. Legal reasoning itself depends on metaphor and myths of origin." Id. at 1156.
226. But see supra note 122.
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inevitability of the status quo, CLS and feminist practitioners communicate a Utopian
vision about law-that there are "grounds for hope" because "things could be
otherwise." 7 Law and economics scholars could be seen to advance a similar
message in claiming that legal choices are available to improve the economic
well-being of society.
Each of these new movements thus expresses different disillusionment about the
traditional forms of legal scholarship. L/E scholars argue that traditional methods of
legal scholarship are woefully inadequate because they lack "scientific" rigor. L/E
scholars look beyond the legal texts to develop a new determinant theory of rights
based upon the quasi-science of economics. CLS scholars, on the other hand, seek to
show how traditional forms of legal scholarship can be subjected to political criticism
based upon an understanding of the relationship between knowledge and politics.
CLS scholars thus look beyond law to examine politics. Modern feminists question
the claims of traditional legal scholars who defend judicial virtues on the basis of a
universal, gender-neutral process. These scholars assert a new form of feminist
criticism which looks into law and politics from the perspective of women in order
to discover the influence of gender. In their own distinctive ways, each of these
movements questions the legitimacy of forms of legal analysis which have become
divorced from an economic, political, and social context. To understand the unity
between the three movements, it is necessary to now describe briefly the mainstream
position that they seek to transform.
IV. MAINSTREAM LEGAL THOUGHT
If legal realism inspired a new generation of legal critics, it also challenged and
transferred mainstream thought. A new generation of legal scholars reacted to the
challenge posed by the realists and constructed new theories of law and adjudication
that accepted the public interest or social engineering strand of legal realism but
rejected the extreme craims of the deconstructionists. 228 While recollections of the
227. "And that is finally what may be the most infuriating and subversive message of the CRITS-not at all their
supposed 'nihilism.' but their insistence, to those who have come to equate maturity and realism with a cynical
resignation, that there are grounds for hope." Gordon, supra note 15, at 86.
228. The deconstructive strand of legal realism was dismissed by modern doctrinal scholars as "nihilistic,"
"morally relativistic," and "nominalist." Peller, supra note 52, at 1222 (citing L. FultEF. THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF
(2d ed. 1940)); Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUt. L. REv. 352, 357-58 (1931); Dickinson, Legal
Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1931); Fuller. American Legal Realism, 82 U.
PA. L. REv. 429 (1934); Harris, Idealism Emergent in Jurisprudence. 10 TUL. L. REV. 169 (1936); Kantorowicz, Some
Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240 (1934); cf. Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA L. REV. 669,
672 (1936); Miltner, Law and Morals, 10 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 8 (1934); Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,
44 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1931); Pound, The Future of Law, 47 YAL L.J. I, 2 (1937).
The objection and fear was that the radical skepticism of the legal realist might lead legal scholarship to a "dead
end." There was an emerging new confidence at this time in the scientific method and the ability of "man" to solve social
problems through rational techniques. The era of ideology struggle seemed to be at an end; a new era of "reasoned
elaboration" seemed possible. By the end of the 1930s many of the best known realists eventually embarked on a new
effort to "reconstruct" an objective theory of law by turning to the social sciences and pragmatic social engineering. The
concerns of intellectual discovery and social improvement led a number of the realists to look to the social sciences for
guidance in developing a new public interest law. Others gave up teaching and practicing law and joined the New Deal
effort established by the F.D.R. administration. Ultimately, the rise of fascism in Europe and world war II made it
difficult, if not impossible, for legal academics to sustain the realists' assault on the legitimacy of American law.
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misadventures of Justice McReynolds and the 1930s Supreme Court remained
"vivid" in the minds of legal scholars, there was a renewed sense of optimism within
the 1950s and 1960s generation of legal scholars that an alternative jurisprudence
could be found to "answer" the questions posed by the radical challenge of legal
realism.
A. Process Theorists
A new pluralism in legal methodology has now been established with the
"uneasy marriage" 2 29 of the formalist and realist traditions. During the 1950s, a new
paradigm in legal analysis, known as the "Legal Process" school, emerged
promising legal objectivity of "reasoned elaboration" that combined principle and
policy in an effort to recreate the idea of neutral decisionmaking.2 30 A major tenet of
this school was to provide an objective "process" determined by legitimate
procedures and proper institutions for resolving subjective questions of "public
policy." '23' The hope was that judicially conceived notions of self-restraint and the
duty to render a "reasoned decision" would establish constraints on the freedom of
a judge in deciding issues of subjective value. The realist critique of "subjectivity"
in decisionmaking would thus be avoided by a new understanding of "legal
reasoning" and the process of adjudication. 232
229. See Note, 'Round and 'Road, supra note 184, at 1669.
230. This post-realist movement is commonly associated with the scholarship of Henry Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks.
See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLFNIS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (198 1); Peller, Neutral Principles in the
1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988). See also G. WHITE, THE AMERtCAN JUDICIAL TRADmON: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMiERICAN JUDGES 230-96 (1976); Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks,
29 ARtz. L. REV. 413 (1987). Hart and Sacks articulated the new pluralism of legal process by suggesting that it was
possible to identify a legal method of "reasoned elaboration" for resolving controversial issues of public policy in a
determinant manner. The idea of "reasoned elaboration" assumed that decisionmakers could discover determinant legal
solutions in a way that would give effect to fundamentally shared values. "In short, principles and policies of law
comprise [in the view of the Legal Process school] a background... a substratum of values which inform and rationalize
the rules and standards of the law." Id. at 420. Hence, the idea of reasoned elaboration signifies "a sense of craft within
which the judiciary could elaborate principles and policies contained within precedent and legislation to reach a reasoned.
if not analytically determined, result in particular cases." Peller, supra, at 595. The basic tenets of this school were
premised upon the view that the legal community could develop a coherent theory of the shared social values embodied
within the law. See Mensch, supra note 3.
23 1. The underlying theory of legal process focused on questions of institutional competence, reasoned elaboration.
and democratic government. See, e.g., Greenwalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
982, 982-83 (1978); Singer, supra note 3.
232. Thus, H.L.A. Hart argued that there were characteristically judicial virtues that potentially constrained judges
in legal decisionmaking. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). These constraining virtues were described in
terms of "values" such as "impartiality" and "neutrality" in surveying the alternatives, "fair consideration" for the
interest of all who will be affected, and "judicial rationality" that some acceptable general principle be deployed as a
reasoned basis for decision. Professor Herbert Wechsler, in turn, argued that judicial authority rests on "principle
neutrality" or "reasoned principle." See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv.
1 (1959), reprinted in H. vECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS. AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961). See also Greenwalt, supra
note 231; H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 230. The thrust of their argument was that judges should be constrained from
interjecting too much ideology into decisionmaking at the expense of consistency and principled reasoning. The
underlying idea was that judges were supposed to decide "like cases alike" and to base decisions on reasons that have
general application. While judges may be required to make difficult choices between conflicting values, they should make
those choices fairly and impartially, and apply neutral principles. In response to the question of the legal realists who
questioned the ability of judges to render neutral decisions, Professor Wechsler stated: "The answer... inheres primarily
in that ... [judges] are-or are obliged to be-entirely principled. A principled decision ... is one that rests on reasons
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A fundamental source of difficulty posed by the idea of an objective legal
process is that the theory failed to specify a principled method for determining the
bounds of discretion afforded judges in choosing between different techniques of
interpretation.2 33 Even if one were to accept the existence of "reasoned elaboration,"
"neutral principles," or "objective interpretation," judges would still need to know
how to choose between any number of possible meanings ascertainable from different
interpretations and defensible on rational and other grounds. Even more perplexing is
the possibility that process theory might fail to support morally correct results in
particular cases. The problem is that process theorists failed to establish that there is
a necessary analytical link between their theory of law and social justice. The reality
of inequality and oppression in America during the 1950s and 1960s was largely
irrelevant to those who believed that law should be defined exclusively in terms of
rational modes of decisionmaking. 234
Indeed, while the process orientation of these theorists shifted attention away
from substantive values to "the process by which legal institutions operate," the
Warren Court era in constitutional adjudication and the events of the 1960s refocused
scholars once again on substantive principles and outcomes. The normative justifi-
cation for cases like Brown v. Board of Education235 made the position of legal
process scholars untenable. It was difficult to square decisions like Brown with the
process-oriented perspective which uncritically assumed that American law was the
product of a free and democratic process. 236 The racial segregation at issue in Brown
with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved." Wechsler. supra, at 27.
233. This has been the source of the current debate in constitutional law about whether the Supreme Court should
give effect to the original meaning of the framers in interpreting the Constitution. The debate involves a host of
interpretative theories about constitutional adjudication such as "originalism," "textualism," and "intentionalism." See
Lyons. Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning. 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 75 (1986).
234. See Peller. supra note 230, at 620 ("Despite its progressive and sophisticated tone, the process rhetoric was
the language through which socially comfortable and intellectually sophisticated white Northeasterners translated their
own social assumptions into language that was culturally acceptable in their environment because it did not bear the
obvious baggage of bigotry." In eschewing ideological preferences, for example, judges in the Legal Process School were
supposed to preserve the integrity of the legal system by preventing individual biases and preferences from influencing
the resolution of disputes. The belief in the "characteristically judicial virtues" of rationality, neutrality, and respect for
the institution fails, however, to instruct judges on the proper course of action when they are faced with subtle choices
between different modes of interpretation in adjudication. Even the most careful of legal process scholars would now seem
to agree that it would be difficult to "evaluate the consistency of judge from case to case, and difficult even for the judge
who aims for consistency to be sure that he was not being swayed by non-relevant factors in particular cases." Greenwalt,
supra note 231, at 982-83. Indeed, it is now recognized that "occasional compromises" of legal process virtues must
be made and judicial decisions might have to be "sacrificed" for other social goals in making choices about different legal
interpretations. Id.
The now classic illustration of this approach can be found in the liberal jurisprudence of the Warren era in civil rights.
Indeed, it was the Warren Court activism in civil rights culminating in such celebrated decisions as Shelley v. Kramer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). which presented serious challenge to the
dominant ideology of the Legal Process School. The Warren Court decisions on race were particularly troublesome
because, while they seemed to be obvious victories for "truth and right," they were under sharp attack by well respected
legal scholars such as Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, and Philip Kurland. Greenwalt, supra note 231. A. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970): P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CoNsrTTrrUToN AND THE WARREN COURT
(1970). See Wechsler, supra note 232. These scholars launched "widesweeping indictments of the Warren Court's
performance, claiming that the Court had constitutionally enshrined its own egalitarian sentiments without adequate
justification." Greenwalt, supra note 231, at 982-83.
235. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
236. Peller, supra note 230, at 610.
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was, after all, the product of a pervasive system of state-supported institutionalized
racism which itself called into question the legitimacy of an objective process. Hence,
the liberal jurisprudence of Earl Warren called into question the validity of process
theory.
B. Law as Interpretation and the New Rights Theorists
Mainstream legal theorists today seek to avoid the moral bankruptcy of process
theory by advancing new theories of adjudication that claim legitimacy by appealing
to democratic values and process. These theorists appear to accept the idea that law
is indeterminate but argue that adjudication can be more or less objective, con-
strained, and rational. They postulate that judges operate and are restrained by
established rules, customs, and conventions of legal culture. These rules and customs
are what Owen Fiss calls the "disciplinary rules" found in the "interpretative
community" of judges, or what Ronald Dworkin calls the judge's "interpretative
attitude.''237 These "disciplinary rules" or "interpretative attitudes" establish the
basis for believing in the possibility of an objective interpretation for "filtering" and
discovering community values.
By advancing the idea of "law as interpretation," these scholars have adopted
the understanding that adjudication is interpretation and that judges can make
rational choices about sharply contested issues by identifying shared or community
values through an objective interpretative process. For example, Fiss has claimed
that "[ad]judication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process by which a judge
comes to understand and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text and the
values embodied in that text."-238 Ronald Dworkin has advanced a similar claim in
arguing that "we can improve our understanding of law by comparing legal
interpretation with interpretation in . . . literature.' '239 Modern liberal scholars thus
share an ideological commitment that objective methods of interpretation can be
identified as giving effect to the community of values which epitomize the Warren
Court era. 240
Modern liberal theorists such as John Rawls,24' Ronald Dworkin, 242 John
Ely,2 43 and Bruce Ackerman 244 have in turn attempted to construct new interpretative
theories of rights and judicial process, by elaborating upon ideas of community
237. R. DWORKIN, supra note 3. Fiss, supra note 3.
238. Fiss, supra note 3, at 739.
239. Dworkin, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1982). But see West, Adjudication is
Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1987).
240. The field is divided, however. While some scholars believe that interpretation can be grounded in objectivity
and shared values, other scholars working in the law as interpretation school argue that legal interpreters are "'for all
intents and purposes, free" to construct their own interpretations of legal texts and discover their own values. See, e.g..
Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 551 (1982). See also S. FISH,
Is THERE A TEXT IN Tins CLASS? (1980).
241. J. RAWLS, supra note 3. Nonliberal versions of the new rights theory have also been offered. See, e.g.. R.
NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
242. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 3.
243. See. e.g., J. ELY. supra note 3.
244. See. e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 3; B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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norms, "shared values," and fair procedures that responsible individuals would
consent to within a structure of rational consent. The goal of such scholarship is to
create a new theory of rights or process based upon normative legal argument. 245
First, the objective of much of new rights discourse is to specify fair decisionmaking
standards for "filtering community values." ' 246 Some rights theorists hypothesize
how community values would emerge from an objective and authoritatively defined
"choice situation." 247 The process-oriented approach to rights theory thus imagines
the existence of a neutral medium for discovering shared values. 248 Rights theorists
also rely upon a framework of interpretation which combines descriptive and
normative arguments for objectively prescribing fundamentally shared values. 249 In
short, legal principles help prescribe the relevant process and range of normative
argument for resolving substantive issues.
An alternative paradigm born out of the legal process tradition thus seems
possible to some legal scholars-one that is more traditional in its understanding of
the legal realist's project. This alternative paradigm arises from the view of
traditional legal scholars who have accepted the skeptical, functional approach of the
realists but who have rejected the political and ideological ramifications of realist
critique 5 0 This alternative paradigm adopted the legal realists' view that law must
look outward for legal justifications, but rejected the radical implications of the
realists' assault on the objectivity of law.25 ' Proponents of this view proclaim that the
application of genuine public values shared withinthe community can settle public
policy issues through either strong adherence to the "legal process" virtues of
reasoned judgment and rational technique 252 or by adherence to the liberal ideals of
universalism and impartiality. 253
245. Singer, supra note 3, at 508.
246. Id. at 510.
247. Id.
248. The most famous version of this is J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971). See also J. ELY, supra note 3
(developing a process-oriented approach for constitutional review of substantive rights).
249. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 3. As Singer explains the work product of these scholars:
This second framework for rights theory combines descriptive and normative theory. Dworkin asks judges to
determine what the consensual practices and beliefs of our community are, and to identify principles that "fit"
both with precedent and community values. But they are also to examine those community norms critically, with
an eye toward generating principles that can be normatively and rationally "justified" from the standpoint of
"substantive political morality."
Singer, supra note 3. at 570.
250. For example, it is not uncommon to hear traditional legal scholars reject the legal realist project as "a naive
attempt to do empirical social science" and yet at the same time proclaim that "we are all realists now." See Schlegel,
supra note 184, at 459-60.
251. These scholars defend the view that it is possible to develop a coherent theory of law and adjudication for
resolving uncertainties posed by controversial legal questions involving conflicts in values. In short, these legal scholars
advanced the idea that legal decisionmakers can discover and implement a reliable method for informing and rationalizing
the rules of law. See also Minow, supra note 2, at 93.
252. See, e.g., J. RAWLs, supra note 3.
253. See. e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1566-71 (1988) (arguing for a new
liberal republican philosophy of law).
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C. How Each Movement Critiques the Mainstream
Modern day law and economics, CLS, and feminist legal scholars offer different
modes of legal criticism challenging the views of mainstream legal scholars. Law and
economics scholars argue that the dominant methodology of the legal process school
is inadequate because it lacks scientific rigor and a persuasive theory for developing
a consistent theory of decisions. These scholars argue that "[h]opes for a better
society do not justify unreflective treatment of the tradeoffs we must make in a world
of scarcity." 25 4
Some law and economics scholars take issue with liberal scholars who argue that
objective decisionmaking standards can be inferred from an interpretative community
or from some enduring theory of legal rights. 255 Other L/E scholars accept the liberal
vision of shared values, but offer a more determinant methodology for realizing the
liberal vision. These scholars argue that judicial decisionmaking has and will become
increasingly consistent as the judiciary adopts the law and economics perspective. In
place of process values of "harmony," "stability," and "shared-values," law and
economics scholars argue that in the "real world," what count are the "facts of
life"--"scarcity," "choice," and "self-interested conduct.''256
Adherents of the CLS movements argue that the legal scholars' current plea for
reaffirmation of the "virtues" and "morality" of the legal process serves only as
protection for the professional status of a particular conception of the judicial process
that has dominated the profession since the 1950s. 257 CLS scholars argue that
mainstream scholars can defend their claims of rational, determinant law only by
establishing a theory of law that projects false and misleading visions about the nature
of law in American society. 258 CRITS argue that legal interpreters are always free to
choose between a host of possible techniques, outcomes, and values. In place of the
process virtues of stability and shared values or liberal ideals of universalism and
254. Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authorit'y: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 629 (1985) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's constitutional decisions have become increasingly coherent as the Court has adopted the LIE
perspective). Judge Easterbrook's view of statutory interpretation reflects a public choice theory which views legislation
as the product of political bargains. See Fox, The Politics of Laiv and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust
As A Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 560 (1986). Moreover, unlike liberal constitutional scholars who advance
noneconomic goals such as fairness and justice, Easterbrook can see no public purpose other than efficiency for statutory
interpretation. See id.
255. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2.
256. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 254 (arguing that "scarcity," "choice," and "self-interested conduct" are
"the facts of life" which judges must sometimes respond to in legal decisionmaking); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13,
at 341 ("Economics tries to reveal the costs in time, money, and energy of all of life's enterprises; it refuses to permit
dreamers to ignore scareity.") See also Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 863, 864 (1985)
(describing how "liberal reformist legal thinkers" are challenged by "law-and-economics" adherents' claim to scientific
rigor and hardheaded realism about 'the way things are' "').
257. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 230 (describing the ideology of mainstream legal scholars of the 1950s and how
that ideology came to dominate the thinking of a generation of post-war scholars). See also Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981) (describing the various "responsive modes" of traditional legal scholarship in
denying "the historical and cultural contingency of law.").
258. See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 3, at 207 ("[Tlhe difference between critical and mainstream
legal thought is that, although the latter rejects formalism, it persists in the view that some viable distinction can be drawn
between legal reasoning and vulgar political debate"). See also Mensch. supra note 3. at 29-37; Schlegel, Introduction.
28 BUFFALO L. REv. 203 (1979).
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impartiality, these scholars argue that law and adjudication are the product of
"conflict," "struggle," and "politics."
Feminist legal scholars assert yet another set of related claims. Feminists argue
that modern legal scholars seek to justify a perspective of law shared by men but not
by women. They assert that traditional legal scholars can claim consistency and
fairness only by relying upon a conception of law and adjudication which excludes
the perspectives of others who are at the margins of power. Feminist scholars advance
the perspective of women's experiences and the values such a perspective represents.
In place of the process values of "universality" and "objectivity," these scholars
argue that law must be contextual, particular, and obedient to human values of love,
commitment, and care.
All three movements thus challenge the pragmatic and antitheoretical stance of
traditional doctrinal scholars, who argue that questions of public policy can be settled
by an autonomous and universal "legal process." 2 59 Law and economics scholars
argue that modern liberal scholars have internalized a "political" view of "law as an
autonomous discipline"-a view which assumes that law is "a subject properly
entrusted to persons trained in law and in nothing else.' '260 L/E followers assert that
this way of thinking is "old-fashioned, pass6, tired"; 26' that it ignores the insights of
other disciplines; and that it assumes a political consensus can be reached for deciding
upon an official method for legal decisionmaking.2 62 L/E scholars argue that it is
"wrong" to assume legal problems can be "informed by one set of premises and one
method of argument.''263 L/E scholars thus look beyond law to develop new
determinant theories for establishing law's legitimacy.
CLS scholars, in turn, challenge the notion that legal texts contain neutral
meanings which can be "correctly" discovered by "authoritative" legal interpretive
methods. 264 They argue that the claims made by modern liberal scholars defending
259. See. e.g., C. MAcKINNON, supra note 5; R. UNGER., supra note 35; Easterbrook, supra note 210; M. Ot.sE ,
supra note 33; Posner, supra note 2; Scales, supra note 16; Tushnet. supra note 75.
260. Posner, supra note 2. at 762. In reacting to Judge Posner's essay, Erwin N. Griswold wrote:
[Judge Richard A. Posner's] essay is thoughtful and penetrating, but it does take me by surprise. It has never
occurred to me that the law is an "autonomous discipline." and I do not think that that was the lore of the
Harvard Law School when Judge Posner was a student or at any other time in the twentieth century. It always
seemed to me-and I was taught--that the law sought light from any source, and that contributions from other
fields were welcome and relevant.
Griswold, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Han'ard Law Review: Introduction, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 728. 729-30 (1987).
While it may be true, as former Dean Griswold argues, that modern legal scholars look to sources "outside the law"
for insight about their subject, modern legal scholars nevertheless make assertions about the meaning and application of
those insights in the context of an autonomous legal methodology.
261. Posner, supra note 2, at 773.
262. Id.
263. Easterbrook. supra note 210. at 4.
264. Borrowing from the field of literar postmodern criticism, critical theorists have challenged the notion that
legal texts contain meanings which can be "correctly" discovered by utilizing "authoritative" interpretative methods. See
e.g., Frug. supra note 115; Kennedy. Turn, supra note 115. See also Minda, supra note 115, at 487 n.34. By
deconstructing legal texts into equally plausible counter-meanings, these educators have sought to illustrate how a
community of legal interpreters has performed an ideological function by creating legal meanings which fail to perceive
honest differences and alternative ways of being. Their goal is to empower the reader so that she can evaluate the
inescapably ideological character of legal thought. For a general introduction to deconstruction as a new postmodern
critical attitude toward interpretation. see Peller. Reason, supra note 195.
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modern liberal methods are simply too inconsistent and incoherent to support such a
conception of law. CLS scholars argue that the class of law interpreters is too elitist
and privileged to be relied upon as a representative of the values and interests of those
within the larger society. 265 Both CLS and feminist scholars argue that the traditional
methods of legal reasoning ignore the significance of contingency and difference.
Feminist scholars build upon the CLS critique by rejecting the notion that law
can be studied as an autonomous system, abstracted from the reality of class, race,
and gender differences. These scholars use the experiences of women to show how
allegedly neutral abstractions of mainstream legal analysis privilege the male
perspective. Feminist scholars argue that claims of objective and universal law mask
discriminatory content and application under male-constructed norms of jurispru-
dence.
Feminist critics, like the critics of L/E and CLS, look beyond law to ascertain
how the traditional understanding of adjudication reflects a cultural perspective which
fails to respect the realities of women in the world. Like L/E critics, feminist legal
scholars argue for a view of law that evaluates the effectiveness of legal rules by
judging their instrumental capacity in promoting the well-being of individuals.
Hence, while Chicago School L/E scholars argue that efficiency or wealth maximi-
zation should be the general welfare standard, feminist legal scholars argue that a
broader definition of substantive equality should be the standard. 266 Feminist legal
scholars, like CLS scholars, argue that law must be approached from a multi-
disciplinary perspective focusing on political culture and the social basis of politics.
Members of each of the new movements in jurisprudence also exhibit various
degrees of antipathy toward the rights theories of mainstream legal scholars. Chicago
School law and economics scholars claim that the assignment of legal rights is
theoretically irrelevant in cases without transaction costs.2 67 Where transaction costs
block bargaining, these L/E scholars treat rights as if they were mere "price signals"
for allocating scarce resources to their most efficient uses. L/E scholars who are
associated with other schools of law and economics have adopted behavioral
assumptions which analyze legal rules as incentives which influence how individuals
respond to rules. 268 The new generation of L/E scholars, like the founders of the
Chicago School, no longer give primary significance to the traditional legal scholars'
concept of rights and their correlative duties.
The analytical move of L/E scholars thus allows a shift from rights to policy;
these scholars argue that economics equips lawyers with a new understanding of how
to make legal policy analysis much more rigorous and scientific. Rather than
deducing meanings from abstract legal concepts like freedom of contract and
265. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 8, at 771.
266. A feminist critique of law and economics might seek to show how the principle of wealth maximization serves
to entrench sexism and patriarchal structures by solidifying the position of the status quo. If wealth is maximized in a
society structured by the values of patriarchy, then disadvantages resulting from gender differences would probably be
worsened. The hand of the dominant class would be strengthened at the expense of the weaker class.
267. As Singer has noted: "'[t]he rights theorists have attempted to modernize and revitalize social contract theory;
the law and economics scholars sought leave to do the same for utilitarian theory." Singer, supra note 3, at 513.
268. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 45; R. CoorER & R. ULEN, supra note 25.
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property, L/E scholars approach legal analysis by drawing assumptions and making
predictions from "models" of economic behavior. 269 Their goal is to redefine legal
rights by unifying law and the social sciences thereby erecting a new structure for
instrumentally approaching law. 270
CLS scholars also reject the conception of rights advanced by mainstream legal
thinkers. Some CRITS reject the modern rights theorists' belief in a rational basis for
making normative judgments. Such an appeal is seen as founded upon an unrealistic
belief that noncontroversial criteria can be found to support the judgments that all
reasonable persons in society would accept. Most CLS scholars point to the existence
of doctrinal inconsistencies and indeterminacy as examples of the controversial nature
of the normative judgments made by traditional scholars. 27' A minority faction within
CLS argues that the liberal conception of rights can be transcended and re-established
by redefining rights to correspond to the needs of disadvantaged social groups.
Finally, while substantial disagreement exists, some critical thinkers have claimed
that the trouble with rights is that they reinforce a profoundly self-destructive and
alienated form of human consciousness. 272
Feminist legal critics challenge the rights theories of traditional legal scholars by
demonstrating how those theories fail to respond to the social, economic, and
political harms of women. A central point to the feminist critique of rights is that
abstract formulations of rights actually conceal gender-biased hierarchies and
coercive systems of relationships. 273 Some feminists argue that the rights discourse of
modern scholars "has an unofficial, underground, subterranean potentiality, only
occasionally recognized, but nevertheless always there." 274 According to this view,
rights discourse must be used carefully to advance feminist interests or to remedy
their harms. 275 Other feminist thinkers argue that the concept of rights must be
transformed to take into account the differences of others. Minow argues, for
example, that "[i]nstead of trying continually to fit people into categories, and to
enforce or deny rights on that basis, we can and do make decisions by immersing in
particulars to renew commitments to a fair world. ',276 While feminist legal scholars
269. Singer, supra note 3. at 514. "[E]fficiency theorists reject the idea that one can deduce the inherent meaning
of legal entitlements from abstract concepts." Id. at 515.
270. Id.
271. Some CLS practitioners claim that abstract concepts of rights cannot be rendered determinant by either theory
or social context. As Mark Tushnet has claimed, "[slpecifying a particular right is thus either an act of political rhetoric
or a commitment to social transformation." Tushnet, An Essay on Rights. 62 Tax. L. REV. 1363, 1380 (1984).
272. See Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1563 (1984); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 207 (1984). But see
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 401 (1987)
(arguing that rights can empower the disadvantaged).
273. See, e.g.. MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory. reprinted in FEM.NIST THEORY: A CRITIQE OF IDEOLOGY 1 (1982).
"To say that the personal is political means that gender as a division of power is discoverable and verifiable through
women's intimate experience of sexual objectification, which is definitive of and synonymous with women's lives as
gender female. Thus, to feminism, the personal is epistemologically the political, and its epistemology is its politics."
Id. at 535 (footnote omitted).
274. West, supra note 2. at 52.
275. "As a consequence, [the Rule of Law] can be used and occasionally is used to ameliorate the sorrow we feel
as a consequence of our alienation, as well as to protect the autonomy we value against the very real threat of
annihilation." Id.
276. Minow, supra note 5, at 91.
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advance different views on how to "feminize" rights, as a group they believe that
prevailing "masculine" theories of rights must be resisted.
Thus, members of each movement reject a number of the central premises of
mainstream legal theory, including the assumption that judges or legislators can
discover shared values;2 77 the idea that a political consensus on fundamental issues
exists; 278 the belief that American society consists of a harmonious, conflict-free
citizenry who share profound values; and the idea that law and legal reasoning can be
the basis for establishing a universal, autonomous system of thought.279 Practitioners
of each movement argue for a new "realism" that reflects the deep conflict and
tension present in a world comprised of sharp political and economic differences-a
world where scarcity, privilege, sexism, and disadvantage are ubiquitous.
V. How SOME LEGAL SCHOLARS HAVE REACTED TO THE NEW MOVEMENTS
The new movements have provoked a response from a number of distinguished
legal scholars. Some have called into question the new critics' professional and
ethical commitment to law and the legal profession. 280 Others have argued that the
new critics are practicing dangerous forms of criticism. 28' Still others have ques-
tioned whether the new movements will make communication and discourse within
the profession impossible. 282 The response of these scholars establishes examples for
understanding the mainstream position that the new movements are now criticizing.
The response of mainstreamers to the competition of the new critics also suggests that
the resolution of paradigm conflicts will not be resolved by theoretical proofs, but
will instead depend upon the force of conviction and pleas for commitment to
preserve the status quo.
A. The Plea for Commitment to the "Rule of Law"
Perhaps the most notorious reaction to one of the movements, CLS, was Paul
Carrington's metaphoric essay, Of Law and the River,2z 3 which sparked a heated
controversy among the pages of the Journal of Legal Education.2 84 Carrington argued
that law teachers who "embrace nihilism and its lesson that who decides is
everything, and principle nothing but cosmetic [have] an ethical duty to depart the
law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy." ' 28 5 The essay
277. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, at 773.
278. Id. See also Freeman, supra note 184, at 1233-34.
279. See, e.g., Mensch, supra note 3, at 30.
280. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 7.
281. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2. Still others have argued that some of the new movements are simply "wrong."
See Hegland, supra note 81 (criticizing the deconstructive stategy of CLS).
282. See, e.g., B. ACKERM AN, supra note 3, at 42.
283. Carrington, supra note 7.
284. See Martin, supra note 7.
285. Carrington, supra note 7, at 227.
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provoked bitter controversy because it was generally understood as a broadside attack
on the critical legal studies movement. 286
Carrington subsequently stated that it was not his intent to question the
professional ethics of all persons "having sympathy or connection with CLS" but
"to comment instead on Legal Nihilism." 287 Additionally, Carrington has made clear
his "oppos[ition] to Red Hunts and loyalty oaths." ' 28 8 A number of legal scholars,
including a few who are identified with the mainstream position which CLS
criticizes, nevertheless strongly objected to the overall position Carrington advanced.
Guido Calabresi of Yale University Law School retorted that "if in all honesty what
the scholar sees seems false, then the scholar must declare it to be false even if that
opens him or her up to the charge of nihilism." ' 289 Owen M. Fiss, rejecting
Carrington's suggestion of a purge of the so-called nihilist, argued that "[w]e cannot
shut off an avenue of inquiry, for fear that it would render the professional training
[in law school] pointless.... [I]t is of the essence of academic freedom to allow all
sides to speak." g290
However, while most legal scholars have found the idea of a purge distasteful,
there remains a lingering concern within the legal academy over whether the new
trends in legal theory represent healthy developments for law and legal scholarship.
Dean Carrington's essay may thus articulate what other legal scholars have been
unwilling to say-that some forms of legal criticism, especially the form represented
by CLS, are threatening to the profession because they undermine the commitment
that lawyers owe to the "Rule of Law. '"291 So, while most legal academics would
probably agree that "nihilists" should not be excommunicated from the academy,
there is far from a consensus on whether "nihilistic" scholarship satisfies academic
tenure requirements for retention, or whether "nihilistic" candidates for appointment
represent hot prospects for upgrading the institution's scholarly status. In performing
their gatekeeping function, mainstreamers appear to demand that new members to the
profession demonstrate their scholarly commitment to mainstream perspectives on
law and adjudication. The assertion of professional "standards" may thus become a
subterranean basis for mainstreamers to defend their particular conception of law and
adjudication. 292 Members of the new movements risk ultimate exclusion in advancing
286. See, e.g., Robert IV. Gordon to Paul D. Carrington, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985); Paul Brest to Phillip E.
Johnson, 35 J. LEGAL EDoc. 16 (1985).
287. Paul D. Carrington to Robert W. Gordon, 35 J. LEGAL EDC. 9, 10 (1985).
288. Id.
289. Guido Calabresi to Paul D. Carrington, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 23 (1985). "1 also cannot say-because I know
few of them well, and do not know them all--that all members of the CLS are honest in their nihilism as Leff and Gilmore
were. But if they are-and the burden must be on those who claim they are not to show it-then they are as worthy of
being teachers of law as those of us who do not, in all honesty, share their vision." Id. at 24.
290. Owen Al. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington, 35 J. LEGAL EDvc. 24 (1985). "Every law school should confront the
question whether law exists, and it is of the essence of academic freedom to allow all sides to speak, even those who would
answer that question in the negative and thus recommend that our doors be closed and resources be used for other
purposes," Id.
291. See, e.g.. Hegland, supra note 81 (While Hegland states that he does not "share Carrington's position," id.
at n. 46, he nevertheless argues that commitment to the "Rule of Law" has professionally important value.).
292. The plea to obey "the law" may represent a "strategy utilized to shift the debate within the profession about
the content of law and legal education over to a debate about the necessity of protecting law and its institutions from
non-believers." Minda, supra note 15, at 721. What may be at stake in the debate provoked by Dean Carrington's essay
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scholarly projects which mainstreamers find to be objectionable. In some cases, mere
association with the new movements has resulted in a decline in civility and trust of
one's colleagues. In other cases, membership has resulted in academic isolation and
exclusion. The danger, of course, is that a new group of scholars may be effectively
suppressed from advancing alternative professional conceptions of law and adjudi-
cation crucial to the scholarly and pedagogical mission of the nation's law schools.
B. The Plea for Shared Values and Public Morality
Perhaps the most eloquent and thoughtful spokesperson and defender of the
mainstream position of liberal legal scholars has been Owen M. Fiss. Fiss has offered
honest criticism of the new movements without embracing the tainted position now
attributable to Carrington. Fiss has also been extremely forthright in explaining his
strongly held convictions about law and adjudication. In his Stevens lecture at
Cornell University School of Law, Fiss presented the most forceful argument and
defense of the conception of law that has come to represent the position of liberal
scholars-the idea that law and adjudication express a public morality and an
objective process for discovering law's legitimacy.
In his lecture, ominously entitled The Death of the Law?, 293 Fiss argued that law
and economics and CLS "were dangerous jurisprudential movements" because
practitioners of those movements "distort the process of law and threaten its very
existence.'"294 Fiss criticized the strand of LIE associated with the Chicago School
because its arguments and methodology depend upon what Fiss deems "contestable
assumptions" about law and adjudication.2 95 Fiss claimed that the new economic
analysis of law "fails to supply the explanatory mechanism needed to give [the
movements' claims] predictive validity, or even descriptive credibility. ' '2 96 He
argued that the "normative" claims of the hardliners within this movement rest upon
a "crude instrumentalism" that would lead to the "relativization of all values." '2 97
Fiss thus asserted that the law and economics movement fails to reflect the way the
judiciary understands its own role-' 'judges do not see themselves as instruments of
efficiency, but rather as engaged in 'a process of trying to understand and protect the
values embodied in the law.' '298
is whether a particular conception of professionalism should be allowed to displace other conceptions for no reason other
than somefelt necessity about the faith in the need to protect the "Rule of Law" from non-believers. See also Minda,
The Politics of Professing Law, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 61 (1986).
293. See Fiss, supra note 2.
294. Id. at 1.
295. Id. at 4.
296. Id. at 5.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 8. Fiss acknowledges, however, that "some practitioners of Law and Economics (originally based in
New Haven)" offer a more acceptable view of law and adjudication-a view which shifts its focus from private law
subjects to "the great public law cases of our day." Id. at 7. He thus defends the liberal school of law and economics
because he finds that the scholars of this school better understand the "larger role for law ... in qualitatively different
terms." Id. According to Fiss, "[tihe role of the law is neither to perfect nor to replicate the market, but rather to make
those judgments that the adherents of law and economics claim are only 'arbitrary,' i.e., a mere matter of distribution."
Id.
Ironically, it may be the hardliners of the Chicago School that provide Fiss with his strongest source of support.
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As for CLS, Fiss argued that such practitioners critique without a vision of what
might replace that which is destroyed- a form of critique Fiss finds "politically
unappealing and politically irresponsible. ' 299 Fiss argued that the indeterminacy
claims that CRITS assert about law are suspect because the assertions have not been
empirically established or defended. 3°° Fiss argued that the "law is politics" creed of
CLS is threatening to both law and morality because there is no way of confining the
"law is politics" criticism. 30 ' Fiss claimed that the CLS movement has generated a
new and dangerous form of nihilism which threatens the ability of law to sustain or
generate a public morality. 302
In defense of a liberal, yet more traditional, form of jurisprudence, Fiss invokes
the great struggles of the civil rights movement and the liberal values associated with
the Warren Court era as examples of the public morality and concept of law that he
favors. Thus, Fiss claims that "[t]he proponents of law and economics would have
us believe that the typical nuisance case, or for that matter, a case like Brown v.
Board of Education,30 3 is simply a conflict over preferences, and that it arises
because the preference of all parties cannot be fully satisfied."3"4 As for CLS, Fiss
argues that the nihilism of CLS is dangerous because it undermines the law's belief
in the fundamental values fostered by cases like Brown.30 5 Like other modern liberal
scholars, Fiss posits the notion that an objective interpretative process can establish
a necessary balkline for defending a conception of public morality symbolized by
Chief Justice Earl Warren. 30 6
While Fiss acknowledges that feminism is a "new cause" which he sees as
having "achieved (at least in New Haven) the momentum that once belonged to the
civil rights movement,''307 he warns feminists that they may also fall prey to the
dangers that have befallen the CLS and the L/E movements. Hence, Fiss argues that
the "bears of the (feminist) cause" must "cease to view gender issues as a matter of
individual or group interests, and recognize the claim to sexual equality as an
expression of the ideals and values we hold in common." 308 Fiss thus admonishes
These L/E scholars offer objective methods for making legal choices that avoid the necessity of making arbitrary
subjective choices in decisionmaking. See Posner, supra note 2. See also Singer, supra note 3, at 55 n.106, citing
Kennedy, Distributive, supra note 219, at 621. Not unlike the claims of liberal scholars, L/E scholars of the Chicago
School argue that their particular method and perspective should be privileged over all other methods and perspectives
because their theory allegedly avoids the necessity of taking sides on sharply contested values. Liberal LIE scholars are
much more tentative and less certain about the possibility of realizing consistent and determinant decisions. Where LIE
scholars differ is in their rejection of the liberal notion that "'principles of law could be inferred from judicial opinions."
Posner, supra note 2, at 762. Thus, Fiss' criticism of the hardliners of the Chicago School may have been substantially
wide of mark-methodologically, those scholars may be his strongest allies.
299. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 10.
300. Id. at 12.
301. Id. at 13.
302. Id. at 15.
303. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
304. Fiss, supra note 2, at 8.
305. Id. at 11.
306. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 29-30 (using Justice Warren's decision in Brown as an example of
the public morality which can be defended under an interpretation of the Constitution).
307. Fiss, supra note 2, at 15.
308. Id.
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feminist thinkers to commit their movement to a view of law which embraces the
fundamental ideals of liberalism.
While Fiss has since recanted much of his criticism of the CLS movement in an
unpublished speech, 309 he has remained staunchly committed to his overall jurispru-
dential position, a position which the new critics, including CLS, criticize. Indeed,
much of Fiss' views about the law must be understood in terms of his firmly felt
convictions about the Warren Court era. 310 The missing ingredient in Fiss' defense of
a liberal, more traditional jurisprudence is the affirmative justification for believing
that his particular professional conception of law and adjudication is in fact superior
to the ones he criticizes because it will serve to protect the jurisprudential values he
associates with the Warren Court. It is one thing for Fiss to advocate a position on the
basis of conviction; it is a different matter altogether for Fiss to establish the validity
and truth of his convictions, no matter how strongly felt.31'
The conviction that an objective legal process can guarantee and preserve the
values of civil rights, equality, or an entire constitutional era is, of course, something
which at least some members of the new jurisprudential movements debate and
ultimately reject. It is not just the new critics who have come to question the
conviction of those who believe that a particular form of jurisprudence can preserve
the fundamental values of the Warren Court. Indeed, a growing number of court
observers are quite pessimistic and skeptical about the lessons to be drawn from the
Warren Court era.31 2 As Derrick Bell has observed, "ij]ubilant predictions of victory
in the struggle against racism based on a favorable court decision or helpful statute
309. See supra note 211.
310. For nearly a decade Fiss has been warning of the dangers of new jurisprudential trends which depart from the
style of jurisprudence characterized by the Warren court era in constitutional law. Fiss asserts that during the Warren
Court era of the 1960s, judges sought to provide "structural reform" by giving "meaning to our public values." Fiss,
Foreword, supra note 8, at 2. According to Fiss, Earl Warren symbolizes the "great judge"---"someone whom the
specter of authority both disciplines and liberates, someone who can transcend the conflict." Fiss, supra note 3, at 758.
The public values which "great judges" give effect (values such as equality, liberty, and due process) are thought to have
a "true and important meaning" such that judges can discover and make them meaningful. Fiss, Foreword, supra note
8, at 17. "The task of ajudge, then, should be seen as giving meaning to our public values and adjudication as the process
through which that meaning is revealed or elaborated." Id. at 14. Fiss admits that he is "a romantic and an innocent."
Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington, supra note 290. It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, to sustain the
conviction and romanticism of the Warren Court when the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have established examples of
what a Supreme Court is like. See Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch, Legisprudence and the New Legal
Process, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1071, 1093 (1988).
311. Fiss acknowledges that his assumptions are "open to a factual challenge, as any empirical claim must be."
Fiss, supra note 2, at 203. Hence, his theory of jurisprudence is subject to the same challenge he raises against CLS and
LIE. Fiss asks for the proof that "our legal culture is sufficiently developed and textured so as to yield a body of
disciplining rules that constrains judges and provides the (rational) standards for evaluating their work." Id. at 11. If the
claims of I/E and CLS are empirically weak, as Fiss suggests, then why does Fiss perceive these movements to be so
dangerous? A movement founded on empirically weak claims would hardly present a danger to traditional dogma unless
the profession uncritically accepts the unverified claims as truth. In fact, if either I/E or CLS is dangerous because the
profession may readily accept unfounded assertions about law and adjudication, then might not Fiss be seen as advancing
an equally dangerous position? If, however, the real danger presented by LE or CLS discourse is that it is transforming
the content and meaning of justice, then the true source of objection is politics, not empirical impression. See F.
Michelman, Bringing The Law To Life: A Plea For Disenchantment (unpublished manuscript on file with The Ohio State
Law Journal) (arguing that "law is-that is ought to be, and ought to be understood to be politics").
312. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUsTtcE (1987). See also
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1331 (1988); Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 295 (1988).
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL MOVEMENTS
have always proved premature." 3 13 Anti-discrimination law has accommodated
conservative as well as liberal views of race and equality; there is no guarantee that
a particular form of jurisprudence fosters a particular moral vision. 314 The new critics
can thus argue that there is no evidence, in theory or practice, to support the
conviction that an objective legal process will ever overcome racism, sexism, and
economic disadvantage. The new critics can also offer alternative conceptions of law
that promise to preserve the very values which Fiss and other liberal scholars try to
defend.
Hence, law and economics scholars argue that there is an economic justification
for supporting cases like Brown, and for rejecting the principle of separate but
equal. 3 1.5 "Segregation reduces the opportunities for valuable associations between
races and these associations would be especially valuable to the blacks because of the
dominant position of the whites in the society." 3 16 These scholars thus advance an
economic principle to support Brown: "Because blacks are an economic minority, the
costs to them of the whites' prejudice are proportionately much greater than the costs
to the whites." '317
Law and economics scholars contend that so long as efficiency and self-
interested rationality embody important social norms, economics will be necessary to
"clarify value conflicts and to point the way toward reaching given social ends by the
most efficient path." 318 Even in cases involving public morality, economic scholars
offer a calculus which they claim can be useful for analyzing the costs of competing
moral choices. 319 Some argue that even if other noneconomic values are at stake, "a
judge may feel obligated to achieve legal objectives without wasting resources."320
Thus, "[t]he fact that legal officials are expected to pursue consistent ends by
efficient means implies (in their view) that there is broad scope for legal theory based
upon economic analysis." 32' Certainly, law and economics scholarship cannot be
found inappropriate merely because it provides a new cautionary basis for making
legal choices under scarcity.
CLS scholars raise yet another set of arguments questioning the existence of
so-called "objective interpretive methods" which liberal scholars such as Fiss claim
are essential for preserving a liberal public morality. Instead of evaluating whether
the social impact of their efforts maximizes the objectives of some objective program,
CRITS argue that legal academics must become actively involved in actually
313. Bell, Foreword, 61 OR. L. REv. 151 (1982). According to Bell, "[tlhe modern civil rights movement and its
ringing imperative, 'Ve Shall Overcome,' must be seen as part of the American racial fantasy." Bell, Foreword: The
Civil Rights Chronicles. 99 HARV. L. REv. 4. 10 (1985).
314. See Crenshaw, supra note 312 (demonstrating how antidiscrimination law represents "an ongoing ideological
struggle in which occasional winners harness the moral, coercive. consensual power of law." Id. at 1335.).
315. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 18, at 617-19.
316. Id. at 617.
317. Id. at 619.
318. Id. at 23.
319. Id. at 238. LE scholars argue that such moral principles as "honesty, truthfulness, frugality, trustworthiness
(as by keeping promises), consideration for others, charity, neighborliness, hard work, and avoidance of negligence and
of coercion" have "economic value." Id.
320, R. CoorER & T. ULN's, supra note 25. at 12.
321. Id.
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transforming the social and legal structures which deny real democratic decisionmak-
ing and justice. CRITS claim that theory cannot be separated from practice and that
a theoretical commitment to the equalitarian values of the Brown decision requires
political awareness of the relation between knowledge and politics. If CLS argu-
ments, raising fundamental questions about coherent interpretations of shared values
have any validity, then the legal process generation of liberal scholars must face what
these claims mean for their liberal vision of public morality under law. 322
Finally, Fiss must face the claims of feminists who assert that the legal
profession has entrenched male domination and power by failing to view gender
issues from the particular perspective of women.3 23 Feminist legal scholars argue that
mainstream legal thought advances and entrenches the ideals and values shared by
men, not women, under claims of universal law. Feminists, at least radical feminists,
seek to make law respect the fundamental differences between men and women by
emphasizing the value of difference, not shared values.
CLS and feminist scholars argue that there is a dialectical relationship between
law and values: that dreams and visions for a better world are shaped and limited by
the traditional legal discourse that denies the existence of difference as a social and
political force. Feminists argue that men seeing males and females as abstractions,
are kept within a legal philosophy proclaiming the necessity for domination and
power rather than the true reality of the "other" person. CLS scholars argue that elite
powerholders represent themselves as the group which claims to have the authority
under the "Rule of Law" to block or dominate alternative experiences and
understandings necessary for critical reflection and action. Both feminist and CLS
scholars ask: How can we expect to have shared experiences or understandings if only
one particular perspective is given the power and authority to define meaning?
Responding to the reactions of modern liberal scholars, the new critics challenge
the view that a public morality can be consistently and intelligently developed
through an objective interpretative legal process, uninfluenced by the particular
perspective of the law interpreter. The new critics challenge the assumption that
judges can discover shared values in a society where vast disparities of wealth and
power exist between social and economic classes. Some critics emphasize the cost of
making choices between alternative courses of action and the efficiency of choosing
one action over another. Some argue that a conception of public morality can be
defended, but only by utilizing different, more determinant methods. Others question
the belief that a community of law interpreters can be trusted with the absolute
322. See Peller, supra note 230. In order to judge the superiority of Fiss' theory of law and adjudication, one would
need to know who counts in determining shared values for the "larger role of law" he foresees for the profession. Do
we count the perspective and values of all groups in society or only those values and perspectives ofjudges, lawyers, law
professors, and other legal elites? If we count only the values of some sub-group within society, upon what basis can we
claim that law is based on a shared-value perspective? More generally, why should the perspectives of a legal elite be
authoritative over the perspectives of those at the margins of power? It is in the face of such questions, questions which
are inherent in the critique advanced by CLS, that Fiss' theory must ultimately respond to and resolve.
323. See. e.g., C. MAcKINNON, stpra note 5, at 137; West, supra note 2, at 58-68.
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authority to define public morality under law. 324 Still others wonder whether the very
idea of shared values, in denying the value of difference, is itself a dangerous idea for
those at the margins of power. Instead of offering pleas for shared values, these
scholars make pleas for disenchantment with the values that now dominate the legal
imagination. 325
In this important sense, Fiss is right to wonder if the new movements may
signify the death of the law as his generation has come to know it. What is unclear
is whether the death of an understanding of law which has dominated the legal
imagination of Fiss' generation is cause for celebration or concern. What is clear is
that the new movements in jurisprudence have successfully posed a serious challenge
to a concept of law which has dominated legal analysis for nearly three decades.
C. The Pleas for New Comprehensive or Comprehensible Discourses
Of course, the threat posed by the new academic movements has provoked
heated debate and controversy. Academic discussions about law have reached a new
level of heightened hyperbole as a result of the new forms of critical discourse. It
seems apparent that the legal academics are "more openly politicized and more
polarized than ever before." ,326 For some, the new developments in legal theory have
resulted in a "pseudocritical posturing" at the legal academy which has erupted into
a "shouting match pairing outrageous and self-congratulatory Chicagoan against
obscure and critical Ungero-Marxist. '"327 In reacting to the possibilities of sheer
incomprehensibility of different discourses, some legal scholars have called for the
creation of a new "constructive" or "comprehensible" discourse.
The plea for a comprehensive discourse has been raised by mainstream legal
scholars who complain that they are being incapacitated by "barriers of language and
intellectual style" erected by the new critics. 328 Martha Minow, for example, argues
that the new interdisciplinary movements in law are making it increasingly difficult
for members of the profession to speak together or to speak to members of other
disciplines. 329 Minow calls for a new "comprehensible discourse" which would
allow legal academics to engage in a public debate about their differences in
methodology and outlook.
324. Hence, some new critics argue that when Fiss claims that "the judge ... speaks with authority of the Pope,"
or when Dworkin asserts that "the courts are the capitals of law's empire, and the judges are its princes," the images of
absolute authority are neither "accidental nor hyperbolic flourish." J. Baken, Retreat to the Elite 4 (unpublished
manuscript). See also Singer, supra note 3. Singer argues that Fiss seeks to defend the idea that there is only one way
to think about questions of morality. Fiss' "rationalist approach says: Either you take my view-normative statements are
answers to problems that are solved by applying a 'universally accepted criterion' such as rational consensus or reasoned
elaboration of precedent-or you have rejected morality and reason altogether." Id. at 543.
325. See F. Michelman, supra note 311.
326. Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1985).
327. B. AcKansAN, supra note 3, at 44.
328. See, e.g., Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REv. 413, 416 n.6 (1984)
(commenting on "CLS theories and vocabulary"). See also Ulen, supra note 24, at 206 (arguing that "practitioners of
CLS have seemed to be talking only to each other speaking in tongues, as it were, intelligible only to the true believers"
(footnote omitted)). The problem of communication has also been raised in reaction to the new form of power-talk
associated with the law and economics movement. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 44-45.
329. Minow, supra note 2. at 95.
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In asserting her "feminist commitment to communication," Minow argues that
we need a new discourse which would "relinquish the claim of exclusive truth, and
[evince] a willingness to hear competing vantage points, all of which are partial." 330
She asserts that "[r]ather than creating some new distanced categories and methods
of legal analysis removed from popular understanding, legal scholars [should] look to
local, specific problems that crop up in their experiences" such as "problems
grounded in the experiences of particular groups, like women, or like the residents of
the Jamaica Plain area in Boston."- 33 1 Minow recommends dialogue, listening, and
efforts to make one's own claims comprehensible to others while advocating the
recognition of the inevitable partiality of one's own understanding and perspective.
The idea is that "legal scholarship should look outward by looking inward to how it
has insulated law from communication with nonlawyers, and cut off the sound of
legal meaning in people's daily lives." 332
Other legal academics have made proposals for the creation of a new compre-
hensive form of legal discourse. Bruce Ackerman, for example, recently argued that
the legal profession needs a "common language" that will enable its practitioners to
engage in a "main line of conversation in a more Constructive direction.' 333 Unlike
Minow, Ackerman calls for a new "technocratic" discourse to provide a new source
of authority and to stabilize the rhetoric of lawyers. Then, lawyers could "translate
their clients' grievances into a language that powerholders will find persuasive." 334
As it turns out, the new "common language" that Ackerman advocates is based at
least in part on the language of "law and economics." 335
These divergent proposals for a new common discourse suggest that the decision
to use a particular "descriptive" discourse, such as feminism, the discourse of
difference, or the language of law and economics, would be just as controversial and
perhaps as polarizing as the current substantive debate now being waged by different
discourses. Legal scholars probably could never agree on a common language
because whoever is allowed to define the official language for the profession will
have the power to entrench particular conceptions of law and adjudication.
Even a language that seeks to valorize difference may abuse the power to cut off
alternative conversations that may be necessary for presenting new and contrary
perceptions of the world. Martha Minow has recognized this danger in noting that
"[i]n critiques of the 'male' point of view and in celebrations of the 'female,'
feminists run the risk of treating particular experiences as universal and ignoring
differences of racial, class, religious, ethnic, national, and other situated
330. Id. at 97.
331. Id. at 99.
332. Id.
333. B. ACKERtAN, supra note 3, at 44-45.
334. Id. at 3.
335. Id. at 42. Ackerman argues that there are two structures to his new discourse: one for establishing "facts"; the
other for establishing "values." Id. at 45. The language of law and economics would be used to determine facts, and
common discourse of the "people" would be used to determine "values." Id. at 29, 79-80. See also Peller, supra note
326, at 867-68. "Ackerman's strategy for the liberal reformist center is to incorporate conservative law-and-economies
discourse into the 'main line of conversation' for the legal description of facts yet preserve traditional liberal discourse
for the discussion of values." Id at 869_
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experiences. "336 Of course, the same danger exists with critiques of CLS which come
close to asserting that a particular contradiction in legal thought is "fundamental"
and hence is the universal basis for critiquing American law. There seems to be a
common tendency within the new jurisprudential movements to privilege a particular
perspective as "truth" and thereby repeat the mistakes these movements have
identified in mainstream legal thought. Indeed, the tendency to privilege some view
as the universal view for understanding the world may be a powerful tendency
affecting all perspectives. 337
The call for new comprehensive or comprehensible forms of legal discourse will
probably never escape the very conflict it is designed to avoid. The notion of a pure
descriptive discourse for communication is itself subject to the fact that social power
is always at stake, that change can only come about through struggle and conflict, and
that "there is no such metadiscourse that is itself immune to being placed within its
particular 'interpretative framework.' "338 The fact that someone or some group has
the power to define the acceptable standards of professional discourse too often
remains submerged, unexpressed, and unappreciated. If different languages and
perspectives are allowed to coexist and compete, then perhaps other perspectives can
be acknowledged and appreciated, or at least tolerated. If there is a single lesson to
be gleaned from the new jurisprudential movements of the 1980s, it is that method
itself is ideological and political; that there is no escape from the link between law and
politics.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the methods and approaches of law and economics, critical legal studies,
and feminist legal theory are not beyond criticism, neither are they responsible for
creating what even mainstream legal scholars have recognized as the "current
malaise" in mainstream scholarship and legal theory.339 The competition between the
new movements in jurisprudence and the controversy that they have sparked with the
old can be understood as part of an ongoing intellectual struggle now being waged by
new critical discourses offering new ways for understanding law and new methods for
utilizing that understanding. The debate generated by the new "movements" in legal
theory has relevance to an older debate involving some of the central questions raised
by the legal realists concerning the nature of power and meaning and the role of law
in American society. This debate also raises new theoretical questions concerning the
limits of scientific reasoning, rational investigation, and the relationship between
knowledge and power.
336. Minow. supra note 16, at 47-48. Indeed, Minow acknowledges that the problem of mediating between
different discourses and perspectives renders the idea of a universal discourse difficult, if not impossible. See Minow,
supra note 5. at 92-93. See also Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600-01 (1988).
337. Minow suggests that this tendency is the product of "our attraction to simplifying categories, our own
psychodynamic development, our unconscious attachment to stereotypes, and our participation in a culture in which
contests over powcr include contests over what version of reality prevails." Id. at 51.
338. Peller, supra note 326, at 880-81.
339. For a discussion of the current "crisis" in legal scholarship and legal theory, see Contemporary Legal Theory
Symposium, 36 J. LEGAL EDLc. 441 (1986).
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The new trends in legal scholarship may be developing because the prevailing
visions of the 1950s and 1960s no longer adequately explain or justify the operation
and conflict of everyday social life occurring in the marketplace, the workplace, and
the family. 340 New sources of images and visions of the world appear necessary when
mainstream legal theory becomes divorced from the realities of a world plagued by
cultural differences and a multiplicity of societal factions.
The belief in a shared political consensus might have seemed sensible and
appropriate in the 1950s when the legal process school was established. Nevertheless,
such a belief is "oddly out of touch" with the realities of the judicial activism of the
1960s and the social events following the Vietnam War and Watergate. 34 1 The law,
like society, is now comprised of a wide spectrum of conflicting views which, as
Judge Posner has noted, "runs from Marxism, feminism, and left-wing nihilism and
anarchism on the left to economic and political libertarianism and Christian
fundamentalism on the right. ' 342 As the debate over abortion rights now vividly
illustrates, we no longer live in a legal world of shared values where one legal theory
or moral conception can hope to command widespread allegiance. 343
Perhaps the need for a persuasive explanation of how the world works is
responsible for the birth of new trends in legal jurisprudence. In arguing for an
340. A number of explanations have been advanced to explain the development of the jurisprudential movement of
the 1980s. See Minow, supra note 2. One "simple explanation" may have to do with the fact that "the job market for
Ph.D's has constricted dramatically in the last 15 years." Id. at 91. Ph.D.s who could no longer find jobs in the social
sciences were forced to retool their skills in law school. Minow suggests that as some of these peoplejoined law faculties,
they "brought with them questions and methods of inquiry common in nonlegal disciplines, and subjected law to
scrutiny." Id. An alternative explanation stems from the fact that there is a "lag-time before the ideas from academic
study permeates the rest of society-including law." Id. at 91-92. The lag-time is "the time it takes for those ideas to
be taught to undergraduates who enter other fields, and this lag-time has been met by efficiency-oriented economies,
post-World War II continental philosophy and social theory, and post-modern literary interpretation." Id.
Yet another "simple explanation" focuses on the "group biographies" of the scholars who have identified with each
movement. Minow notes that the personal experiences of members of each group (especially CLS) were "forged in the
political upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s with questions about what then makes law legitimate for resolving disputes and
maintaining order." Id. at 92. See also Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in TiHE PoLrrIcs OF LAw 281, 282-84
(D. Kaiys ed. 1982).
There is an even deeper explanation for why these new trends in legal theory are occurring now. Behind each new
movement is the legacy of the legal realist movement and its revolt against formalism and conceptualism in legal thought.
As Minow has observed, it was the legal realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s that caused the "fissures in the legal
edifice troubling contemporary scholars" ever since. Minow, supra note 2, at 92. Law and economics, CLS, and feminist
legal theory can be understood as the heirs of an earlier oppositional academic movement which has profoundly challenged
"law's foundation in knowable truth, objectively determinable rights, and reliably applied precedents." Id. at 93. The
legal process movement of the 1950s was an attempt to respond to the criticism of the legal realists by substituting
"objectivity of process" for "objectivity of doctrine." See White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 649, 663 (1984).
341. See, e.g., White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59
VA. L. REv. 279, 291-302 (1973); White, supra note 340, at 659-60. The myth of a national consensus was "forever
shattered" by the Vietnam War and the realities of American society in the years following Vietnam. See Binder, supra
note 10, at 16-18. "The experience of the Vietnam years fundamentally altered [Americans'] conceptions of the state,
the national political community, the role of the intellectual, and the process of social change. " Id. at 16. Of particular
significance was the economic stagnation following the war and the black "ghettoization" of American cities. Id. at 18.
More than anything else, the urban riots of the late sixties ended the idea that Black Americans shared a consensus with
the rest of America. "The looting and burning that characterized these riots primarily targeted exploitative white owned
businesses. It was, in short, political protest." Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
342. Posner, supra note 2, at 766.
343. For a description of the world which has dominated the thinking of mainstream legal scholars, see D. BELL,
THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1960).
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL MOVEMENTS
economic approach to legal decisionmaking, law and economics scholars have been
successful in advancing the idea that it makes sense for judges to consider the
opportunity cost of their decisions, that in the real world there is "scarcity," and that
legal actors, like people generally, tend to engage in "self-interested conduct."
These scholars have also advocated a new economic "metric" for making choices
* about sharply divided public policies that accept and respond to the modern realities
of scarcity, choice, and trade-offs. 344 While some may find the underlying values of
law and economics distasteful, disagree with its underlying assumptions, or reject
some of its advocates' empirical assertions, it is difficult to ignore the reality of an
approach cognizant that in a world of scarcity, trade-offs are inevitable and that
"judicial decisions create, transfer, or destroy valuable things and affect people's
decisions.' 345
Critical legal and feminist scholars offer yet another message about law and
adjudication. These scholars have fueled a deep skepticism about the possibility of
authoritative and rational interpretations of legal texts. 346 The arguments of these
critics are bound to be unsettling to both traditional liberal and modern law and
economics scholars. If CLS and feminist claims about the limits of scientific
reasoning and rational discourse are correct, then much of the current thinking about
law and adjudication would be placed in jeopardy by a crisis transcending law and
questioning the distinction between rationality and politics. What critical legal and
feminist scholars have been successful in doing is advancing a "new realism" about
the way knowledge and power are reproduced and reinforced by professional
discourse and in advancing a better understanding of the choices available for
establishing the quality of life we want to live.
The new jurisprudential movements have already made significant contributions
which will have lasting consequences for the future development of legal theory and
practice. It is, of course, too early to predict the resolution of the current paradigm
conflicts. One possibility is that one of the new movements, or perhaps a combination
of two or all three, will emerge as the dominant jurisprudential perspective, thereby
replacing the prevailing jurisprudential views of mainstream legal scholars. Move-
ments toward partnerships and synthesis seem likely. Critical legal studies and the
feminist legal theory movement have already begun to develop a partnership of sorts
which may yield a new form of legal criticism built on the strengths of each. 347 It is
not inconceivable that a synthesis may also develop between progressive strands of
the L/E movement and CLS.348
344. As one leading law and economic scholar has proclaimed:
we get nowhere by listing values unless we have both a metric by which to assess the claims the parties make
and a legitimate rule of decision. Economic analysis sometimes suggests a metric and a rule of decision; a list
of values along with an aspiration to improve life in all its fullness does not.
Easterbrook, supra note 254, at 626.
345. Id. at 622.
346. Posner, supra note 2, at 768.
347. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
348. Indeed, there is now room within both the L/E and CLS movements for a more critical form of law and
economics, one which develops a theory of law from a deeper understanding of ideology, or one which develops concepts
from the philosophical traditions associated with Hegel or Marx. However, a synthesis may mean dilution of the
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Another possibility is that the movements of the 1980s will themselves be
absorbed into a new reconstructed jurisprudence developed from prevailing jurispru-
dential perspectives of mainstreamers. For example, a new breed of legal scholar has
recently appeared on the academic scene proclaiming to have developed a new
high-tech theory of legal process for approaching public law and statutory interpre-
tation problems. 349 This New Legal Process builds on the theories of the older legal
process by incorporating elements of public choice theory of law and economics and
the critical interpretative methods of CLS into a more realistic understanding of
legislation. 350 Other ambitious legal scholars have attempted to develop a new liberal
conception of civic virtue as an alternative to the possessive individualism of
mainstream Lockean liberalism. 35 1 It is far from clear whether the New Legal Process
approach to legislation will establish a reconstructed form of legal process. It is also
doubtful that a new liberalism developed from universal civic virtues could ever hope
to overcome the criticism of the new movements while defending the basic tenets of
a universal and politically impartial legal theory. What does seem certain, however,
is that the attitudes and perspectives of mainstream legal scholars will be forever
affected by the challenge posed by the critics of the new movements.
Whether law and economics, critical legal studies, or feminist legal theory are
to be praised, condemned, or replaced by new forms of "discourse" will depend
upon how successful these movements are in hastening the death, not of law, but
rather of the particular methods legal scholars have traditionally employed in thinking
about their subject. The proliferation of new forms of competing discourses, the
willingness of some to try new methods, and the expression of discontent and
resistance signify neither the end of professional discourse nor law as we have known
it-all may simply be symptomatic of change from the old to the new. 352
distinctive nature of the claims now made within each movement. The risk inherent in synthesis is the possible extinction
or absorption of the separate character of a particular movement. See Minow, supra note 2, at 99. Whether the new
movements result in revolution, or merely modification of the prevailing legal paradigm, may depend upon the ability of
each movement to maintain its distinctively critical edge.
349. See Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era. 48 Prrr. L.
REV. 691 (1987) (developing a new theory for reading statutes and understanding legislative lawmaking). See also
Froomkin, supra note 310 (reviewing W. ESKRtDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGtsLAToN: STAIUES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)).
350. The New Legal Process approach to legislation is based on the view that "lawmaking is a process of value
creation that should be informed by theories of justice and fairness . . . that legislation too often fails to achieve this
aspiration and that creative lawmaking by courts and agencies is needed to ensure rationality and justice in law. A final
theme is the importance of dialogue or conversation as the means by which innovative lawmaking can be validated in a
democratic policy and by which the rule of law can best be defended against charges of unfairness or illegitimacy."
Froomkin, supra note 310, at 1088 (citing J. KiNODON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND Pu3uc POLICIES 330-31 (1984)).
The term New Legal Process was first coined by Weisberg in The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 237-49 (1983).
351. See Sunstein, stpra note 253.
352. See, e.g., T. KuHN, supra note I, at 91.
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